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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 25

JULY-DEC. 1929

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XXV

JULY TO DECEMBER 1929

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Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XXV.

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

No. 1.

[E 3297/2322/91]

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received June 29.)(No. 98.)
(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, June 29, 1929.

WHILE Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that severe defeat has been inflicted on Ajman tribe and its adherents, and that several of their leaders have been killed, my information, however, is to the effect that these tribes have extended their field of operations and have succeeded in cutting communications between Riyadh and Hassa.

Amongst his own local sympathisers Ibn Saud's position, both in the Hejaz and in the north, is considered to be somewhat serious.

Ataiba tribes are reported to be collecting at Ruqba, on Mecca-Riyadh road, and the King has been rushing numbers of troops to concentration camp north of Taif in order to deal with the situation. It is reported that some fighting has already taken place.

There is also good evidence to show that the King is concentrating another force at Henakiya, north-east of Medina.

Motor cars, lorries and drivers are being commandeered wholesale in Jedda and Mecca, and are being sent to both camps with troops.

The King is leaving Mecca for Riyadh to-day, having delayed his departure, it is said, owing to insecurity of the road and necessity for collecting a large force to accompany him.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, Bagdad, Koweit, Government of India, No. 136.)

No. 2.

[E 3449/94/91]

Mr. Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 9.)(No. 133.)
Sir,

Jeddah, June 7, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to 31st May, 1929.

2. Copies of this report have been sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Simla, Singapore, Khartum through Port Sudan, Lagos (2), the senior naval officer, Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c.

H. G. JAKINS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

Jeddah Report for the Period May 1 to 31, 1929.

AFTER many delays which gave rise to doubts as to the success of his military activities in Nejd, Ibn Saud arrived in Jeddah on the 7th May by way of Medina. His Majesty did not enter the town, and fewer people than ever took the trouble to walk outside the walls to welcome him. The King left the same day for Mecca, and returned at 6 A.M. on the 11th May to hold the usual official reception. His Majesty showed during his short stay in Jeddah that his vigour was unimpaired, and that battle had not robbed him of his smile, his wealth of gesture or his love of sermonising. I am told that in Mecca there has been a change in his demeanour, and that he has openly recalled, for his own encouragement, the worst of his campaigning days, when he had to wash his own shirt and had only dates to eat. It is not perhaps surprising that, with, on the one hand, Yusuf Yasin and Fuad Hamza, and, on the other hand, Indian agitators, such as Ismail Ghaznavi and Moulvi Obeidullah, whose common obsession is the oppressive imperialism of His Majesty's Government, Ibn Saud finds the atmosphere of Mecca depressing. There may be deeper reasons for his change of humour. The story is circulating that a returning Nejd pilgrim caravan was attacked by the Ataibah, and that feeling is running very high over the "treacherous" manner in which Faisal-ed-Doweish (who is still said to be at large) and Ibn Bujad were attacked. Restiveness is reported from the Shammar and from the Beni Shehr (south-east of Taif), and it is said that the King is being urged to release Ibn Bujad in the hope of quietening unrest.

2. The "Um-el-Qura" has given some interesting extracts from various speeches made by His Majesty since his return to the Hejaz. In one he is reported to have referred to the hopelessness of attempting to compete in force with the preparations made by European nations against Moslems. For every aeroplane or ship the one could build the other could build hundreds. Allah alone could be their aid. On another occasion he is reported to have said that Moslems gave him more cause for fear than foreigners. A foreigner alone in the midst of Moslems could achieve nothing. It was by the Moslem, who, for private gain, was willing to help the foreigner, that foreign penetration prospered. The present Islamic need was for unity. On this same question of unity another report quotes the King as saying that it was incorrect and malicious propaganda to refer to the Wahabis as a special sect. Mohammed-bin-Abd-el-Wahab created nothing new. Their belief and that for which Abd-el-Wahab stood was that of their ancestors with no differentiation in respect for the four great Imams. The pains and evils, loss of power and dignity which had fallen on Moslems arose from their neglect of the Koran and the traditions. Their safety, success and happiness in both worlds lay in returning to religion. Elsewhere he said that the people of the present day, whether they wished it or not, were compelled to accept Western civilisation. His Majesty did not object to new ideas provided they did not clash with religious beliefs. He counselled the ready acceptance of any material advantage available in order to resist those who might wish to harm them. He urged, however, a strict adherence to Arab clothes and customs, which were associated with manliness, dignity and the other virtues of rough Arab life. Imitation of Europeans was not progress, but led to the adoption of the evils of modern civilisation and to the loss of Moslem character, habit and spiritual and national principles. He himself had often been pressed to visit Europe, but would not go because his only tastes were for the Arab life to which he had always been accustomed. The title of King and the glory of sovereignty were nothing to him, who considered himself, without distinction, one of the people of the country.

3. On the 8th May the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs was charged to state that in pursuit of offenders a Nejd punitive expedition was moving towards Iraq and Koweit. His Majesty feared that the pursued might be guilty of hostile acts in the neighbourhood of the frontiers, and he therefore requested that if they attempted to cross the frontiers they should be resisted. His Majesty is stated to have left the maintenance of peace in Nejd to isolated detachments under his brother Abdulla, Ibn Musaad, Emir of Hail, Abdulla Jelawi, Emir of Hasa, and Jelawi's son, Fahad. During an attack on his camp, the latter and Ibn Hithlain (Ajman), whom he is supposed to have taken prisoner, were both killed. It is said that on hearing this news Abdulla Jelawi massacred all the Ajman he could find in

Hasa, and that, as he would not listen to the King's words of restraint, the King's brothers, Abdulla and Mohammed, were sent to persuade him. His Majesty has commented on the presence of Farhan-bin-Mashur and some Ghut Ghut tribesmen in Koweit territory, whither he states they had retired for food-stuff and equipment with the loot taken from Iraq tribes. He maintained that he could not inflict punishment on raiders if they were allowed to take refuge in and obtain their supplies from Koweit. He therefore asked for their ejection. His Majesty was formally assured that all advances made by Nejd tribesmen concerned in the recent unprovoked attacks on Iraq to the Administrative Inspector of the Iraq Southern Desert Area for shelter had been sternly repulsed, and that the Iraq Government intended to resist any attempt to enter Iraq. In expressing his gratification at the attitude of the inspector, His Majesty asked that sanctuary might be refused to all Nejdīs without discrimination. Farhan-bin-Mashur was subsequently induced by the Sheikh of Koweit to return to Nejd, an act for which Ibn Saud expressed his thanks, urging at the same time that offenders should not be allowed to draw supplies from Iraq or Koweit.

4. On the score of his troubles in and about Hasa, Ibn Saud asked His Majesty's Government to supply him with 3,000 rifles and 3 million rounds of ammunition to be landed at Uqair. The Government of India found that they had 2,700 rifles and the required ammunition immediately available, and the Hejaz Government placed a formal order accordingly. At the time of his request for arms, Ibn Saud also asked that a British troopship might be placed at his disposal to convey 1,000 troops immediately from Jeddah to Hasa. Sheikh Fuad explained this curious request by saying that transport by sea would not present to the Hejaz Government the same problem of transport as the conveyance of 1,000 men by land, and that His Majesty wished to send the troops he had in the Hejaz, as there was some risk that a detachment sent from Nejd would include close relations of the rebellious tribesmen and some strain consequently be put on their fidelity. His Majesty's Government stated that no British troopship was available, and, after the Hejaz Government had approached every British shipping agent in Jeddah for a suitable vessel, Fuad Hamza announced that troops had been sent from Riyadh, and sea transport would not therefore be required. It has been suggested to me that the publicity given to this matter is intended to produce an effect in Nejd similar to that produced in the Hejaz during the last Wahabi invasion, when the appearance of a British Indian pilgrim ship in Yambo harbour convinced the surrounding tribesmen that Ibn Saud had the complete support of His Majesty's Government, and thus induced them to range themselves definitely on the side of Ibn Saud against the sherifs.

5. Ibn Saud has expressed his appreciation of the personal message conveyed to him from His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan on the subject of the arrest of Auda-el-Etna, and his hope that this disturber of the Transjordan-Nejd frontiers will soon be brought to book.

6. On the other hand, it is claimed that the narrative of the death of Enad-bin-Jumaian has been distorted. The sheikh was held as a hostage for the restitution of the plunder he had taken from Tebuk, but that, instead of restoring the loot, his party attempted his rescue by force of arms and Enad was accidentally killed by a stray bullet of his own companions.

7. There has been a lull so far as the lodging of protests against raids on the Transjordan-Hejaz frontier is concerned. On the other hand, no progress has been made in securing Ibn Saud's unqualified acceptance of the proposal of His Majesty's Government to refer past claims to arbitration. The King was informed that the conditions put forward by His Majesty's Government were expressly framed to cover the objections put forward by His Majesty to Sir Gilbert Clayton on the subject of claims not formally lodged by Transjordan. If the King insisted on the elimination of unregistered claims, the whole proposal might have to be abandoned and the existing unsatisfactory situation on the frontier would become worse. His Majesty's mistrust of the responsible authorities in Transjordan is, however, such that he wishes to have nothing to do with arbitration but to refer the respective claims of both sides to His Majesty's Government for decision.

8. The pilgrimage culminated on the 19th May in the assembly of 200,000 at Arafat—or so the "Um-el-Qura" would have us believe. The final figures of arrivals by sea are given as 90,000. The remainder, it is explained, walked overland. The record numbers so facily reached are attributed to the excellence of the arrangements made for the comfort of pilgrims.

9. Supplementary articles of the regulation on the press and printing appended to the report for the month of April are now attached.

10. Mr. W. L. Bond has been appointed His Britannic Majesty's agent and consul at this post in succession to Mr. F. H. W. Stonehewer-Bird.

11. During the period under review one slave applied to this agency for repatriation and was sent to his home by way of Suakin.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

Regulations on the Press and Printing—(continued)*

14. No permission will be granted to the applicant unless he himself is responsible for the paper or has appointed a responsible manager. In case he himself is a responsible manager, he should comply with the conditions mentioned in article 16.

15. The applicant (holder of the licence) should pay a cash deposit of £100 to the Treasury for every political magazine or newspaper, and £50 for every scientific magazine which he is granted a licence to publish.

16. The responsible director of the newspaper and the magazine must be one of His Majesty's subjects and should be over 20 years of age. He must not have been deprived of his civil rights, or have been sentenced for a crime arising out of bad conduct or dishonest practice, and he should be a graduate of a high school or have studied in various schools and acquired knowledge equivalent to that of a graduate.

17. Any paper or magazine published before compliance with all the conditions contained in these regulations will be made to cease publication at once, and the proprietor and the printer will be fined from £5 to £25; for a second offence the fine will be doubled and they will be imprisoned for a period of from seven days to a month.

18. Anyone giving false details when applying for a licence will be liable to the same punishment as that mentioned in article 17.

19. It is forbidden for the name of another paper to be used in such a way as to cause confusion, unless fifteen years have elapsed from the date on which the first one ceased publication, or unless one year has passed from the date on which the licence was issued without publication having subsequently been proceeded with.

20. When the responsible director resigns, the Government must be informed accordingly and another director must be appointed within a fortnight from the date on which the first resigned. If the paper is published during that period, the holder of the licence will be considered responsible for complying with the above-mentioned conditions, or will have to appoint a responsible director.

21. Every director responsible for a newspaper must forward two copies to the highest administrative official of the place where the paper is issued, and two to the Press Department at Mecca. In case of failure to send them, the director responsible will be fined from £1 to £5 for every number of which he failed to send copies as above.

22. Newspapers must not publish false or garbled news. If they do so, they will be warned the first time, and the second time fined from £5 to £10.

23. The responsible director should publish free of charge, at the head of the next number of the newspaper or of the periodical circulars, all corrections sent to him by one of the representatives of the general authorities concerning his duties. If the director fails to do so he will be fined from £5 to £10. He must also publish the replies sent to him by individuals against whom anything untrue may have been alleged in the same newspaper or circular, and if he fails to publish them he will be fined from £1 to £5 besides any punishment that may be imposed by the Government.

24. Newspapers should not publish anything which encourages conduct affecting public morals or leads to superstition, heterodoxy or heresy. If they do so, they will be fined from £5 to £10 or the directors will be imprisoned for a period of from a week to one month. In case such publications affect the general welfare, the paper will be stopped and the people responsible will be imprisoned from a month to one year and fined from £10 to £50.

25. Newspapers should not publish private correspondence exchanged between ordinary people, or official papers belonging to the Government, except with written

* See May 27, Section 1, Enclosure 2.

permission, and in case they publish anything of this sort without special permission, the proprietor or the director responsible will be fined from £5 to £25.

26. The object of the newspapers, circulars and books must be to urge virtues and to advise adherence to religion and good conduct, and the abandoning of vice and undesirable habits.

27. Newspapers should not publish anything that affects the honour or the credit of anyone. Criticism should be in accordance with the rules of polite discussion.

28. It is forbidden to import newspapers, circulars and books which lead to:—

- (a.) Heterodoxy and superstition.
- (b.) Heresy and praise of vice.
- (c.) Which affect the interests of the country and the Government.

Anyone who ventures to bring in any such publication will be warned the first time, punished by confiscation and fined £5 for a second offence.

Section 4.

29. Everyone dealing in books of any kind, newspapers, magazines, circulars, pictures or portraits, whether he has a shop or sells them in his house, or is a hawker, should apply to the Press Department to have his name registered.

30. Everyone carrying on the sale of books as described in the previous article should forward to the Press Department, during a period of not more than forty-five days from the date of the entry into force of this regulation, a list of the books and printed matter in his possession for sale to the public, and should also forward a list of the new books, circulars and the newspapers which he receives from abroad for sale.

31. Anyone failing to comply with the previous articles will be fined £5.

32. Anyone who sells, distributes or circulates books and newspapers will be termed a "bookseller," which is the name to be given to anyone who follows this calling, whether in a definite place or whether he carries them round with him in the market place.

33. The application of the articles contained in this regulation is included within the province of the courts of first instance.

34. All previous regulations and instructions will be considered as cancelled from the date of the enforcement of this regulation.

35. This regulation will be considered as taking effect after one month from the date of its publication.

36. The Viceroy has to see this regulation executed and should give the necessary instructions for carrying it out.

[E 3370/1822/91]

No. 3.

Mr. Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 135.)
Sir,

Jeddah, June 8, 1929.

I HAVE read with interest the report No. 5 of the 4th December, 1928, made by the commanding officer of H.M.S. "Dahlia" to the Commander-in-chief of His Majesty's ships and vessels in the Mediterranean, on the subject of slave trade in the Red Sea, a copy of which was enclosed in your printed despatch No. 43 of the 1st March, and venture to offer the following observations on Commander Cotton's concluding general remarks:—

2. It is commonly accepted in Jeddah and Mecca that, within the past two or more years, the import of slaves into this country has diminished considerably. The slave market has in consequence become almost entirely confined to persons of long residence in Arabia. Occasionally, children of domiciled slaves are offered for sale, but, as I had recently occasion to verify from a Malay pilgrim who hoped to secure two slaves and return with them to Malaya, only old slaves are for the most part available. The French delegate, who is annually sent to reside at Mecca for the whole pilgrimage season and has an intimate acquaintance with the life of the town and its citizens, recently informed me, as a rare item of interest, of the sale of an Abyssinian girl at the significant figure of £136.

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B 3

3. I do not share the opinion that the principal factor in the trade is the pilgrimage. Isolated cases have been brought to my notice of pilgrims travelling alone on foot who have been set upon by Bedouins and sold into slavery, but incidents of this nature are not of recent occurrence, nor is their repetition likely in the absolute security of the pilgrim ways enjoyed under the present régime. Similarly, it is difficult to continue to accept at its original value the report of the sale by indigent parents of their offspring. Parents will, of course, give a daughter in marriage for a good monetary consideration, but transactions of this nature do not fall under the heading of slave trade. The few cases of the sale of children into slavery are of old standing, and refer, rather, to the disposal of children entrusted to guardians. With the increasing control exercised by the neighbouring pilgrimage authorities, I see no reason why sales of this nature should not cease entirely, if they have not already done so.

4. I believe reports of the presence of convoys of slaves in the interior of Arabia, if by that expression Nejd is intended, to be unfounded. In my opinion, the general movement of slaves into the Hejaz is from the south. It has its source in the Yemen, where the economic pressure of an unsettled situation appears to be leading to a general disposal of superfluous slaves, and is fed by occasional cargoes landed in the southern half of the Red Sea coast.

5. I have sent a copy of this despatch to the commissioner for Port Sudan and to the senior naval officer, His Majesty's sloops in the Red Sea.

I have, &c.

H. G. JAKINS.

[E 3373/3/91]

No. 4.

Mr. Jakins to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 138.)

HIS Majesty's acting agent and consul at Jeddah presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him a note to the Acting Hejaz Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the interpretation of article 6 of the Bahra Agreement.

Jeddah, June 9, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Mr. Jakins to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mecca.

(After compliments.)

Your Excellency,

Jeddah, June 9, 1929.

WITH reference to the question of the interpretation placed by His Britannic Majesty's Government on article 6 of the Bahra Agreement, I am directed to confirm the statements made to your Excellency by Mr. Stonehewer-Bird on his return from leave in January last that the article in question contemplated raids and the pursuit of raiders across the frontier, and that it did not contemplate incursions on a vast scale amounting to armed attacks; that His Britannic Majesty's Government was not limiting the scope of article 6, but was providing against two eventualities which were not contemplated under that article:—

- (1.) An organised attack in force, which His Majesty was unwilling to prevent, *i.e.*, an aggression amounting in fact to an act of war; and
- (2.) An incursion which His Majesty was unable to prevent, *i.e.*, an aggression resulting in a revolt against His Majesty's authority;

and that it was in these special circumstances only that His Britannic Majesty's Government reserved the right of pursuit over the border.

2. I am now to explain that the statement in the letter which, as your Excellency is aware, His Majesty was pleased to address to me on the 23rd January last to the effect that His Britannic Majesty's Government are now attempting to attach a condition to their undertaking to be bound by the article does not correctly represent the position. On the contrary, His Britannic Majesty's Government have assured the Hejaz Government that they intend to observe the provisions of that article, and they recognise that British forces in Iraq, as well as Iraqi forces, are

covered by its terms. The position is, indeed, that His Britannic Majesty's Government have every intention and desire to observe the provisions of the article, and will naturally continue to do so, so long as a normal situation exists. They have, however, thought it only fair to warn the Hejaz Government that in the event of a situation of grave danger to Iraq being brought about by the actual occurrence of a serious attack on a large scale against a township in Iraq, or of continuous raiding by Nejd tribes, which the Hejaz Government prove unable to prevent or punish, His Britannic Majesty's Government must reserve their liberty of action and their right to take the necessary measures against those guilty of the attack, if this should prove, in their opinion, the only means of defending the Iraq tribes, for whose safety they are responsible, from further aggression. If, however, the Hejaz Government would establish the same degree of control over their tribes as has recently been enforced by the Iraq Government, who have effectively restrained their tribes from raiding Nejd, there would be no occasion for British forces to cross the frontier in any circumstances, and thus no hesitation on the part of His Britannic Majesty's Government in falling in with the wishes of the Hejaz Government in the matter of article 6 of the Bahra Agreement.

(Respects.)

H. G. JAKINS.

[E 3391/2322/91]

No. 5.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 102.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, July 4, 1929.

MY telegram No. 98 of 29th June.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and official communiqué confirm report of defeat of Ajman and Ibn Mashhur at Al Rida.

News of this, coupled with extensive preparations made by Ibn Saud to ensure his safe journey to Riyadh, should have had a salutary effect, and there is no further news of trouble with Ataibah tribe.

King is still concentrating troops north of Medina, and in last five days has placed order with local British firm for 5,500 cases of benzine for immediate delivery at Jeddah and Rabegh.

(Repeated to Cairo, Jerusalem, Bagdad, Koweit and Government of India, No. 144.)

[E 3456/821/91]

No. 6.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 148.)

Sir,

Jeddah, June 19, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that two days after my arrival in Jeddah His Majesty King Ibn Saud came down from Mecca for a final visit before his imminent return to Nejd and Hasa.

2. Having presented my credentials to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs when I first called at the Jeddah office of the Ministry, I was received by His Majesty on the 16th June. I was in uniform, and was accompanied by Mr. Vice-Consul Jakins. Sheikh Fuad Hamza and Sheikh Yusef Yasin were with the King.

3. I felt that the occasion and the general situation required some sort of formal address, and I therefore read to His Majesty the address of which I have the honour to enclose a copy. An Arabic translation, which I had previously had prepared for the benefit of Ibn Saud, followed immediately.

4. His Majesty, in reply, expressed his conviction that the excellent relations which had always existed between him and His Majesty's Government would continue to be founded on the basis of the utmost cordiality. He referred with appreciation to Mr. Stonehewer-Bird's work in Jeddah and, while expressing regret at his departure, was pleased to assure me of his conviction that my stay in his dominions would serve to strengthen the bonds of friendship, understanding and co-operation between our two nations.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

[21087]

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Enclosure in No. 6.

Address delivered to Ibn Saud by Mr. Bond on June 16, 1929.

Your Majesty,

HIS Majesty King George V, King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, my August Sovereign, has deigned to appoint me to be his diplomatic agent and consul in the territories of your Majesty.

Your Majesty will recollect that Mr. Stonehewer-Bird, whom I have the honour to succeed, was unfortunately called away by serious family illness from the execution of his duties here. He has since been instructed to proceed to India, where he is to confer with the Government of India, who have appointed a special commission to examine the means whereby greater facilities and better conditions may be provided for British Indian Moslems to perform the pilgrimage. In this task he will, I am sure, be inspired by the attention and devotion to the pilgrims' interests which have been your Majesty's especial care.

I assume my task in the conviction that the very special relations which have always existed between His Britannic Majesty's Government and that of your Majesty, and which bind the two nations together now more strongly than ever with bonds of friendship and with the ties of common interests, will continue to be inspired by the utmost cordiality, and I crave that the full measure of the Royal confidence which your Majesty has been pleased to bestow on the British representatives in the past may now be extended to me.

[E 3458/2479/91]

No. 7.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 150.)

Sir,

Jeddah, June 19, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 54 of the 18th May, the Acting Hejaz Minister for Foreign Affairs was asked to produce a memorandum setting forth the precise points His Majesty King Ibn Saud wished to raise in connexion with the Persian Gulf.

2. In his reply, a translation of which is attached, Sheikh Fuad Hamza states that the questions His Majesty wishes to raise are:—

- (1.) Customs and transit dues collected in Bahrein on goods imported into Nejd.
- (2.) Certain points relating to the nationality and passports of Hejaz-Nejd subjects in the Persian Gulf.
- (3.) The position of Ibn Saud's agents in Bahrein and Koweit.

3. This note is couched, as was his previous verbal communication, in the vaguest terms, and throws little further light on the points previously raised. I am transmitting it, however, as the bag leaves to-day, and I shall not have an opportunity of clearing the matter up with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

4. The questions were not brought up for discussion during the course of His Majesty's short visit here. He left Jeddah yesterday for Mecca, and is expected to proceed thence in a few days' time to Riyadh and Hasa, where he will presumably remain until next spring.

5. It might therefore, under the circumstances, be as well to leave matters as they are, unless Sheikh Fuad returns to the charge, and I propose to await your instructions before taking any further action.

6. A copy of this despatch and its enclosure has been sent to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, the Political Resident, Bushire, the Political Agent, Koweit, and the Political Agent, Bahrein.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 7.

Fuad Hamza to Mr. Jakins.

(Translation.)

Dear Mr. Jakins,

June 12, 1929.

I HAVE received your letter of the 30th May last, concerning the British Government's having under consideration the questions which His Majesty my Lord the King wishes to be studied regarding the Persian Gulf. In compliance with your desire as indicated by you I have to inform you that the questions which His Majesty would like to raise are:—

1. The customs dues and transit dues which the Government of Bahrein collect on goods imported into Nejd.
2. Certain points relating to the nationality and passports of His Majesty's subjects in the Persian Gulf.
3. The position of His Majesty's agents both in Bahrein and Koweit.

With highest respects.

Yours sincerely,

FUAD HAMZA.

[E 3459/821/91]

No. 8.

Mr. Bond to Foreign Office.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 151.)

Sir,

Jedda, June 19, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a copy of a note, with translation, received from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that the Hejaz Government has decided to establish a Legation in London and to propose the name of Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, His Majesty's adviser, to be His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in London.

2. The Hejaz Government hopes that the British Government will shortly decide, on its part, similarly to raise the status of its agency to that of a Legation.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

P.S.—Sheikh Fuad tells me that Sheikh Hafiz Wahba has instructions to approach His Majesty's Government in London in the sense of the above.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Bond.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

Jedda, June 18, 1929.

THE Hejaz Government, conscious of a duty incumbent upon them, namely, the cultivation of good relations fortunately existing between it and His Britannic Majesty's Government, are of opinion that the question of the mutual diplomatic representation between the two countries is one of the greatest means for strengthening these relations and fortifying their supports. For this reason, and because of its desire to convey the sincere sympathy and true friendship which His Majesty ever feels for His Majesty King George V and for his noble people by means of a representative to represent His Majesty at the Court of St. James, the Hejaz Government has decided to establish a Legation in London, of which the first important duty will be the strengthening of the present bonds of friendship and existing agreement, and for strengthening the good understanding which exists between the two countries.

Moreover, the Hejaz Government has seen fit to propose to the British Government the name of Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, His Majesty's adviser, to be His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in London.

The Hejaz Government hopes that the British Government, its active friend, will shortly decide upon raising the status of its agency in Jeddah to the status of a Legation so that its representation may be of similar form.

Respects.

FUAD HAMZA,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[E 3462/63/91]

No. 9.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jeddah).

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, July 12, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 96 of 26th June: Nejd-Transjordan raids arbitration.

You may inform Hejazi Government that His Majesty's Government share their anxiety to settle the question as soon as possible, and that they have no objection to acting as arbitrator if requested to do so by Governments concerned. In that case, however, it would be necessary for His Majesty's Government to appoint an investigator, who would examine matter on the spot, and whose procedure would be the same as that of the arbitrator previously proposed, except that he would report to His Majesty's Government, who would deliver final judgment. Same arrangements regarding expenses would apply in case of investigator as were proposed for arbitrator.

Before proceeding further in the matter, however, His Majesty's Government will be glad to know whether they are correct in assuming that above is what Hejazi Government have in mind.

[E 3703/66/91]

No. 10.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 24.)

(No. 157.)

Sir,

Jeddah, June 26, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that the British Air Mission under Wing-Commander F. W. Stent, which was sent here in order to ascertain the condition of the existing aircraft of the Hejaz Government, has now completed its work and is returning to Egypt to-day.

2. On the morning of his arrival, the 15th June, Wing-Commander Stent was introduced to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and arrangements were made for an interview with the King on the 17th June. Instructions had already been issued for all facilities to be given to enable the mission to begin its work at once.

3. At the latter interview the King asked various technical questions regarding the condition of the aeroplanes and their suitability, and he seemed anxious to obtain some idea of their possible utility. Wing-Commander Stent, who had had time to complete a preliminary inspection, was able to inform His Majesty, albeit unofficially, that the model had been out of date for some years, that the type was quite unsuited to the conditions of this country, and that, although one or possibly all of them could be made serviceable if spare parts were available, they could never be regarded as anything but practice machines. The King was quite prepared for this information, and stated that he had not expected any other verdict and had not considered the aircraft safe for flying.

4. His Majesty then went on to say that he proposed to establish two main air bases, one at Jeddah and the other at El Katif, with intermediary bases at El Mueh, Sha'Ara and Riyadh. He did not for the present envisage the formation of any other air routes.

5. He then asked Wing-Commander Stent's advice as to the practicability of this scheme, and was informed by the latter that he saw no difficulty on technical grounds.

6. Wing-Commander Stent was careful throughout the interview to explain both to His Majesty and to Sheikh Fuad that his views could not be taken as either official or final. I thought it as well, however, that, subject to the above reserve, he should discuss freely the questions put to him, and I asked him to do so.

7. In the course of the mission's stay here two aeroplanes were made serviceable. Several flights have been made, and during one afternoon the Governor of the town, aged about 60, and one or two Arab notables were taken up. They expressed themselves as delighted with the experience and amazed at the skill of the pilot.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Residency in Cairo, the High Commissioner in Iraq and the Government of India.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

[E 3704/3704/91]

No. 11.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 24.)

(No. 158.)

Sir,

Jeddah, June 26, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that Ainal Mulk Habibulla Khan Howeida, Persian consul-general for Syria, passed through Jeddah recently on a mission to the King, undertaken at the instance of His Majesty the Shah with the object, I am informed, of smoothing over difficulties that have occurred in the past in connexion with the pilgrimage over differences in religious practice and belief, and of paving the way for mutual recognition by the two Governments.

2. Habibulla Khan, who has had previous experience of a mission of this nature, called on me on his return from Mecca and expressed himself quite satisfied with the result of his conversations with the King. He also informed a member of my staff that the King had stated to him that he had no objection to any section of Islam acting in accordance with its belief, even where such was at variance with Wahabi ideas, provided that it did not do so openly. He would not interfere with anything that was done in private.

3. Habibulla Khan on his part expressed the opinion that the Persian Government might be able to exert pressure upon the Shia Ulema with a view to abolishing certain existing religious beliefs with which the Persian Government was not in sympathy.

4. He hoped to be able to secure a settlement of outstanding questions on his return to Persia. This, he states, will probably be followed by a deputation from the Hejaz to Tehran, and some other political or commercial agreement between the two countries may ensue.

5. The semi-official organ of the Hejaz Government, the "Um-el-Qura," publishes very friendly references to this visit, and states that the negotiations have been successful, and that the results will be published in due course.

6. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, and to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

[E 3842/2322/91]

No. 12.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 114.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, July 30, 1929.

ACCORDING to account published here of a speech delivered by King to chiefs of Ataibah tribe who had been summoned to meet him at Duwadami on his way to Riyadh, King, after upbraiding them for being [? group omitted], after passing judgment on them, stated that he wished to annihilate the Atman tribes and that he proposed to send an army against them on 6th August. All persons who have wavered in their allegiance but now profess loyalty are to take part. Absence of anyone without proper excuse will be punishable by death or by arrest of his army and confiscation of his arms and horses.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Bushire and Koweit, telegram No. 163. Copies by post to Cairo, Aden and Government of India.)

[E 3912/3704/34]

No. 13.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 397.)

Sir,

Gulhek, July 24, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that a report was recently published in the semi-official "Iran" to the effect that the King of the Hejaz was sending a delegation to Tehran to obtain recognition by the Persian Government. On my enquiring of the Minister of Court whether there was any truth in this report his Highness confirmed it, adding that in old days Persia had had a consul at Jeddah, and wished to have one again in view of the many pilgrims who went each year to Mecca.

2. I imagine that any rapprochement between the two countries is unlikely to lead to close co-operation in other questions, although its possible effect on Gulf politics generally should not be lost sight of.

3. Copies of this despatch have been sent to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, and to His Majesty's Government for Iraq.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 3947/3947/91]

No. 14.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 191.)

Sir,

Jeddah, July 20, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that Ibn Saud has taken another important step towards establishing the Wahabi religious influence at Mecca to the exclusion of that of all other sects.

2. It will be remembered that soon after his assumption of power Ibn Saud made drastic reductions in the number of imams of each of the four Sunni sects who had for generations led the daily prayers at the holy mosque in Mecca. His next measure was to allow one imam only for each sect, the four imams taking turns during the day in leading the five different prayers, the imam of the Hanbali sect, to which the Wahabis claim to belong, doing so at two of the sessions.

3. Ibn Saud has now abolished this system and has dismissed the imams, retaining only the Wahabi imam and appointing one other of the same sect, both Egyptians, who now in turn lead all the prayers.

4. Hitherto also a separate part of the mosque (musallah) has been reserved to each sect for its devotions. With the dismissal of the imams these musallahs automatically cease to exist and all prayers are now read from one part of the mosque only.

5. Although, under the system existing latterly, all four sects of the Sunnis have had perforce to accustom themselves to praying indifferently under the leadership of their own imam or of that of the other sects whose turn it happened to be to lead the prayer, the non-Hanbali sects have done so in the comforting knowledge that they were still represented at the mosque and that, as explained above, they had once a day an opportunity of following their own imam.

6. Ibn Saud's action may have serious repercussions in the Mahometan world if it becomes generally known and is exploited, and it is not too much to imagine that the pilgrimage might also be affected.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt, Iraq and Palestine, the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, the Political Resident, Bushire, and the Political Resident, Aden.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

[E 3993/63/91]

No. 15.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 118.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, August 9, 1929.

MY despatch No. 176 of 13th July.

Note received from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs gives His Majesty's Government *carte blanche*, but considers method now proposed by the latter may involve delays.

Hejaz Government will welcome any measures taken, of whatever nature, which may expedite settlement.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 171.)

[E 4055/3/91]

No. 16.

Correspondence between the High Commissioner for Iraq and King Ibn Saud on the subject of the relations between Iraq and Nejd.—(Communicated by the Colonial Office on June 20 and August 15, 1929.)

(1.)

Ibn Saud to Sir G. Clayton.

I HAVE received with pleasure your Excellency's letter, dated the 14th March, 1929, informing me of your arrival in Iraq and of your assumption of the duties of High Commissioner. I congratulate you on your safe arrival and on your assumption of the charge of affairs which have been entrusted to you in the sister country of Iraq. What we have known in your person, O your Excellency, as to the truthfulness of word, the anxiety for the fulfilment of pledges, and the unmistakable desire for the strengthening of good relations between us and the British Government, renders us hopeful of a change in the present burdensome situation (which has arisen between us and some of those in Iraq), as a result of the drastic and wise measure which we believe you will adopt with resolution and determination for the clearing up of the atmosphere and the removal of the unpleasant matters which have clouded it. We would like your Excellency to feel certain that you will have the support of myself and my Government in every endeavour which is calculated to strengthen the good relations between us and the British and Iraq Governments, in deference to your person and out of desire to strengthen the ties with the British Government and of confidence in the result of your endeavours. You shall, by the will of God, find us always up to your good opinion of us, while we, on our part, are hopeful of finding you always up to our good opinion of you.

Please accept, &c.

(Seal of Ibn Saud.)

14th Dhul Oi'dat, 347 (April 24, 1929).

(2.)

Ibn Saud to Sir G. Clayton.

WE have received your letter, dated the 14th March, 1929, and we regret, as you do, that the first communication from your Excellency, after your assumption of the office of High Commissioner, should be on the subject of raiding incidents and attacks, &c., between Nejd and Iraq. I like that you should feel certain, in the first place, that the attack on Mr. Crane's car and the murder of the American missionary were not of the doing of the raiders referred to by you, since the enquiry which we made into this incident in particular has shown us that the raiding party in question had not reached the place reached by Mr. Crane's car, and that the party had not at all come across that car.

As regards other than what relates to the Mr. Crane incident, we wish to acquaint your Excellency as follows:—

You will no doubt recollect the verbal discussions which took place between us at Jeddah, when we emphasised to your Excellency the fact that Iraq's continuance in the policy pursued by it would lead to continuous disturbances along the frontier. You will also recollect that we told you that unless the fortifications erected were pulled down it would be impossible to prevail over the forces in the vicinity of the frontier, because the people of Nejd as a whole were displeased with the conduct of the Iraq Government, their revocation of their pledge and their interpretation of the treaties between them and us according to their own wish and desire, to which has been added (or which were aggravated by) the activities of certain British officials, and their creation of causes for wrongdoing. All the foregoing has led to certain incidents to which you have referred. In our opinion, those responsible for these incidents are those who have been the cause of them, as we have already informed the British Government on more than one occasion, and as we also informed you at Jeddah. The incident of the action by aeroplanes and cars in Nejd territory, when you were in Jeddah negotiating with us for the solution of the problems, is not far to recollect. This, and what preceded it and what followed it, and their persistence in their intrigues, have reduced the conditions on the frontier to the state which you described in your letter. We, on our part, being anxious to prevent disputes between us and the British Government, and in the hope that existing problems would be solved following the arrival of your Excellency in Iraq, found it inevitable to take the hazardous step of stabilising conditions on the frontier. Accordingly, I set out in person at the head of 30,000 of my troops, attacked the forces assembled in the vicinity of the frontier under the leadership of Sultan-bin-Bujad and Faisal-al-Dawish, and dealt them a fatal blow, in the course of which the Dawish was wounded and surrendered himself to us, whereupon we sent him back to Artawiyah temporarily, until his wound is healed, when he will come back to us. As regards Ibn Bujad, we captured him, together with those who were with him, beheading some of them and sending the others to jail. Thanks to these strong and harsh measures, affairs on the frontier have calmed down completely. Those of our subjects whom we have thus fought had not complained of any injustice or oppression on our part, all were the subject of our sympathy, deference and justice. Their only complaint against us was that the Iraq had transgressed upon us by the erection of those qasrs on the frontier, and put our honour to contempt by violating our territory, while we did not retaliate the aggression. This is what had induced them to march on the frontier, to disobey our orders, and to be obstinate in their behaviour, and it was on account of this that we have dealt them this destructive and hard blow. This is what we have done for the pacification of conditions on the frontier, and we wish to know the action taken and to be taken by his Excellency General Clayton, on his part, with a view to assisting us in the removal from Iraq of the causes of these disturbances. There are three matters which should receive the attention of the British Government, so long as they wish to insure their interests and comfort in Iraq and also the interests and comfort of the people of Iraq, and so long also as they wish for the comfort of their friend (*i.e.*, Ibn Saud himself—*Translator*). These three matters, which should receive consideration and for which a definite settlement should be improvised, and over which agreement should be reached between us and the British Government, are:—

Firstly.—The Ashraf and their intrigues—both the Ashraf ruling in Iraq and Transjordan, and those residing there. They are the cause of the disputes between Nejd and Iraq and Nejd and Transjordan. Before they came there no such difference or disputes existed. They should either leave these neighbouring countries or have their hands bound, leaving them no power or authority over matters outstanding between us and Iraq and Transjordan, or over the frontiers of these two countries.

Secondly.—A "liquidation" of former treaties should be effected so as to obviate misinterpretation and alteration, the qasrs and "recent innovations" being removed. With this accomplished, the British Government will find us anxious to ward off any occurrence against Iraq.

Thirdly.—British officials in Iraq and Transjordan should be made the subject of an enquiry (*literally*: should be considered), and the removal effected of those of them who have been the cause of instigation to evil, the others being prevented from persistence in their activities which are productive of trouble and mischief.

The above three matters we place before the British Government and before his Excellency the general, for urgent examination with a view to subsequent agreement over a definite and conclusive solution, in order that neighbouring Arab countries might devote themselves to affairs of reform and reconstruction and to the ensuring of the happiness and prosperity of their peoples. We are confident of receiving, at an early date, from your Excellency and from the British Government, practical reply for proceeding with the settlement of these matters.

Please accept, &c.

(Seal of Ibn Saud.)

14th Dhul Oi'dat, 347 (April 24, 1929).

(3.)

Sir G. Clayton to Ibn Saud.

Your Majesty,

The Residency, Bagdad, May 25, 1929.

I THANK your Majesty very sincerely for your kind letter, dated the 24th April, 1929, in which your Majesty sends congratulations to me on my appointment as High Commissioner in Iraq.

I welcome with deep gratitude your Majesty's assurance of support and sympathy in the task of strengthening and confirming the good relations between your Majesty's kingdom and the Governments of His Britannic Majesty and of Iraq.

Your Majesty's sympathy and confidence has always been extended to me in full measure, and I sincerely hope that the time will come when friendly discussion of matters of mutual interest will afford me the privilege of once more meeting your Majesty in person and of renewing the friendship with which your Majesty has honoured me.

Accept, &c.

GILBERT CLAYTON,

Acting High Commissioner for Iraq.

(4.)

Sir G. Clayton to Ibn Saud.

Your Majesty,

The Residency, Bagdad, May 25, 1929.

I HASTEN to acknowledge the receipt of your Majesty's letter, dated the 24th April, 1929, a copy of which I have duly communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

The information which I have gathered on the spot regarding the attack on Mr. Crane and his party leads me to the belief that your Majesty has been misinformed, and that the perpetrators were men from the forces of Ibn Hithlain, who was at that moment carrying out a raid in the immediate vicinity. Nevertheless, it will serve no useful purpose now to continue discussion on this deplorable incident, which is only one of the unfortunate effects of an unsatisfactory situation which I hope may be remedied by mutual confidence and understanding.

I venture once more to submit my respectful congratulations on the signally successful manner in which your Majesty has dealt with those who attempted to disobey your orders. Whatever may have been the motives of those who dared to flout your authority, their punishment has been timely and well-deserved.

The question of the posts is one on which we were unable to reach agreement, and, as your Majesty is aware, His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Iraq Government have signified their willingness to submit to impartial arbitration the interpretation of article 3 of the Uquair Protocol. At the same time, I am bound to point out to your Majesty that the existence of the posts during the recent troublous period, to which your Majesty has now happily put an end, has been the means of saving much loss of life and property. On no single occasion have raiders ventured to attack any post or to carry out raids in their immediate vicinity. They have invariably confined their attacks to defenceless shepherds and tribesmen who have moved far afield in search of grazing. In these circumstances, it is not unnatural that considerable value should be attached to the posts by those who are

responsible for the protection of Iraq tribes from unprovoked attack. Nevertheless, I am in a position once more to assure your Majesty—with full knowledge—that these posts are in no way designed to interfere with the free movements of tribes, whether Nejdi or Iraqi, nor do they constitute any menace whatsoever against your Majesty's people and country. I have myself visited the posts and satisfied myself on this point by personal inspection. Provided that the situation on the frontier remains normal and peaceful, there is no intention of making them anything more than police posts for the better control and administration of the desert areas of Iraq.

I have also satisfied myself by careful investigation and enquiry that the authorities in Iraq have, since our conversations in Jeddah, been scrupulous in observing their treaty obligations and have on no single occasion taken action which could be construed as provocative, or even incorrect. So patient and forbearing have they been that they have been the object of sharp criticism in many quarters, and have been accused of failing adequately to protect the interests of their own subjects.

The Government of Iraq has no hostile or aggressive intention against your Majesty or your dominions. Their own aim is to devote themselves to questions of reform and reconstruction and to ensure the progress and development of Iraq in an atmosphere of peace and amity with their neighbours.

I would here speak particularly of the unwarranted accusations levelled against Captain Glubb. I have made very careful enquiries, and I am in a position to affirm that they are entirely unfounded. Captain Glubb is an officer of high principle who discharges his duties unselfishly and conscientiously, and it is intolerable that he should be subjected to continual persecution not only in the "Umm-el-Kura" but also in the anti-Government press in Bagdad. If criticism is to be levelled, let it be at those who are responsible, but I am confident that your Majesty's chivalrous and generous spirit will no longer tolerate these continual attacks on an individual officer who performs his duty with courage and devotion and who, moreover, holds your Majesty's person in high respect.

It will be obvious to your Majesty that I have no authority to speak of any revision or interpretation of former treaties. That is a question which can only be considered by His Britannic Majesty's Government in consultation with the Iraqi Government. I can only say that any proposal for friendly discussions which may tend to remove misunderstandings and causes of friction will receive my warm support. It is of vital importance to the interests of the neighbouring Arab States of Nejd and Iraq that relations of mutual amity and co-operation should be established and maintained.

Accept, &c.

GILBERT CLAYTON,
Acting High Commissioner for Iraq.

(5.)

Ibn Saud to Sir G. Clayton.

(Translation.)

THE tender feelings and good wishes which you have expressed in your letter dated the 25th May, 1929, have left the deepest and best impression on my heart. It is hardly necessary for me to assure your Excellency of the particular sympathy and the affection which I felt towards your noble person when I met you for the first time. I still entertain that very same feeling unchanged. The confidence to which you refer is, in fact, all that I can extend to you, and there is no doubt that you are the most worthy of being made the subject of such confidence.

As to the hope you express for an opportunity for us to meet once more, this is a desire which is cherished by us as well, and we consider it in the interests of both countries that the affording of an opportunity for such meeting at an early date should be expedited.

Please accept, &c.

(Seal of Ibn Saud.)

Mecca, 17th Muharram, 1348 (June 24, 1929).

(6.)

Ibn Saud to Sir G. Clayton.

(Translation.)

WE acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 25th May, 1929, and we have noted certain points in it, on which we have to remark as follows:—

1. We have already informed you that the investigation which we ordered to be made into the regrettable attack on Mr. Crane and his companions proved that Ibn Hithlain and his party had no part in it. We did not give you the assurance that the people in question had no part in the crime from a desire on our part to lessen their responsibility, because you are aware of the extremely severe punishment we meted out to them because of their attacks on Iraq and Koweit territory. Our intention in sending such an assurance was to describe the facts as they occurred and to throw light on the incident, which has been veiled around with much suspicion and ambiguity.

2. As for the question of the forts, our position in this matter is well known to you and to the British Government, since these forts are the original cause of most of the regrettable incidents which have taken place on the frontiers. As for your Excellency's statement that the use of the forts has been clearly shown, in that they were the means of preventing attacks in their neighbourhood, it is true in one sense but not in another. That no attack has happened in their vicinity is correct, but that they were the means of preventing the attacks is not correct. For you doubtless know that when forces marched last year to attack the forts and the frontiers, we sent certain people after them, who brought them back, in the hope that the problem would be solved in the course of the conversations which it was expected to hold with your Excellency. When they set out this year for the frontiers with the same intention, we ourselves went after the aggressors and dealt them a decisive blow which prevented them from reaching the Iraq frontiers. But, as we have already verbally informed your Excellency, if the Iraq Government believe that such forts will protect them against the Arabs of Nejd, we can decline all responsibility regarding any aggression that may occur against Iraq on account of these forts or others, and then the Iraq Government will defend themselves with their forts. We believe that an expert would not consider such forts as conferring an advantage so much as having brought harm, and likely to do still more harm, to Nejd and Iraq. This is the point we wish to explain, just as we expect our friend the general to do his best to put an end to any harm that may arise because of them.

3. As regards Captain Glubb and his activities, we have always believed that these activities on the frontiers, with the harm that has resulted and will still result to Nejd and Iraq, were not carried on with the knowledge of the British Government. If such activities have been carried on with the knowledge and consent of the British Government, this is a matter for much regret to us, and we are convinced that the British Government does not fully appreciate the consequences of such activities and conduct.

Captain Glubb personally has never for one instant been hateful to us, and was deserving of our respect when he met us at Jeddah, since he was in your Excellency's company. The activities we have noticed and which we believe to be harmful to the interests of both parties are those which we have mentioned to the British Government and to your Excellency. We have therefore been criticising actions and not persons.

4. As regards the question of arranging a liquidation of treaties, the object of this is to agree on the stipulations of the treaties concluded between us and Iraq, on the points the execution of which still gives rise to dispute, and to fix a definite limit, without any possibility of further explanations and interpretations, in all those matters over which so much wrangling has taken place both verbally and in writing. The clearing up of such questions and their being put into one clear form into which no doubt or interpretation can enter will preclude any future disputes and will remove the causes of the present ones. This is what we have suggested to the British Government through you. You will find us always ready to meet whole-heartedly and sincerely every effort directed to the strengthening of relations between Nejd and Iraq.

With highest respects,
(Sealed) IBN SAUD.

19.1.1348 (June 26, 1929).

[E 4074/1136/91]

No. 17.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 357.)

Sir,

Constantinople, August 15, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, according to an announcement in the Turkish press of the 12th instant, negotiations for the conclusion of a Turco-Hejazi treaty of friendship have resulted in the signing of a draft treaty, under which, while Turkey recognises the complete independence of the Hejaz, the subjects of the two countries will enjoy most-favoured-nation treatment.

2. I will report in due course such details as I may be able to gather.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Cairo.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 4134/94/91]

No. 18.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 192.)

Sir,

Jeddah, July 22, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to 30th June, 1929.

2. Copies of this report have been sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Simla, Singapore, Khartum through Port Sudan, Lagos (2), the senior naval officer, Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 18.

Jeddah Report for Period June 1 to 30, 1929.

THE King visited Jeddah on the 15th June, returning to Mecca on the 18th. There were no official functions, and his time seems to have been devoted entirely to official business and the reception of individual members of the Diplomatic and Consular Corps.

2. Soon after his return to Mecca reports began to circulate that clouds were gathering on the political horizon in the north, and that in the south also there was a possibility of trouble with the Ataibah tribe on the King's return journey to Nejd. These latter rumours gained considerable currency, so much so that it was considered advisable that he should be accompanied by a strong fighting force, instead of making the journey as usual protected only by his bodyguard.

3. The mobilisation and equipment of this force delayed the King's departure for some days, much to his annoyance, it appears, as he had been anxious to leave Mecca for Riyadh as soon as possible in order to deal with the situation in Northern Hasa. The chief obstacle was the difficulty experienced in finding the requisite number of chauffeurs to drive the cars and lorries which had been commandeered *en masse* in Jeddah and Mecca.

4. Matters apparently came to a head on the 27th June, when the King roundly abused his Ministers for the delay, and inflicted severe corporal punishment on a large number of his entourage.

5. The result was that Sheikh Abdulla Suleiman, His Majesty's most influential Minister, came post-haste to Jeddah the same evening, and ordered the police to round up any man who looked like a driver and to send him to Mecca.

6. Some thirty drivers, British-protected subjects, took refuge at the British agency, and it was only after prolonged discussion that some guarantee was extracted from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to ensure them, as far as might be, against further molestation.

7. On the eve of his departure for Riyadh the King received a report of the defeat of the Ajman tribe and Ibn Mashhur at Al Rida, the casualties being given as 600 killed. The news is said to have greatly lightened the depression from which he was suffering, and he left Mecca in very good spirits. It also appears to have had a salutary effect on the situation generally, although several of the King's sympathisers still express considerable anxiety over the situation in the north-east, where Feisal-ed-Doweish is still at large in the neighbourhood of Jaryah-el-Ilya (in Northern Hasa about 100 miles south of the Koweit frontier), and may combine with the Ajman tribe and Ibn Mashhur.

8. The continued presence of these insurgents in the neighbourhood of Koweit brought to a head the question of the right of pursuit over the Koweit border. The King asserted that, in spite of Ibn Mashhur's withdrawal from Koweit territory itself, the rebels were still receiving assistance, encouragement and food from Koweit, and, while expressing his confidence that the Sheikh of Koweit, "his dear friend," would not intentionally do anything that might run counter to the King's policy, he threw doubts on the ability of the sheikh to control the situation unaided. He therefore requested His Majesty's Government to provide the sheikh with effective military backing in order to prevent any rebels from taking refuge in Koweit, and with the object of stopping any leakage of supplies from Koweit to the rebels. He further asked permission to pursue the rebels, if need be, into Koweit territory itself, and he made a similar request regarding the pursuit of rebels into Iraq territory also. In advancing these requests, Ibn Saud was anxious that His Majesty's Government should believe that the recent punitive measures were undertaken not because of his subjects' misconduct in Nejd, but because of their acts against countries with which he is bound by ties of friendship and affection.

9. The Sheikh of Koweit indignantly denied the allegation that Ibn Mashhur and the Ajman were still receiving any form of supplies from Koweit, and regretted that "his old friend" so readily believed idle tales. He protested strongly against Ibn Saud's proposal to pursue the rebels across the frontier, and stated that, if assistance were required to repel them, he would apply for it to the Royal Air Force.

10. On the 16th June the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed a further note to His Majesty's agent recapitulating previous requests, and adding that, in order to show the Nejd tribes that His Majesty's Government were co-operating with them against the rebels, and in order to cut the latter off from all communication with Iraq and Koweit, the Hejaz Government was willing to allow the forces of His Majesty's Government to attack the rebels in Nejd territory itself. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs added verbally that it would be a good thing if the Royal Air Force were to make a demonstration against the rebels immediately, even if this entailed crossing into Nejd territory. In reply to the King's requests concerning the right of pursuit, he was informed, as regards the Koweit frontier, that His Majesty's Government was concerting measures for the co-operation of British forces with those of the Sheikh of Koweit with a view to preventing the improper use of Koweit territory by any refugees from Nejd. As regards the Iraq frontier, he was told that Iraq would prevent the entry of rebel tribesmen into her territory by all available means. The question of permission for Nejd forces to cross the Koweit and Iraq frontiers therefore ceased to be a practical issue, and the Sheikh of Koweit appears to have acted up to the spirit of his assertions by recently refusing the sanctuary of Koweit territory to Feisal-ed-Doweish, who had requested permission to camp at Subaihiyah.

11. The proposal that British forces should carry operations into Nejd territory is a new one, and the present attitude of the Hejaz Government in allowing and in going so far as to request this is in the nature of a *volte-face*. After all his public utterances and fine words and protests, it must have caused Ibn Saud a pang to invite the foreigner in over the inviolable boundary, and allow the tribes to suspect, whether rightly or wrongly, that perhaps, after all, he is not entirely capable of keeping order in his own house without foreign intervention.

12. His Majesty's Government have decided that the frontier should not be crossed except in hot pursuit and unless contact has been maintained with the rebels. They cannot agree to aeroplanes crossing the frontier merely to search for rebels or to initiate operations in Nejd.

13. In contradistinction to the situation on the Nejd-Iraq frontier, which, so far as raiding is concerned, has been quiescent, the Nejd-Transjordan frontier has been the scene of a number of raids on both sides, which have given rise to a constant interchange of protests. The Hejaz Government has despatched two punitive

[21087] *... of the Hejaz Government ...* c 2

expeditions to the frontier districts with orders to attack all raiders found in Nejd territory, but they are forbidden to cross the Transjordan frontier.

14. As regards the liquidation of existing claims by arbitration in respect of raids on this frontier, an official notification has been received from the Hejaz Government to the effect that they now wish to abandon the idea of arbitration in the form proposed by His Majesty's Government, and desire that His Majesty's Government itself should act as arbitrator in the matter, and dispose of the claims and counter-claims in whatever way it considers fit and just.

15. Discussions have been going on since the beginning of the year with the King and the Hejaz Government regarding the interpretation to be placed on article 6 of the Bahra Agreement, which provides that the forces of Iraq and Nejd may not cross the common frontier in the pursuit of offenders except with the consent of both Governments.

16. On the 9th June, in a note addressed to the Hejaz Government, it was explained that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the article in question contemplated raids and the pursuit of raiders across the frontier, and it did not contemplate either an organised attack in force which His Majesty was unwilling to prevent, *i.e.*, an aggression amounting in fact to an act of war, or an incursion which His Majesty was unable to prevent, *i.e.*, an aggression resulting in a revolt against His Majesty's authority.

17. The Hejaz Government, on the other hand, consider that the wording of the article is categorical, and they regard the above as an extension, and therefore a modification, of its terms.

18. The constant complaints and newspaper attacks directed against the administrative inspector of the Iraq Southern Desert have called forth a statement from His Majesty's Government, embodied in a note addressed to the Hejaz Government on the 9th June, to the effect that there is no foundation for the allegations which have been made against his activities, and that these are clearly based on inaccurate reports. The Hejaz Government were also informed that the continued presentation of baseless protests could only complicate an already difficult situation, and their attention was drawn to the obvious interest which such admittedly recalcitrant tribes as the Mutair must have in representing their delinquencies as the result of Iraqi provocation.

19. A reply has been received from Ibn Saud to the note addressed to him on the 17th May on the subject of the collection of zikat from Transjordan tribes, who migrate periodically to the Wadi Sirhan for purposes of watering and grazing. His Majesty's Government, basing their views on article 4 of the Hadda Agreement, contended that the imposition of this tax was inconsistent with the clear intention of the agreement, which was to maintain unaltered the established rights of access to the Wadi Sirhan previously enjoyed by Transjordan tribes, and, furthermore, that it would be contrary to all principles of justice to impose on the tribes of Transjordan, who are required to pay taxes to their own Government, a second annual tax payable to the Nejd Government. Ibn Saud maintains, however, that the article in question, whilst securing reciprocity in the enjoyment of grazing rights, leaves each Government free to collect zikat or any other taxes leviable under its own laws, whether from its own subjects or from other persons.

20. Another eye-witness's account has come to hand of the manner in which Ibn Saud established his authority at the meeting of the tribes at Riyadh in October last. From his statement it would appear that the tribesmen openly declared their disapproval of Ibn Saud's title of King of the Hejaz and Nejd. He was at liberty to style himself King of the Hejaz, but they would not recognise him as King of Nejd. Ibn Saud is said to have drawn his sword then, and to have claimed that he had made himself King by the strength of it. This caused some commotion, resulting in several of the tribesmen being killed. The gates of the town and of the palace were immediately closed, and no further open meeting took place.

21. The representations made to Ibn Saud with a view to eliciting the facts concerning the death of Sheikh Enad-bin-Jumaian, to which reference was made in Jeddah report for April, have drawn a reply from the Hejaz Government to the effect that Ibn Jumaian and a companion were captured in the course of an encounter of their caravan with a detachment of zikat collectors. He was detained as a hostage in connexion with the looting of some camels, and, according to Sheikh Fuad, was killed by a stray bullet fired by some of his own people who attempted to rescue him.

22. On the 15th June the British Air Mission under Wing-Commander F. W. Stent, which was sent to Jeddah with the object of ascertaining the condition of the existing aircraft of the Hejaz Government, arrived and began work. It soon

became apparent that the existing machines, four in number, were of a model that had been out of date for some years; that the type was quite unsuited for the conditions of this country; and that, although one or possibly all of them could be made serviceable if spare parts were available, they could never be regarded as anything but practice machines.

23. In the course of the mission's stay, two aeroplanes were in fact made serviceable. Several flights were made, and during one afternoon the Governor of the town and one or two Arab notables were taken up for short flights.

24. The Air Mission left again for Egypt on the 26th June.

25. On learning of the condition of his machines, the King placed a formal order with His Majesty's Government for a complete air force, and requested immediate delivery. The order was confirmed the same day by a note from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, which described the King's requirements in detail. Four aeroplanes were needed, as well as the requisite personnel to fly them and maintain them in condition. The Hejaz Government left it to His Majesty's Government to fix the price, and undertook to make payment on demand. His Majesty's Government were also given discretion as to the number of pilots and mechanics to be sent, and as to the provision of any other requisites, such as spare engines, hangars, &c.

26. About the middle of the month Ibn Saud received a visit from Ainal Mulk Habibullah Khan Howaida, Persian consul for Syria, who had been sent by the Shah to open negotiations for an *entente* over outstanding differences in connexion with the pilgrimage, and to pave the way for mutual recognition on the part of the two Governments. Habibullah expressed himself as entirely satisfied with his conversations with the King. He also stated that his mission would probably be followed by a deputation from the Hejaz to Tehran, and he suggested that some political or commercial agreement between the two countries might ensue. His visit was the subject of very friendly references in the semi-official organ of the Hejaz Government, the "Um-el-Qura," which stated that the negotiations have been successful, and that the results would be published in due course.

27. The repatriation of pilgrims is in full swing. The roads and all open spaces in the town are packed with humanity, and an overpowering stench proclaims to high heaven the incapacity of the Hejaz Government to provide for the elementary needs of the pilgrims, and to deal with a situation which each year seems to become progressively more offensive. Fortunately, there has been no serious outbreak of disease, as the authorities would be quite unable to cope with it. The system of repatriation, with the improvements introduced in the course of the last two years, is working satisfactorily, and no serious hitch has occurred so far. It is hoped that many if not all of the modifications of the old system will be endorsed by the Haj Conference now sitting in India and will be made law. The same attention has been given by the authorities this year as last to ensure the safety of pilgrims and to lessen their hardships on the road. On the 12th June a Nejdî was publicly executed at Yambo for robbing pilgrims on their way to Medina.

28. The Egyptian Medical Mission, whose difficulties were described in paragraph 13 of the Jeddah report for April, continued to be the object of aversion on the part of the Hejaz Government, which did not cease from putting obstacles in its way. The ambulances were released only two days before the Haj day, and then only under vexatious conditions, and the work of the mission itself was generally obstructed. At Yambo, for instance, the Egyptian doctor, who was sent there to attend the pilgrims on their return from Medina immediately after the pilgrimage, was for five days prevented from having access to his medical stores, which had been passed through the customs when the mission first arrived and placed in a neighbouring store. Meanwhile 14,000 Egyptian pilgrims remained in Yambo without medical attention.

29. At the last moment the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that he would not allow the mission to return to Egypt until it had obtained from Cairo the Hejaz visas with which, as he had already stated, its members should have been provided originally in order to enter the country. The mission was, however, eventually allowed to depart in peace, the dispute being left for subsequent settlement.

30. The obligation or otherwise of giving the Hejaz Government prior notification of the arrival of the mission, and other questions connected with visa and similar formalities, which ostensibly gave rise to the present difficulties, are still the subject of negotiation, without, so far as I can gather, much progress being

made. The whole difficulty is, of course, accentuated by the non-recognition of Ibn Saud by the Egyptian Government, and I fear that, in the absence of such recognition, the Egyptian mission next year may experience the same or greater troubles.

31. An Italian Mahometan doctor from Tripoli has been appointed Italian vice-consul in Mecca, and has taken up his duties there. It will be interesting to see what these duties comprise, as, even in the height of the pilgrimage season, his *ressortissants* in Mecca are a negligible quantity.

32. The late Bolshevik agent in Jeddah, Kerim Khakimoff, passed through Jeddah recently on his way to Hodeida. It is understood that he has been appointed Russian commercial representative in the Yemen.

33. During the period under review one female slave, who had taken refuge in this agency during May, was manumitted by her master, the Director of Customs, and remained in Jeddah. No others took refuge during June.

[E 4184/2322/91]

No. 19.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 87.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, August 26, 1929.

MY telegram No. 80 of 26th July: Attitude of Sheikh of Koweit towards rebel Nejdi tribes.

Please make communication on following lines to Hejaz Government without delay:—

Ibn Mashur sent a message to political agent, Koweit, on 22nd August that he had been deputed by Akhwan leaders to lay their case before High Commissioner, Bagdad, and requested permission to proceed thither unmolested on 24th August.

Instructions were sent by telegram on 22nd August that request should be categorically refused, and that Ibn Mashur should be ordered to leave Koweiti territory immediately.

[E 4388/2322/91]

No. 20.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, September 2.)

(No. 33.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, August 30, 1929.

KOWEIT telegram No. 502 of the 29th August:—

"Express message just in from Subaihiyah reports that Dawish's wife, accompanied by women, children and old men of Mutair and Rashaida, have suddenly crossed into Koweit territory with large number of camels, and have camped at Subaihiyah and other wells in the immediate vicinity. Dawish's head slave, who is in charge, states that scarcity of camel fodder has compelled them to move from Hamudh, and that they intend leaving Subaihiyah as soon as Dawish tells them where to go. Sheikh of Koweit has sent Abdullah-bin-Jabir to issue immediate warning that unless everyone crosses the border by noon, Sunday, there will be trouble.

"Sheikh thinks that move is deliberate plan of Dawish, who is reported to be at Arak with his fighting strength, to see whether we will bomb women and children crossing border alone. At present sheikh is awaiting Abdullah's return. If his report shows situation as bad as messenger makes out, shall either proceed to Subaihiyah or shall recommend bombing, in which case consider that camels only should be attacked and not tents, and these only in short periods. There is, of course, a connexion between above incident and Braih's move into Hasa, *vide* my immediately preceding telegram."

We should use every effort to avoid bombing women and children.

[E 4476/2322/91]

No. 21.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, September 4.)

(No. 34.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, August 30, 1929.

MY telegram No. 33 of 30th August.

Koweit telegram No. 503, the 30th August:—

"My telegram No. 502.

"Abdullah, who has just returned, reports serious developments. Says that he found Dawish with all Akhwan leaders, and whole of fighting strength of rebels had arrived from Arak. States country is black with tents; estimates number at 1,000 men, 5,000 women and children 9,000 and camels 30,000, and calls it migration of a nation. In reply to sheikh's message that rebels must be across the border by Sunday, Dawish protested that the Akhwan wanted neither arms, food nor assistance from Koweit, as they were not fleeing from Ibn Saud. Their sole reason for coming to Subaihiyah was the serious water and grazing famine in North Hassa. In desperation, they had decided to cross the border, where there was plenty to drink and eat. It was impossible to go back now, as it would mean death for thousands of camels. They could not believe that the English would carry out their threat of bombing their women and children, as the Akhwan had repeatedly offered to be friends. They asked that Sheikh of Koweit might plead for them as they were in his country, not English territory. Sheikh Ahmad, who is very upset at the whole turn of events, suggests that I should make one final effort to persuade Akhwan to retire, so I am proceeding to Wara alone to see Dawish this afternoon. Will report on my return.

"Addressed to Resident. Repeated to High Commissioner."

[E 4476/2322/91]

No. 22.

Acting Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, September 4.)

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, August 30, 1929.

MY telegram immediately preceding. Koweit No. 504, the 30th August:—

"Just returned. Dawish has promised me on word of honour to leave Koweit territory on Sunday at dawn, taking with him all rebel forces, women, children and camels. Report follows."

(Repeated to Jedda, Bagdad and Simla.)

[E 4478/2322/91]

No. 23.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, September 4.)

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, September 2, 1929.

KOWEIT telegram No. 508 of 2nd September is as follows:—

"Dawish kept his word; left Sunday at dawn. Remainder of Akhwan slowly following. Sheikh anticipates complete evacuation of Koweit territory Wednesday night. Sheikh's patrols are with Akhwan hurrying on the process, but progress bound to be slow owing to the large number of non-combatants, baggage and camels.

"Addressed to Bushire. Repeated to High Commissioner for Iraq."

(Repeated to Jedda and Government of India.)

[E 4504/2322/91]

No. 24.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 5.)

(No. 128.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, September 5, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 80 and your telegram No. 87.

Note received from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs expresses warm appreciation of evident goodwill and desire to co-operate shown by His Majesty's Government.

Resolute course adopted by His Majesty's Government is welcomed with thanks and sense of obligation.

I am requested to convey the thanks of the Hejaz Government officially to His Majesty's Government.

May I communicate to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs when I see him the facts reported in Bushire telegrams to Colonial Office, Nos. 33 to 36?

[E 4504/2322/91]

No. 25.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 94.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 7, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 128 of 5th September: Attitude of Sheikh of Koweit towards rebel Nejd tribes.

You may act as suggested in last paragraph.

You should, however, avoid any references to bombing, and substitute some phrase such as "threat to expel by force."

[E 4629/2322/91]

No. 26.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 130.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, September 10, 1929.

PERSISTENT rumours, to which I am inclined to give credence, tend to confirm the opinion held in Jedda and Mecca that the political and financial situation in Hejaz and Nejd is becoming steadily worse.

The Ataibah are giving serious trouble. It is confirmed from various sources that they have been robbing lorries containing arms and cash which were being sent to Riyadh, and have been committing other acts of aggression. It is further reported that a strong punitive expedition sent against them has been defeated near Turba. Governor of Jedda has received instructions from Mecca to prevent the sale of food-stuffs to Arabs of this tribe, and to exercise a strict control over sale to other visiting tribes. On the Medina side the Beni Amr of Nejd Harb appear to have thrown off their allegiance, and there are frequent reports of raids and robberies in that [? group omitted] and in Henakiya regions. New and severe measures are being taken to bleed Hejaz tribes of men and money, and there is general discontent. It is estimated that about 7,000 Bedouins have been [? enrolled] at Taif and sent to Medina and Nejd.

Situation, although unsatisfactory, is to a large extent the natural result of the period of suspense through which the country is passing in anticipation of definite solution by battle of situation *vis-à-vis* the Akhwan.

(Repeated to Koweit, Bushire, Jerusalem and Bagdad, No. 185. Copies by post to Cairo and Government of India.)

[E 4640/2322/91]

No. 27.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 131.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, September 11, 1929.

MY telegram No. 128.

Further note received from Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs states that interview of rebel leaders with political representatives at Koweit, and fact of their return in safety, has created a bad impression, and has given rise to rumours that His Majesty's Government have changed their attitude and are not carrying out their undertakings.

He hopes that instructions will be issued for the arrest of such persons in future and their delivery to Hejaz Government for trial and punishment.

Copy of note leaves by bag to-day.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Koweit and Bushire, No. 186.)

[E 4682/2322/91]

No. 28.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, September 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, September 16, 1929.

POLITICAL agent at Koweit reports that Ibn Saud's agent in Koweit has telegraphed to Ibn Saud that Ibn Musaed has completely defeated at Ummar Rudhummah raiding party of 500 rebels under Azaiyiz-bin-Dawish intercepted on return from successful surprise attack on Lavqah, 180 miles north of Hail. Feisal-al-Shiblan with 100 and Azaiyiz with eighty men escaped.

(Repeated to Bagdad and Jedda.)

[E 4133/323/91]

No. 29.

Foreign Office to Mr. Bond (Jeddah).

(No. 198.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 16, 1929.

WITH reference to Foreign Office despatch No. 71 of the 11th April last, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Henderson to transmit to you the accompanying copies of a revised memorandum on the question of the channels to be used for communications between His Majesty King Ibn Saud, or the Hejaz-Nejd Government, and the High Commissioners for Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, and certain British officers in the Persian Gulf. The present memorandum should be substituted for that enclosed in the Foreign Office despatch referred to above.

2. You will observe that insertions have been made in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the original memorandum so as to cover the question of communications regarding Hejaz-Nejd affairs to and from posts in the Persian Gulf.

I am, &c.

G. W. RENDEL.

Enclosure in No. 29.

Communications with Ibn Saud.

UNTIL August 1928 communications intended for Ibn Saud were sent through His Majesty's agent and consul at Jeddah when Ibn Saud was in the Hejaz, or through the Resident in the Persian Gulf (at Bushire) when Ibn Saud was in Nejd.

2. In August 1928, Ibn Saud requested that this arrangement should no longer be followed, but that in future all communications should be addressed to him through His Majesty's agent and consul, even during his periods of residence in Nejd. It may, therefore, now be laid down as a general rule that all communications for Ibn Saud shall pass through His Majesty's agency at Jeddah.

3. The High Commissioners at Bagdad and Jerusalem are authorised to correspond direct with Ibn Saud on matters of detail arising out of the Bahra and Hadda agreements, and such communications will ordinarily be sent through His

Majesty's agent at Jeddah, who will act merely as a channel of communication. In cases of extreme urgency, however, it will still be open to the High Commissioners to communicate with Ibn Saud through the quickest available channel, while sending a repetition or copy to His Majesty's agent and consul at Jeddah. Communications intended for Ibn Saud will ordinarily be addressed to His Majesty's agent at Jeddah direct by the High Commissioners concerned, but copies in the case of despatches, and repetitions in the case of telegrams, should in every case be sent to the Colonial Office.

4. As a general rule, such communications, whether sent by telegram or despatch, will be transmitted textually by His Majesty's agent at Jeddah, and they should be drafted on that understanding. His Majesty's agent will, however, have discretion, more particularly in the case of telegrams, to introduce any minor modifications of style or wording which, in the light of his local knowledge, he may consider desirable. It will, further, be open to His Majesty's agent at Jeddah, in any case where he considers that the proposed communication raises issues of political importance, to refer to the Foreign Office for instruction. Information received from the Iraqi and Transjordan Governments respecting raids on their tribes by Nejdian tribesmen and other minor frontier incidents, or replies from those Governments to complaints by the Hejazi Government respecting raids on Hejazi or Nejdian tribesmen and other minor frontier incidents, should, subject to the proviso indicated above, be communicated by His Majesty's agent to the Hejazi Government, without awaiting the receipt of instructions from London.

5. Communications for Ibn Saud, or regarding Nejdian or Hejazi affairs, from Iraq, Transjordan, Palestine or the Persian Gulf posts, on all other questions, should be addressed to the Colonial Office, but repeated, or copied, to Jeddah in every case. In such cases His Majesty's agent at Jeddah will not take official action on the communication until specifically authorised to do so by the Foreign Office. He may, however, if the matter to be dealt with is in any way urgent, take such informal action with the competent Hejazi authorities as he may think desirable.

6. Similarly, His Majesty's agent at Jeddah may address the High Commissioners for Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine, the Political Resident at Bushire and the political agents at Koweit and Bahrein, direct on points of fact, on matters of routine, or in reply to enquiries, sending a repetition, or copy, in each case to the Foreign Office, and in the case of Koweit and Bahrein to the Resident in the Persian Gulf also; while, on all other questions, he will address the Foreign Office direct, sending a repetition or copy to Bagdad or Jerusalem, when either is concerned, and reporting in each case in the body of the telegram or despatch that he has done so.

Foreign Office, September 16, 1929.

[E 4713/94/91]

No. 30.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 215.)

Sir,

Jeddah, August 22, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to the 31st July, 1929.

2. Copies of this report have been sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Simla, Singapore, Khartum through Port Sudan, Lagos (2), the senior naval officer, Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 30.

Jeddah Report for period July 1 to 31, 1929.

CONFIRMATION was received from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at the beginning of the month of the defeat of the Ajman tribe at Al Rida towards the end of June. Since then no change has taken place in the situation in Northern Hasa. Feisal-ed-Doweish is believed still to be in that neighbourhood, and may give trouble.

2. One result of the unsettled situation is the deflection of the transit trade for Nejd from Persian Gulf ports to Jeddah. This is shown in the increased commercial activity between Jeddah and Nejd.

3. The King's journey to Riyadh resembled in many respects an advance into unpacified country. Reconnaissances in force were carried out at every stage of the journey for fear of attack from the Ataibah tribes, and progress was consequently slow. Thanks to the elaborate precautions taken, and no doubt, also, to the arrival of news of the defeat of the Ajman, his journey through the doubtful area appears to have been accomplished without untoward incident. After considerable delay he reached Dawadami, near Sha'ara, a place about 150 miles from Riyadh and some distance away from the main road, to which he had summoned the Ataibah chiefs.

4. He appears at this meeting to have upbraided them for disloyalty and to have passed certain judgments upon them of a nature not recorded, but apparently connected with dismissals and appointments. To judge by the account of his speech to the assembled chiefs published in the local newspaper, Ibn Saud did not mince matters. He reminded his audience of the day when with a band of forty men he attacked and defeated them, and he told them that his people were their masters and the descendants of their masters by right of the sword. "Are there not a number of you," he said, "upon whose fathers' and grandfathers' necks my sword and my father's sword and my grandfather's sword made play?" He finally informed them that he intended to annihilate the Ajman tribe, and he called upon all backsliders to take part in an attack which he proposed shortly to launch against them. Absence of any of the leaders without proper excuse was to be punishable by death or by the arrest of his forces and the confiscation of his arms and horses.

5. On the night of the 17th July the Akhwan leaders Hazam-bin-Hithlain and Al Foqum arrived in Koweit and asked for an interview. The Sheikh of Koweit refused to allow them to enter the city, but, with his concurrence, His Majesty's representative met them at 5.30 A.M. on the 18th instant at a place 1½ miles outside the walls. At the interview the rebels expressed the desire to conclude a treaty of friendship with Great Britain. They stated that they would undertake not to attack Iraq or Koweit, and asked in return for free access to Koweit in order to purchase supplies. His Majesty's representative, in reply, gave them clearly to understand that His Majesty's Government could not treat with men in rebellion against a friendly ruler, and reiterated the previous orders given, that they could have no supplies from Koweit and that if they crossed either the Iraq or the Koweit border they would at once be bombed. Apart from this, there have been no noteworthy incidents on the Koweit border.

6. There is nothing of interest to report in regard to the situation on the Iraq frontier.

7. Another series of raids is reported from both sides of the Transjordan frontier. Further notes have been received from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, complaining of the continuance of this state of affairs. On the other hand, protests are received from the Transjordan authorities in respect of raids from Nejd. Information has also been communicated by these authorities to show that certain protests lodged by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in June are without foundation.

8. Sheikh Fuad continues to press for a settlement of the whole question. The Hejaz Government, he stated in an interview with His Majesty's agent, regards His Majesty's Government as fully competent to deal effectively and quickly with the situation on the frontier. They cannot, therefore, understand how it is that raiding is allowed to continue from the Transjordan side. For their own part, he states, they are keeping their frontier tribes in control, and raids into Transjordan are consequently few and far between. He was assured that the matter was engaging the urgent attention of His Majesty's Government.

9. His Majesty's Government have accepted, subject to minor conditions of procedure, to act as arbitrator in regard to past raids if requested by both Governments to do so, and they have informed the Hejaz Government that they share their anxiety to settle the question as soon as possible.

10. Another note has been received from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to the interpretation of article 6 of the Bahra Agreement. The Hejaz Government, while maintaining its opinion that His Majesty's Government are raising new issues, is nevertheless prepared on a basis of reciprocity to accept what it regards as the two new conditions which His Majesty's Government have laid down in connexion with this article. They propose, however, by extension, to apply them to the Hadda Agreement also.

11. Negotiations are still in progress for the supply to the Hejaz Government of four aeroplanes and the relative equipment, accompanied by British personnel. There has necessarily been some delay in making arrangements, but His Majesty's Government are now prepared to meet the material requirements of the Hejaz Government from stocks in Iraq. In the meanwhile, the Hejaz Government has been informed that their proposals are receiving the sympathetic consideration of His Majesty's Government, and that a definite reply to them will be sent as soon as possible. His Majesty's Government have also under consideration the possibility of themselves bearing a substantial proportion of the initial cost.

12. The financial situation of the Hejaz is becoming somewhat precarious. The situation in Northern Hasa obliges the King to maintain a large force in that neighbourhood, and its upkeep forms a constant drain on the Treasury. The local financial representative of the Hejaz Government, as, I believe, the Minister of Finance at Mecca also, is hard put to it to respond to the demands made upon him, and the former has instructions to remit daily to Abdulla Suleiman in Mecca the receipts of the various Government offices in Jeddah. Customs dues have been collected in anticipation for months ahead. It is practically impossible to obtain payment at present for goods which were commandeered at the time of the King's departure for Riyadh, and the Government owes money all round.

13. No doubt with the object of raising the revenue, the duties have suddenly been raised on the following imports: Tobacco, 40 piastres Miri per kilog. to 80; motor cars, 20 per cent. *ad valorem* to 35 per cent.; spare parts and accessories, 20 per cent. to 40 per cent.; benzine and lubricating oils, 17 per cent. to 50 per cent.; woollen Persian carpets and rugs, 15 per cent. to 25 per cent.

14. It is stated that large stocks of tobacco were bought up by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs before he promulgated the relative decree. On the other hand, the Governor of the town, the chief importer of tobacco but no friend of Sheikh Fuad, was badly caught over a large consignment which was on its way at the time. The other members of the trio responsible for the new duties, Sheikh Abdulla Suleiman and Sheikh Abdulla-el-Fadl, are similarly believed to have made handsome profits by cornering benzine, lubricating oil and motor-car parts just before the new duties came into force. The first effect of the imposition of the new duties will be to provide a large incentive to smuggling, and it is highly doubtful whether increased revenue will be forthcoming.

15. Ibn Saud has taken another important step towards establishing the Wahhabi religious influence at Mecca to the exclusion of that of all other sects.

16. It will be remembered that soon after his rise to power he made drastic reductions in the number of Imams of each of the four Sunni sects who had for generations past led the daily prayers at the holy mosque in Mecca. His next measure was to allow one Imam only for each sect, the four Imams taking turns during the day in leading the five different prayers, the Wahhabi Imam doing so at two of the sessions.

17. Ibn Saud has now abolished this system. He first of all dismissed the non-Wahhabi Imams and appointed one other Wahhabi Imam, thus leaving two only, both Egyptians, to lead the daily prayers. It was subsequently found necessary on practical grounds to increase the number of Imams from two to five. The three additional Imams have been chosen from among the residents of Mecca. They formerly belonged to one or other of the non-Wahhabi sects, but they are all now converts to the Wahhabi doctrines, and, like the other two Imams, lead the prayers according to the Hanbali form of worship. None of them has had any previous connexion with the mosque. Two of them are Indians, young men of no religious standing, and one of these was, until his elevation, a bookseller in Mecca.

18. Hitherto also a separate part of the mosque (musallah) has been reserved to each sect for its devotions. With the dismissal of the Imams these musallahs automatically cease to exist and all prayers are now read from one part of the mosque only. Although under the system existing latterly all four sects of the Sunnis have had perforce to accustom themselves to praying indifferently under the leadership of their own Imam or that of the other sects whose turn it happened to be to lead the prayer, the non-Hanbali sects have done so in the comforting knowledge that they were still represented at the mosque and that, as explained above, they had, once a day, an opportunity of following their own Imam.

19. Ibn Saud's action is likely to be severely criticised in the Mahometan world, and it is not impossible that the pilgrimage may be affected.

20. The visit of Ainal Mulk Habibullah Khan Howaida, Persian consul-

general for Syria, has quickly been followed by the despatch of a delegation to Tehran under a certain Sheikh Abdulla-el-Fadl. The delegation left on the 20th July.

21. The Hejaz Government is in pourparlers with the Polish Government with the object of obtaining recognition and of concluding a commercial treaty.

22. The pilgrimage proper is now over so far as Jeddah is concerned. The last pilgrim ship left Jeddah on the 18th July. One hundred and seventeen destitute Indians were repatriated at the expense of the Government of India, while sixty-five destitute Afghans were repatriated by the leading notables of Jeddah. Among the Indians who applied to this agency for repatriation as destitutes was a party of eight weavers who had been engaged by Ismail Ghaznavi, on behalf of the Hejaz Government, in order to weave the holy carpet. These had fallen foul of their Indian director, and some of them had been thrown into prison in Mecca.

23. Far fewer fines were inflicted this year on the shipping companies for the detention of pilgrims beyond the twenty-five days' grace allowed, the only offenders, in fact, being the Shustari Line.

24. The general impression left is that, whilst there is very great room for improvement, the pilgrimage was on the whole successfully managed in comparison with former years. A greater number of cars and lorries were engaged to deal with casualties and, except in the Central Hospital at Mecca, where arrangements were hopelessly inadequate, better provision was made for administering first aid, for affording pilgrims protection from the sun and for providing them with water. There was general security, but many cases of petty theft were reported at Arafat and Muna. There have been more complaints than last year directed against the Mutawifs, whose activities have not been so strictly controlled.

25. On the 25th July the Hansa Line steamship "Falkenfels" arrived, and during the night discharged a quantity of arms and ammunition. The local authorities attempted to land the cargo at a remote part of the beach, but it was found that there was not sufficient depth of water for the purpose and the whole consignment had to be landed at the customs in broad daylight. The obvious but ineffectual attempt at secrecy tends to strengthen a strong local rumour that the consignment is of German origin.

26. H.M.S. "Clematis" paid a visit to Jeddah towards the end of the month. The usual visits were exchanged between the commanding officer and the local authorities. The Governor referred appreciatively to the regatta organised by the commander of H.M.S. "Clematis" on the 21st May and expressed the hope that a similar regatta would take place next year.

27. The staff of the Soviet agency has been reinforced by the arrival of a lady doctor, who offers free treatment to all and sundry. She is the second lady doctor practising in Jeddah, Mme. Luba Petrides being the other.

28. The cause of feminine emancipation has received a set-back in the Hejaz. The wife of one of the local European residents, who is in the habit of wearing a sleeveless dress with a suggestion of décolleté, has been called to account by the Committee of Public Morals. The sight of the lady's arms and neck is evidently too much for the impressionable Nejdi, and she has been warned henceforth to keep them covered.

29. The Saudieh Motor Company, which was inaugurated with a flourish of trumpets about the end of 1927 and has been the pet concern of the King and his Ministers, who have shares in it, has gone bankrupt and is now in liquidation. The King, it is said, has waived his claim to £5,000, a gesture which does not, however, appear to have roused any enthusiasm among his fellow shareholders.

30. Much jubilation was caused in Mecca during the month by an edict issued by the Emir Feisal authorising music to be played outside the urban area. Crowds availed themselves of this relaxation of the rigid canons of moral behaviour hitherto enforced, and I understand that, in the first burst of enthusiasm, the nightly scenes of revelry at Jorana, a picnic resort about 15 miles outside Mecca, equalled those of Hampstead Heath, its Christian counterpart. Unhappily, though, the released emotions were not kept within reasonable bounds and the order was quickly rescinded.

31. During the period under review one slave, of Abyssinian origin, took refuge at this agency and was repatriated to his home by way of Massowa.

30

[E 4714/66/91]

No. 31.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 216.)

HIS Majesty's agent and consul at Jeddah presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a note to the Acting Hejaz Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 25th August, 1929, respecting the supply of aeroplanes for the Hejaz Air Force.

Jeddah, August 25, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 31.

Mr. Bond to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mecca.

After compliments.)

Your Excellency,

Jeddah, August 25, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the interview which I was privileged to have with His Majesty the King on the 17th June last (10.1.1348), in the course of which His Majesty was pleased to express his desire to purchase aeroplanes from the British Government for the Hejaz-Nejd Air Force and to engage British personnel in it.

2. In your Excellency's letter of the same date you were good enough to explain in detail the exact nature of His Majesty's requirements.

3. I have now much pleasure in informing your Excellency that, as a result of the negotiations which have been in progress since the receipt of your Excellency's letter, His Majesty's Government are now prepared to supply from stocks in Iraq, with which the Royal Air Force squadrons in that country are now in process of re-equipment, four new Wapiti aeroplanes equipped with Jupiter VI engines, aircraft and engine spares, one spare engine, 1,000 20-lb. bombs complete, and four Royal Air Force heavy tents. The total cost of the above has been reduced to the figure of £23,239.

4. I am to explain that this reduction means that His Majesty's Government will themselves defray the cost of freight and all other incidental charges. It therefore in effect represents a free gift by His Majesty's Government of about one-fifth of the total cost and thus furnishes concrete evidence of their goodwill towards His Majesty and their desire to assist him.

5. The machines offered are of the most up-to-date type and of a type also that is the most suited to Arabian conditions. Other machines, of the D.H. type for example, are for this reason not offered.

6. Great care has also been exercised in the selection of personnel.

7. His Majesty's Government understand that it was the desire of His Majesty the King to have of the best both as regards machines and personnel. They agree as to the wisdom of this and believe that their present offer complies with it in both respects.

8. All pilots and most of the mechanics are ready to proceed at short notice.

9. As regards payment, His Majesty's Government wish to avail themselves of the proposal contained in your Excellency's note and request that the sum mentioned above may be paid in advance.

10. It should be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government cannot contribute to the cost of maintenance or renewal. The cost of maintenance is now estimated at £11,000 per annum for the first two years, after which period the need of reconditioning would involve an increase. This sum includes the "extraordinary allowances" referred to in numbered paragraph 3 of your Excellency's note of the 4th instant (28.2.1348).

11. I am to add that His Majesty's Government consider it necessary, in the interests both of themselves and of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its dependencies, to obtain an assurance that no aircraft carrying non-Moslems shall fly over or near the Holy Places.

(Respects.)

W. L. BOND.

31

[E 4773/2322/91]

No. 32.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 138.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, September 18, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 97.

In view of contents of note referred to in my telegram No. 131, I am not acting on authority conveyed in your telegram No. 94. Do you wish me to do so?

[E 4773/2322/91]

No. 33.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 100.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, September 20, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 138 of 18th September: Activities of Nejd rebels in Koweit.

Particulars of the incident referred to in my telegram No. 94 of 7th September have been communicated to Hafiz Wahba, and will no doubt become known to Hejazi Government.

You should therefore address a note to Hejaz Minister for Foreign Affairs recording the circumstances of Feisal-ed-Dawish's entry into and withdrawal from Koweit territory, and pointing out that the political agent at Koweit took action in this matter in strict and loyal compliance with the undertaking given by His Majesty's Government to prevent the improper use of Koweit territory by Nejd rebels (see my telegram No. 62 of 18th June).

You should request Fuad Hamza to bring Colonel Dickson's action on this occasion to the notice of King Ibn Saud.

You should make no reply to the note from the Hejazi Government referred to in your telegram No. 131, nor refer to it in your note based on this telegram.

[E 4833/2322/91]

No. 34.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 21.)

(No. 139.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, September 21, 1929.

MY telegram No. 130.

Government officials in conversation talk of success of punitive expedition.

I am informed on good authority, though, that punitive force has been defeated at Wady Subai, a little north of Khurma, and that large proportion has deserted.

Strong rumours that well-known Wahabi leader Khalid-bin-Lowai, the commander of the expedition, has withdrawn to Khurma, and that Taraba, the place mentioned in paragraph 2 of my telegram referred to, is now in the hands of rebel tribes, added to the fact that two caravans have been attacked on north of Mecca-Taif road, and a number of cars sent from Taif to Riyadh with supplies have been obliged to return via Medina, tend to confirm the rumour of defeat.

I also learn from same source that situation at Wehji and Alula is giving cause for disquiet. Certain of Hashimite leaders are said to be at the bottom of present trouble.

(Repeated to Koweit, Bushire, Jerusalem, Bagdad, Simla, No. 192. Copies by post to Cairo, Aden.)

[E 4892/2322/91]

No. 35.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 140.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, September 24, 1929.

MY despatch No. 159 and your telegram No. 100.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs is under impression that His Majesty's Government have undertaken to attack Dawish on sight whenever he is found in Koweit territory, and requests action should be taken accordingly. He does not regard British undertaking as bearing solely on maintenance of neutrality of Koweit and prevention of improper use of Koweit territory.

[E 4940/3/91]

No. 36.

Papers communicated by the Colonial Office, September 26, 1929.

(1.)

Ibn Saud to Sir G. Clayton (Bagdad).

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

Mecca, June 22, 1929.

WE seize the opportunity of the passage through Bagdad of our mission to Persia, consisting of Sheikh Abdullah-al-Fadhl, vice-president of our Advisory Council, as president, and Muhammad Abdul Rawwaf, our acting (or deputy) agent in Syria and the Lebanon, as member, to submit to your Excellency through them this our letter and to reassure you of the friendly feelings we entertain, and have always entertained, towards your Excellency.

In addition to our instructions to the aforesaid to convey to you an expression of our friendly feelings and love, we have asked them to explain to you certain matters concerning the present situation on the frontiers and the efforts now being exerted by us, in addition to those already exerted, for the purpose of eliminating all cause of difference and disturbance. We trust that the aforesaid individuals will be the subject of your considerate attention, and that, as it has been your practice hitherto and as we expect of you, you will do your utmost for the removal of all causes of difference.

Please accept, &c.

ABDUL AZIZ-AL-SAUD.

(2.)

Sir G. Clayton to Ibn Saud.

Your Majesty,

Bagdad, August 28, 1929.

I have received with the greatest of pleasure your Majesty's gracious letter of the 15th Muharram, 1348, which was handed to me by Sheikh Abdullah-al-Fadhl, vice-president of the Advisory Council at Mecca, and your Majesty's envoy to Persia.

It was a great pleasure to me to receive once more your Majesty's kind expressions of friendship and affection, and I was glad also to have the opportunity of doing what I could to assist your Majesty's mission on their journey. They have now returned from Tehran and I understand have reached satisfactory results in the interests of peace and friendship between your Majesty and the Shah of Persia.

Sheikh Abdullah-al-Fadhl and the other members of your Majesty's mission have discussed various questions with me and have explained to me your Majesty's views and wishes in accordance with the instructions which your Majesty had given them.

Your Majesty may be assured that every effort will be made by the Iraq Government to prevent any of those who are in revolt against your Majesty, or fleeing from their just punishment, taking refuge in Iraq. The other questions, such as the supply of aeroplanes, &c., as I have seen from the correspondence which has been taking place, have been already put in train, and are, I hope, reaching results satisfactory to your Majesty. I look with interest for all accounts of your Majesty's doings in the hope that it will not be long before I hear that your Majesty has succeeded in punishing the evildoers and restoring peace and tranquillity throughout the districts which they have been disturbing.

I send this letter by the hand of Sheikh Abdullah-al-Fadhl, but I fear that as he is returning to Mecca by way of Syria and Egypt that it will be some time before it reaches your Majesty.

I hope that your Majesty will accept my most respectful greetings and good wishes and assurances of my sincere friendship and desire to do all that is possible to remove all causes of difficulty and misunderstanding.

I remain, &c.

GILBERT CLAYTON,

High Commissioner for Iraq.

[E 4892/2322/91]

No. 37.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 102.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, September 26, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 140 of 24th September: Activities of Nejdi rebels in Koweit.

Fuad Hamza has misunderstood the position, which is that His Majesty's Government have undertaken to prevent Nejdi rebels from using Koweit as a base for their activities against, or as refuge from, Ibn Saud. With this object in view authority was given for Feisal-ed-Dawish to be attacked if this should be necessary in order to eject him from Koweit territory. This authority was not an instruction to attack Feisal-ed-Dawish at sight, but was intended to enable British authorities to take drastic action against him if and when necessary without reference to higher authority.

Colonel Dickson, on the occasion to which my telegram No. 100 of 19th September refers, did in fact take steps which resulted in Feisal-ed-Dawish leaving Koweit territory forthwith. Had these steps not been successful he would no doubt have had resort to more drastic action.

No action such as that foreshadowed in Hejaz Government's note referred to in your telegram No. 131 of 11th September is covered by the undertaking given by His Majesty's Government.

[E 5013/2322/91]

No. 38.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 224.)

HIS Majesty's agent and consul at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him a letter of appreciation from the Hejaz Government.

Jedda, September 9, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 38.

*Fuad Hamza to Mr. Bond.**Jedda, September 3, 1929.*

THE goodwill and the desire to co-operate with His Majesty's Government manifested by the friendly British Government, by their refusing on two occasions to listen to the rebels against whom His Majesty the King has sent the necessary forces in order to punish them for their hostile action towards the neighbouring countries, have had the best of effects and impressions on my Government.

The resolute course adopted by His Britannic Majesty's Government, as reported in your Excellency's two notes of the 27th July and the 27th August, 1929, in pursuance of which orders were given for action to be taken against the rebels, is evidence of firm friendship, and His Majesty's Government welcome it with thanks and a sense of obligation.

I am directed therefore to communicate my Government's thanks officially to His Britannic Majesty's Government for the honourable position which they took up.

With the highest respects,

FUAD HAMZA,

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

34

[E 5017/5017/91]

No. 39.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 230. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, September 10, 1929.

WITH reference to this agency's despatch No. 60 of the 20th April, 1928, transmitting a list of Arab personalities, I have the honour to enclose biographical notes on Abdulla Suleiman and Tewfik-esh-Sherif for addition to the list.

2. No circulation of this despatch and its enclosure is being made from this post.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 39.

*Biographical Notes.**Abdulla Suleiman.*

A Nejd, probably from Riyadh, who started life as coffee boy to Qusaibi, the Bahrein pearl merchant, in whose service he subsequently spent ten years in Bombay as Arabic clerk on 30 to 40 rupees a month. He was at one time a broker, but as such was declared insolvent. On the death of his brother, who was a correspondence clerk employed by Ibn Saud, Abdulla Suleiman, on the recommendation of Qusaibi, entered the royal service in his brother's stead. He had no position of standing until the fall of Jeddah, when, in the general distribution of posts, he was appointed Reis-ed-Diwan. He gradually enlarged the scope of his activities to include charge of all household, Bedouin and finally financial affairs. His financial control has since last autumn been absolute. He seizes every penny that enters the revenue-earning departments, and his omnipotence in the Hejaz is unchallenged except perhaps by Fuad Hazam. He travels with a larger retinue and in greater state than Ibn Saud himself. (June 1929.)

Tewfik-esh-Sherif.

He is sometimes called Tewfik Bey Sherif. Comes of a Yemeni family said to be of a certain importance, which has been established for the last century at Damascus. He is a graduate of the Turkish Military College and was a captain in the Turkish army. He was for many years the secretary of the Great Senussi, and accompanied Syed Senussi to Nejd and later to Mecca. Here he became appointed Rais-ed-Diwan of Naib-el-Am in Mecca. This post, however, he surrendered in favour of employment as Ibn Saud's propagandist and unofficial agent abroad. In this capacity he visited India in 1926, afterwards visiting Germany, where he is reported to have had relations with Soviet agents. Apparently owing to the King's distrust of his activities at this juncture, or possibly considering it expedient to disown him, a notice was published in the "Um-el-Qura" stating that Tewfik Bey Sherif was in Germany as a merchant, and had no connexion with the Hejaz Government. The local Hejaz officials, however, had no doubts as to the fact of his employment, especially as Tewfik Bey Sherif was known to be still sending confidential reports to the King and to the Emir Faisal at Mecca.

Although a Syrian, he has privately declared himself to be opposed to Fuad Hamza, Yussuf Yassin and the other Syrian opportunists in the country whom he accuses of dishonesty and whom he considers to have a malevolent influence on the King, particularly so far as Ibn Saud's relations with His Majesty's Government are concerned. He professes great concern for the future of Arabia and regret at the neglect of the country's real interests under the Saudian régime, which, he declares, is now no better than that of King Hussein. He has a fair knowledge of French and some slight acquaintance with English, and has been spoken of as an alternative Foreign Minister to Fuad Hamza. Is small, gentle almost to timidity, and has a certain quiet charm. Physically he is a weakling. (June 1929.)

35

[E 5002/2322/91]

No. 40.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 144.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, September 30, 1929.

FOLLOWING is a summary of main points of lengthy memorandum dated 14th September addressed by the King to British Government with reference to assurances given by His Majesty's Government to prevent rebels entering Iraq or Koweit territory:—

Ibn Saud is now ready to attack them, but before doing so wishes to eliminate any cause for misunderstanding with His Majesty's Government.

First of all, though, he feels bound to pay an unqualified tribute to the efforts of British officials in Iraq and Koweit to assist him.

He then describes briefly eighteen cases which have occurred during the last three months in order to show that assistance and encouragement is being received by the rebels from Koweit and Iraq and from King Feisal himself and that constant communications pass between rebels and the Court at Bagdad; all this is contrary to undertakings of British Government and happens, no doubt, without their consent. These incidents lead to friction and bad relations all round, but their chief importance lies in their effect on harmonious relations existing with His Majesty's Government.

King then refers to six occasions during the last three months when the Koweit frontier has been crossed by the rebels for their own purposes. In spite of promise of His Majesty's Government, they are still taking refuge there. What will be the attitude of His Majesty's Government if they remain in Koweit territory and the King wishes to attack them? If His Majesty's Government object to this, what measures will they take themselves to expel them? As regards assistance received from Iraq, the last proposal made to the rebels by King Feisal is that they should march into Iraq territory and proceed thence to Syria. Ibn Saud fears this may be done clandestinely.

Will His Majesty's Government object to force being posted near Iraq frontier to intercept rebels and to attack them wherever they may be? If they manage to get through to Syria, may the King's forces pursue them over any territory over which His Majesty's Government exercise influence?

Ibn Saud anticipates a rush for asylum to Koweit or into Iraq and wishes to pursue rebels wherever they may be found in order to annihilate them.

Ibn Saud states that he has addressed communication on this subject for their information direct to High Commissioner of Iraq and Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

Full translation of memorandum follows by bag leaving to-morrow.
(Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire and Koweit, No. 196.)

[E 5059/3704/91]

No. 41.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 487.)

Sir,

Gulhek, September 20, 1929.

IN my telegram No. 300 of the 26th August I had the honour to report that a Treaty of Friendship had been signed here between the Persian Government and delegates from the Hejaz on behalf of Ibn Saud.

2. I enquired recently of Taimourtache about this treaty. He told me that it would in due course be published.

3. Meanwhile, he could tell me that it was a very simple treaty in five articles relating to perpetual friendship, exchange of diplomatic and consular representatives in accordance with international practice, protection of Persian pilgrims to Mecca, and eventual ratification. His Highness assured me that there was nothing else.

*. The treaty has not yet been published.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[21087]

D 2

[E 5160/2322/91]

No. 42.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Acting High Commissioner for Iraq.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, October 8.)

(No. 295.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, October 4, 1929.

MY telegram of the 2nd October, No. 291.

It is proposed, subject to your views and those of Resident, Bushire, who is also being consulted, to send telegram to British agent, Jedda, in the following terms in reply to his telegram of the 30th September, No. 144:—

[Here insert text of my immediately following telegram.]

Please inform me whether you concur by telegraph, repeating to Bushire.

It is very desirable that His Majesty's Government should be authorised to deny emphatically allegation made by Ibn Saud that King Feisal is in constant communication with rebels and is assisting them. Have I the King's authority to do this?

[E 5160/2322/91]

No. 43.

Acting High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, October 8.)

(No. 350.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bagdad, October 6, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 295, dated the 4th October.

I have discussed the whole question with the Resident in the Persian Gulf, who is here, and the Air Officer Commanding, and we concur in the terms of the proposed telegram to Jedda. It must be remembered that, should Ibn Saud's force be driven across the frontier, it may be mistaken for rebels and bombed, as it will be impossible to distinguish between them from the air. We suggest that the message to Ibn Saud might contain a warning to this effect.

I fear it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to deny *in toto* the allegations made by Ibn Saud against King Feisal, as they are partially corroborated by the Sheikh of Koweit, and King Feisal himself admits that he has sent emissaries to the rebels, but asserts that they are sent only to obtain information. He points out that Ibn Saud sends agents in the same way both to Iraq and Koweit for the same purpose.

Recently I received from Ibn Saud a letter in which he detailed his grievances against Feisal. I have informed the Prime Minister of Ibn Saud's complaints, and have asked for an immediate assurance that the Government of Iraq in no way countenances the activities of the agents complained of, and that they are taking steps to prevent all intercourse between persons from Iraq and rebels. I have also requested reaffirmation of Iraq Government's obligations to refuse asylum to the rebels and to prevent any supplies from reaching them from Iraq. I will communicate Iraq Government's reply by telegraph as soon as it is available. The opinion of King Feisal, which is shared by Abdullah, whom I saw at Amman, and also, I understand from the Resident in the Persian Gulf, by the Sheikh of Koweit, is that Ibn Saud's authority is on the verge of collapse. King Feisal's personal attitude is that, apart from his own feelings, this, in fact, would best suit Iraq's interests. He argues that effective union of the fanatical tribes of Central Arabia can be maintained only by a policy of never-ceasing aggression against neighbouring States. But disunited, those tribes would expend their energies on local disputes, and in consequence the Iraq frontier, covered by friendly Shammar, would be secure.

King Feisal is prepared, however, in deference to His Majesty's Government, to withdraw his agents and to maintain a scrupulously correct attitude in conformity with His Majesty's Government's policy in regard to Ibn Saud.

(Repeated to Bushire.)

[E 5239/2322/91]

No. 44.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 107.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, October 14, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 144 of 30th September: Position of Akhwan in regard to Iraqi and Koweiti frontiers.

You should inform Ibn Saud, in reply to his memorandum of 14th September, that His Majesty's Government gladly agree to his posting a force near the Iraqi frontier to intercept rebels. They would further welcome any proposals which he may be prepared to make for the establishment of close liaison on the frontier, and suggest that he should designate emissaries to keep the local frontier authorities in Iraq and Koweit informed of the movements of his troops and of the rebels.

His Majesty's Government regret, however, that they cannot reconsider their previous decision against any crossing of either frontier by Ibn Saud's forces.

As Ibn Saud has already been assured, all possible steps will be taken to prevent the use of Iraq and Koweit as a refuge by Akhwan rebels, and the local military authorities have been authorised, if necessary, to take drastic action to achieve this object.

Ibn Saud will, however, himself realise that if rebels should succeed either in crossing frontier with their women and children, or in effecting junction with latter in Iraqi or Koweiti territory, local military authorities may be placed in most embarrassing position. His Majesty's Government therefore hope that Ibn Saud will be able to take effective measures to prevent such a contingency arising.

You should also explain to Ibn Saud that if his own forces cross the Iraqi or Koweiti frontier it may be impossible from the air to distinguish them from rebels, and thus there may be serious risk of their being bombed.

[E 5308/2322/91]

No. 45.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 153.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, October 15, 1929.

AN official communiqué is published here to-day to the effect that expeditions against Ataibah have been successful and that no more trouble is expected from these tribes. I believe this is largely true.

Communiqué adds that rebels in the north have also been defeated and Feisal-ed-Dawish killed.

(Repeated to Koweit, Bushire, Simla, Jerusalem and Bagdad, No. 208. Copies by post to Cairo and Aden.)

[E 5376/2322/91]

No. 46.

*Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, October 18.)*

(No. 46.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, October 16, 1929.

POLITICAL agent at Koweit reports that Mutair and Ajman, under Dawish, inflicted crushing defeat on Awazim at Indjair on 5th October. Latter finally surrendered to Dawish on 8th October, and, with his permission, are about to approach Sheikh of Koweit for shelter and protection. Sheikh has decided to grant them protection. As result of victory, Bani Hajir and Bani Khalid are reported to have offered to submit to Dawish. Dawish is reported to have moved towards south-east Nta in pursuit of Gurki Abu Ithaar. He has given out that he then intends to march in to Hoffuf Qatif and Jubail areas, and later into Nejd. Unconfirmed report received at Koweit that Ibn Musa'ed has retired to Hail owing to indication of Shammar unrest, also that Ataibah are in open rebellion.

(Repeated to Government of India, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Jedda and Bahrein.)

[E 5377/2322/91]

No. 47.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, October 18.)

(No. 47.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, October 16, 1929.

MY telegram of the 16th October, No. 46.

I see no objection to the Sheikh of Koweit affording shelter to remnant of Awazim, who are really a Koweit tribe (see paragraph 9 of my despatch of the 8th August, No. 40.)

(Repeated to Bagdad, Simla and Jedda.)

[E 5410/2322/91]

No. 48.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 247.)

Sir,

Jeddah, September 22, 1929.

IN my telegram No. 130 of the 10th instant I touched briefly on the conditions in the Hejaz, and I mentioned then that the political and financial situation was becoming steadily worse.

2. In view of recent and possible developments, it may be of interest if I amplify the information contained in my telegram and give a résumé of the main features of the situation as it is to-day and as it appears to Jeddah and Mecca opinion, with which I am in touch.

3. Ever since Feisal-ed-Doweish threw off the veil of his doubtful allegiance and declared himself openly in rebellion against Ibn Saud the Government has had to deal with a growing restiveness and lawlessness among the tribes, which has vented itself in incidents of major or minor importance, and which has now brought the Government face to face with a critical situation, resembling in many ways the position at the beginning of the Great War, when the Hejaz was menaced by the revival of the militant Wahabi power, to which it eventually succumbed.

4. There is a general feeling abroad now in Jeddah and Mecca among the better-informed classes, whether sympathetic or hostile to the present régime, that the fate of the Hejaz and of Arabia in general may at any time within the next few months be staked upon the issue of a decisive battle between Ibn Saud and the rebel forces. There does, in fact, seem little doubt that the King's position in Arabia is shortly to be put to a searching test. Openly, every confidence is professed in the result. In private, one observes an undercurrent of anxiety, and anxiety which, fed by the successive rumours of gossip-mongers, sees its justification in the exceptional measures taken by Ibn Saud to provide for the coming conflict. Doubts are expressed as to his ability in certain eventualities to control the situation in the interior; such eventualities might result, for instance, from a succession of *coups*, possibly of small importance in themselves, in which the Akhwan were victorious. Their prestige is such that, given a reasonably successful start, they are likely to attract active sympathy and co-operation from all sides.

5. It would be futile to attempt a comparison between the strength of the rival forces. These vary almost from day to day, and they would fluctuate in accordance with the varying fortunes of the campaign. According to the local representative of the Minister of Finance, Ibn Saud has strong detachments based on Hail, Tebuk, Medina and Riyadh. His position is a strong one. He has all the material if not the moral advantages on his side, and, above all, he has relative freedom of movement and has had time to prepare for a campaign. Whatever the risks may be, therefore, his forces have every chance of success provided that he himself survives. On the other side, the rebels are also believed to be well armed, but one may infer from the deputations and appeals to the Sheikh of Koweit and their anxiety to avail themselves of the Koweit grazing grounds that they are severely handicapped by lack of supplies. Numerically, also, they must be at a great disadvantage.

6. The chief weakness of the King's position lies in the inferior *moral* of his army as compared with the fanatical enthusiasm and desperate courage of the Akhwan and in the general unpopularity of his rule. As a result of the latter, it is generally believed that, except in Nejd proper, the majority of the tribes would rise at once if there were any reasonable hope of throwing off his yoke. Added to this is the fact that he is unable to rely on a large number of troops who have been enrolled

in the south by attractive promises and by enforced levies, and who have not got their heart in the fight; they include, for instance, a number of Arabs of the Ataibah tribe, of which several sections are in open defection. Many of these troops have been sent to Medina, and thence drafted to other bases, while some 7,000 are distributed at different posts between Taif and Henakiya to provide against surprises. In Nejd itself, to judge from the small number of tribal chiefs of importance who are reported to be with him at Riyadh, he does not appear to have succeeded in rallying the tribes to his side and has had to fill his ranks largely with townsmen.

7. Another weakness is the fact that the defection of the Akhwan has to a large extent discredited him among the more fanatical and influential elements of his own following. People like Abdulla-bin-Hasan, a descendant of Abdul Wahhab, who was chiefly responsible for the recent dismissal of the imams at Mecca and Medina, Abdulla-bin-Blaihid, until last year Grand Qadi of Mecca, Mohammed-bin-Ali Turki, who resigned the same post a few months ago, are commonly believed to favour the Akhwan cause, while Abdul Latif, another descendant of Abdul Wahhab and one of the most influential ulemas at Riyadh, is reported to have left Riyadh and to have definitely gone over to Feisal-ed-Doweish. Ibn Saud is beginning to be regarded by these fanatics as no longer true to Wahhabi tenets and as being himself now no better than an infidel. Their support of him is, in any case, likely to be lukewarm only, as they themselves would stand to lose by any diminution of the fanatical Akhwan influence.

8. Signs and incidents are not wanting to alarm the inhabitants of Jeddah and Mecca. Following on the recent *coup* of Feisal-ed-Doweish at Qaya came the news, confirmed from various sources, of the Emir Saud's narrow escape from capture on his way to Hasa, when fourteen out of seventeen cars are said to have been taken and their occupants killed. This was followed by the defection of the Beni Amr of the Nejd Harb, a fact which is symptomatic of the unhealthy condition of the regions around Medina and Henakiya and further north.

9. The situation in the Northern Hejaz has its repercussion in the south in the growing truculence of the Ataibah, as shown by acts of aggression which have lately been committed by them. I may refer again to the attacks on the two caravans on the Mecca-Taif road, where perfect security was thought to exist, and I may mention the arrest of Abdulla-bin-Hassan, whose great religious prestige was expected to guarantee him a safe passage from Mecca to Riyadh, whither he was being sent with gold and with arms and ammunition. He was apparently allowed by the Ataibah to proceed after giving the most solemn assurances that he would secure the release of their chief, Ibn Bujad, but from all accounts the gold, arms and ammunition were retained by the Ataibah.

10. It is now practically established that the punitive expedition sent against them under the well-known Wahhabi leader, Khalid-bin-Lowai, has been checked or defeated, and Khalid himself is believed to have withdrawn to Khurma, whither reinforcements have been sent.

11. It will not be an easy task to bring the Ataibah to heel. Naturally turbulent, connected by blood relationships with the Ashraf, and akin also to the recalcitrant Mutair, they have latterly become impatient over the continued detention of Ibn Bujad in Riyadh. The task will be made no easier by the fact, if it proves to be true, that the tribes around Turaba and further south into Asir, *e.g.*, the Beni Shahrhan, have become disaffected.

12. In view of the state of affairs as described above, it is not to be wondered at that the *moral* of the local Hejazi is shaken. Communication with the north is difficult and takes considerable time. Rumours of defeats are exaggerated and good news, meagre as it is, is received with a scepticism born of many disappointments. The black side of things, therefore, looms large before his anxious eyes, and he derives little comfort from a situation which, for all its brighter aspects, is wrapped in uncertainty. To add to his gloom, the cost of all such commodities as are normally purchased from the interior, *e.g.*, mutton and butter, has risen considerably and is still rising. The cost of mutton, for instance, is doubled.

13. As indicated, though, in my telegram No. 130 of the 10th September, the conditions of the country, although far from satisfactory, is to a large extent the natural consequence of the period of suspense through which it is passing in anticipation of a definite solution by battle of the question of supremacy. It should not be forgotten either that, although latterly there has been peace and security in the Hejaz, disturbances, raiding and counter-raiding on a larger or lesser scale is a normal state of affairs in Arabia.

[21087]

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14. The political situation is still further complicated by the present financial crisis. The Government is having the greatest difficulty in raising money to satisfy the King's requirements and to meet other calls. An attempt to raise a loan among local Jeddah merchants has had no success. Customs dues, as reported in my telegram No. 119 of the 15th August last, have been collected in advance on orders placed, although the goods are not due to arrive for months ahead. Large increases have been made in the customs tariff on tobacco and certain other commodities (*vide* my despatch No. O.T. 9 of the 9th August). Cash which merchants at Yambo, Wejeh, &c., wish to remit to Jeddah is often commandeered by Government representatives, and drafts on the customs are given in exchange. These drafts, which now constitute the usual method of payment, are rapidly losing value, although it is still possible to negotiate them with the more influential merchants at a 5 per cent. discount; it is impossible except in rare cases and by bribery to realise them on presentation. An appreciable proportion of Government funds is diverted into improper channels and finds its way into the pockets of the higher Government officials and of the Emir Feisal himself, while the sums that are sent to Riyadh are, from all accounts, expended by the King in true Royal fashion. A form of taxation has been introduced among the tribes around Taif by which each tribe is called upon to supply a fixed number of men and camels for the arms, failing which a fine of £8 per camel and £13 for each fighting man short of the number is inflicted. This tax is causing widespread discontent. Finally, there is a report from Mecca to the effect that funds held on trust on account of deceased persons' estates are, despite the injunctions of the Koran, being used by the Government for its own needs.

15. The fact is that the Government cannot afford the maintenance of a large military establishment which circumstances have forced upon it; nor can it look for relief until the present situation is liquidated, and what now forms a large standing army, judged by Arabian standards, is effectively reduced.

16. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt, Iraq and Palestine, the Governor-General of the Sudan, the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, the Political Resident, Aden, the political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Political Agent at Koweit, and the senior naval officer, Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c.
W. L. BOND.

[E 5411/94/91]

No. 49.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 248.)

Sir,

Jeddah, September 24, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to 31st August, 1929.

2. Copies of this report have been sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Delhi, Singapore, Khartum through Port Sudan, Lagos (2), the senior naval officer, Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c.
W. L. BOND.

Enclosure 1 in No. 49.

Jeddah Report for Period August 1 to 31, 1929.

THE keynote of the month under review has been one of pessimism so far as Jeddah is concerned. Communication with the north has become increasingly difficult, and the rumours that have filtered through have not been of a kind to allay local fears.

2. News of Feisal-ed-Doweish's successful surprise attack on the 26th July on the Sbei and Sahool tribes, who were concentrated at Qaya, near Artawiyah, under the protection of a detachment of Ibn Saud's troops, was followed by a report, subsequently confirmed, of the narrow escape from capture of the Emir Saud on

his way from Riyadh to Hasa, when fourteen out of seventeen cars of his convoy are believed to have been taken and the occupants killed. The ground was thus prepared for a crop of rumours, which has been keeping the Jeddawi on tenterhooks during the latter part of the month.

3. The Emir Mishari of Buraida, who was related to Ibn Saud and acted as Viceroy in the Hejaz during the Emir Feisal's visit to Europe, is said to have been murdered in his own house by one of Feisal-ed-Doweish's tribesmen. Frequent rumours were also heard of troubles in Medina-Henakiya districts. Security is said no longer to exist, and there are constant reports of minor raiding and robberies in those districts. Further north the Emir Neshmi is reported to be besieged at Tebuk by Hamouda-ibn-Farhan of the Beni Atiya tribe. Troops are constantly being drafted to Medina for distribution to other bases, and a force of 7,000 troops is distributed at different posts between Taif and Henakiya.

4. To counteract the effect of these incidents and rumours of incidents, which, it must be admitted, are to a large extent the natural concomitant of the present period of suspense and anxiety, the Hejaz Government never misses an opportunity of making encouraging announcements, usually of an exaggerated and, as often as not, of an entirely false nature. There has not been much for them to say this month, as the King, despite his declared intention to attack the rebels, appears to have been waiting upon events, and to have spent the month in active preparations for the campaign against the rebels.

5. On the 22nd August Ibn Mashhur sent a message to the political agent at Koweit stating that he had been deputed by the Akhwan leaders to lay their case before the High Commissioner in Bagdad, and requesting permission to proceed there unmolested on the 24th August. The request was categorically refused, and Ibn Mashhur was ordered to leave Koweit territory immediately.

6. Towards the end of the month His Majesty's political agent at Koweit reported that the whole of the Braih concentration at Hafar had thrown in their lot with the insurgents, and that the defection of this important group was likely to have serious repercussions.

7. On the 29th August a report was received by the political agent at Koweit that Feisal-ed-Doweish's wife, accompanied by the women, children and old men of the Mutair and Rashaida tribes, had suddenly crossed into Koweit territory with large numbers of camels, and had camped at Subaiyah and the other wells in the immediate vicinity. The following day Feisal-ed-Doweish himself, together with the other Akhwan leaders and the whole of the rebel forces, were discovered to have entered Koweit territory, having arrived from Arak. The reason given for their action was the serious shortage of water and the grazing famine in Northern Hasa. Feisal-ed-Doweish was interviewed by His Majesty's political agent on the 30th August, and gave his word of honour to leave Koweit territory within forty-eight hours with all his following.

8. Recruiting has been intensified among the tribes around Taif. A fixed number of recruits and camels has been demanded from the tribes; failure to provide them involves a penalty of £8 per fighting man and £13 per camel short of that number. Motor car companies are being called upon to have two cars with chauffeurs always ready at the disposal of the Government. A deposit of £25 is exacted as a guarantee against default. Several companies are anxious on this account to liquidate their business, but permission to do so is being refused. The camelmen of the Harb are said to be keeping away from the towns at present for fear that their camels may be commandeered.

9. The financial position (July report, paragraph 12) gives increasing cause for anxiety. The Government has no credit and is heavily in debt.

10. One raid is reported from the Nejd-Iraq frontier, where, on the 25th August, a band of Mutair rebels 100 strong under Jabir-bin-Ashwan raided the camp of the Sinjara Shammar at Al Aha in Iraq, 58 miles north-east of Jumaima. The raiders were pursued by the Iraq police, who engaged them the same evening. The rebels were driven out of Iraq with heavy casualties, the leader himself being killed, and the bulk of the loot recovered.

11. No raids on the Nejd-Transjordan frontier were reported during the month under review. With regard to the question of arbitration over past raids on this frontier (July report, paragraph 9), the Hejaz Government have left all minor matters of procedure to be settled by His Majesty's Government. They consider, nevertheless, that the procedure at present contemplated may entail unnecessary delays, and they again request a speedy solution of all outstanding claims. They will welcome any measures taken, of whatever nature, which may help to achieve this end.

12. With regard to the supply of aircraft and personnel to the Hejaz Government (July report, paragraph 11), His Majesty's Government have decided themselves to defray the cost of freight and all other incidental charges, representing a free gift of about one-fifth of the total cost. His Majesty's Government have informed the Hejaz Government that they desire in this way to furnish concrete evidence of their goodwill towards Ibn Saud and their desire to assist him. The machines offered are of the most up-to-date type, and of a type also that is the most suited to Arabian conditions.

13. His Majesty's Government consider it necessary in the interests both of themselves and of His Majesty the King to obtain an assurance that no aircraft carrying non-Moslems shall fly over or near the holy places. Representations have been made to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on this subject.

14. Substantial agreement has been reached over the form of contract for the personnel.

15. The cargo of arms and ammunition landed from the steamship "Falkenfels" (July report, paragraph 25) was forwarded to Mecca. A rumour reached the camelmen that their camels were to be requisitioned, and they accordingly scattered into the desert. The police were busy the whole of the following day rounding them up, but they were not very successful. Mecca was the sufferer, as there was thus an interruption in the supplies from Jeddah, resulting in fluctuation of prices of certain commodities.

16. In connexion with the supply of ammunition, it is reported that the King recently engaged a Turk from Constantinople, an expert in refilling cartridges. It is said that the man demanded a salary of £60, but that the King was so delighted to find that he actually could perform the duties for which he was engaged that he doubled the salary asked for and gave him a bonus of £200 in addition.

17. The dismissal of the regular imams from the holy mosque at Mecca (July report, paragraph 15) and the appointment of Wahabi imams in their place has been followed by similar action at Medina, where the non-Hanbali imams have been dismissed and replaced by three new imams, two of whom are Nejdīs and one a negro from Timbuctoo. The appointment of this last cannot fail to give offence, particularly as the imams of Medina have been held in high esteem, some of them claiming direct descent from the Ansar (the Helpers of the Prophet). These changes are said to have been brought about at the instigation of the Akhwan, who are alleged to have declared that they would rather follow a Hanbali dog than an imam of the other sects, whom they regard as infidel.

18. A press communiqué, dated the 3rd August, announces the signature of a treaty of friendship between the Government of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies and the Turkish Republic. The "Al Mokattam," of Cairo, in its edition of the 30th August, published an article to the effect that Seny Bey, the Turkish consul-general in Jeddah, who is now in Syria on leave, stated in an interview with a correspondent of a Syrian paper, in which the Turco-Hejaz Treaty was discussed, that he was going to conclude a similar treaty with the Yemen on the resumption of his duties.

19. The delegation sent by Ibn Saud to the Persian Government (July report, paragraph 20) has concluded a treaty of friendship with the Persian Government. This was signed at Tehran on the 24th August. The local newspaper had already announced, on the 16th August, the mutual recognition of the Persian and Hejaz Governments, and published congratulatory telegrams exchanged between the Shah and the King and between the two Foreign Ministers.

20. There have been some rumours of a proposed treaty between the Hejaz and the Italian Governments. Any negotiations to this effect will probably await the arrival of a new Italian consul, a Signor Solazzo, who has been transferred to Jeddah from Lourenço Marques, and is due to arrive towards the end of September.

21. A translation of an Italian version, published in the July edition of the "Oriente Moderno," of the treaty of friendship of the 26th April between Germany and the Kingdom of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies, is attached to this report.

22. The proposed conclusion of a money order agreement between the Hejaz and Palestine Governments and another between the Hejaz Government and the Government of India is still hanging fire over the question of interest payable on outstanding balances of accounts. It has not so far been possible to find a circumlocution which would meet the objections of the ulema, who will not, on religious grounds, have anything to do with a proposal which might be construed into an agreement for the payment of interest.

23. In connexion with the collection of customs dues on the Nejd-Transjordan frontier, the Hejaz Government stated in October last year that all goods imported into Nejd territory should pass through one or other of the following posts, where the dues could be levied: Qariat, Jauf, Teima, Tebuk and Dheba. They also asked to be informed at which posts customs posts were to be established in Transjordan for the collection of the dues on goods imported into Transjordan. In a note dated the 20th August the Hejaz Government was informed that the Transjordan Government had decided that merchandise imported into Transjordan from Hejaz-Nejd must henceforth enter Transjordan by one of the following routes:—

- (1.) By Aqaba port.
- (2.) By Al Jauf-Al Jafr-Maan.
- (3.) By Tebuk-Maan.
- (4.) By Qaryat-al-Mahl-Al Omari-Al Muwaqqar-Sahab-Amman.

24. The first small batch of Indian pilgrims, the forerunners of the 1930 pilgrimage, who arrived by the steamship "Rahmani" on the 10th July, has been followed by another contingent, who reached Jeddah by the steamship "Akbar" on the 12th August.

25. No slaves were repatriated during the period under review.

Enclosure 2 in No. 49.

Extract from the "Oriente Moderno" of July 1929.

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP OF APRIL 26, 1929, BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE KINGDOM OF THE HEJAZ, NEJD AND ITS DEPENDENCIES.

THE President of the German Reich and His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies, mutually guided by the desire to establish and consolidate ties of friendship between the two States, and convinced that the commencement of relations between the two States will be useful to the prosperity and well-being of both peoples, have decided to draw up a treaty of friendship, and to this end have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:—

The President of the German Reich:

Herr von Stohrer, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Cairo.

His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies:

His counsellor Sheikh Hafez Wahba, and Sheikh Fausan-el-Sabek, his representative in Egypt;

who, after reciprocal communication of their full powers, found in good and due form, have stipulated the following clauses:—

ARTICLE 1.

Between the German Reich and the Kingdom of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies and between the nationals of each State shall reign inviolable peace and sincere and lasting friendship.

ARTICLE 2.

With the intention of establishing in due course diplomatic and consular relations between the two contracting States, it is agreed that their diplomatic and consular representatives shall enjoy in the territory of the other State, on a basis of reciprocity, the treatment established by the universal principles of international law.

ARTICLE 3.

The nationals of either contracting State shall be received in the territory of the other State in conformity with the principles and practice of common international law, and shall enjoy, for their persons and for their goods, the same treatment as the nationals of the most favoured nation. Thus the ships of either contracting State and their cargoes shall enjoy, in every respect, in the ports of the other State, the same treatment as the ships and cargoes of the most-favoured nation.

ARTICLE 4.

The products of the soil and of the industry of either contracting State, which are introduced into the territory of the other State for consumption, re-export or in transit, shall be treated as the similar products of the soil or of the industry of the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE 5.

This treaty is drawn up in duplicate, in the German and Arabic languages, and both parts have equal validity. The treaty is to be ratified. The documents of ratification will be exchanged as soon as possible in Cairo. The treaty enters into force on the act of exchanging the documents of ratification.

In faith of which the plenipotentiaries of both parties have signed this treaty and have affixed their seals thereto.

Cairo, April 26, 1929 (corresponding to the 16th Zil Qeda 1347).

v. STOHRER.
SHEIKH H. WAHBA.
SHEIKH FAUSAN-EL-SABEK.

[E 5566/2322/91]

No. 50.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 113.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, October 30, 1929.

BUSHIRE telegrams Nos. 46 and 47 to the Colonial Office of 16th October repeated to you: Defeat of Awazim by Feisal-ed-Dawish.

To forestall possible protest, please inform Hejazi Government that, in the circumstances described, His Majesty's Government have acquiesced in decision of Sheikh of Koweit to allow the remnant of the Awazim tribe to take refuge in Koweiti territory.

You may explain, should this be necessary, that Awazim, having surrendered to Feisal-ed-Dawish, can no longer be regarded as part of Ibn Saud's forces, but that they equally cannot be regarded as insurgents, so that present attitude of His Majesty's Government is not inconsistent either with their decision not to allow Ibn Saud's forces to cross frontier, or with their undertaking not to allow the rebels to find refuge in Koweit.

[E 5655/2322/91]

No. 51.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office November 4.)

(No. 58.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, November 2, 1929.

REFERENCE my telegram of the 31st October, No. 56.

Dawish, who left Jahra two hours before dawn on the 1st November, met representative of Sheikh of Koweit. He said that he was moving into Nejd at once.

- (1) He begged for an assurance from His Majesty's Government that they would not allow Mutair and Ajman families, whom he was leaving camped in their present localities south of Koweit frontier, to be molested by Iraq or Koweit tribes. He would warn them not to cross frontier.
- (2) He asks if His Majesty's Government would permit his women to take refuge at Jahra in Koweit territory, should they be raided by Ibn Saud's Bedouin in his absence.
- (3) He also asks if His Majesty's Government would hold him responsible if he were to shoot down the aeroplanes which he knows His Majesty's Government have sold to King Ibn Saud, or if they were to fall into his hands. He is anxious to do no harm to English or to take any action which might set His Majesty's Government against him. Sheikh of Koweit no longer desires to meet Dawish, but he will send reply in accordance with His Majesty's Government's wishes.

I presume that His Majesty's Government do not wish to deny asylum to the women and children, but would exclude all males who are capable of bearing arms. In view of the fact that the aeroplanes would be in Ibn Saud's service, I presume His Majesty's Government would not object to Dawish attempting to shoot them down, but would expect him to treat with proper consideration airmen that fell into his hands. Please instruct as to reply to be given by Sheikh of Koweit.
(Repeated to India, Jedda and Bagdad.)

[E 5697/2322/91]

No. 52.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 162.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, November 4, 1929.

BUSHIRE telegram No. 58 to Colonial Office.

I fear it would gravely offend Ibn Saud if Dawish were allowed to count on grant of asylum to his women and children in case of need, and that he would regard it as a distinct breach of the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government. The fact that Dawish is cramped in his movements by having to care for these non-combatants is an asset of considerable military value to Ibn Saud, and he is probably counting on it.

(Repeated to Koweit and Bushire, No. 218.)

[E 5687/2322/91]

No. 53.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 268.)

HIS Majesty's agent and consul at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him copy of the reply sent to the Hejaz Government respecting the position of the Akhwan in regard to the Iraqi and Koweiti frontiers.

Jedda, October 16, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 53.

Mr. Bond to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz.

Your Majesty,

(After respectful compliments.)

Jedda, October 16, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to state that I did not fail to inform my Government by telegram of the contents of your Majesty's letter of the 14th September.

2. I have now received telegraphic instructions to inform your Majesty that the British Government gladly agree to your Majesty's proposal to post a force near the Iraq frontier in order to intercept the rebels. They would further welcome any proposals which your Majesty may be prepared to make for the establishment of a close liaison on the frontier, and they suggest that your Majesty should designate emissaries in order to keep the local frontier authorities in Iraq and Koweit informed of the movements of your Majesty's troops and of the rebels.

3. His Britannic Majesty's Government regret, however, that they cannot reconsider their previous decision against any crossing of either frontier by your Majesty's forces.

4. As your Majesty has already been assured, all possible steps will be taken to prevent the use of Iraq and Koweit as a refuge by the Akhwan rebels, and the local military authorities have been authorised, if necessary, to take drastic action to achieve this object.

5. Your Majesty will, however, realise that, if the rebels should succeed either in crossing the frontier with their women and children, or in effecting a junction with the latter in Iraq or Koweit territory, the local military authorities may be placed in a most embarrassing position. The British Government, therefore, hope that your Majesty will be able to take effective measures to prevent such a contingency arising.

6. If the Nejdi forces of your Majesty cross the Iraq or Koweit frontier, it may be impossible from the air to distinguish them from the rebels, and thus there may be a serious risk of their being bombed.

With the highest respects,
W. L. BOND.

[E 5823/54/91]

No. 54.

Sir P. Loraine to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 882.)

Sir,

Ramleh, October 31, 1929.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 255 of the 24th August last, I have the honour to inform you that, in the course of a visit paid to me on the 25th instant, Sayed Mohammed Zabara again expressed the conviction that the Imam Yehya sincerely desired to compose by friendly negotiation the differences which at present disturb good relations between Great Britain and the Yemen.

2. He referred to the imam's proposals, recently submitted through the intermediary of Commander Craufurd (see Weekly Summary of Events, No. 59, page 7, para. 4), with no great optimism. He seemed, indeed, rather to presume their failure, for his main endeavour during our conversation was to ascertain whether an alternative line of approach, either through this Residency or direct to London, would be acceptable to His Majesty's Government.

3. I informed him that in no circumstances could I consent to intervene in a sphere of politics not my own by undertaking to replace the Political Resident at Aden as a channel of communication between the imam and London. He then suggested that the imam should send an official mission, headed by one of his sons, to London, preferably during the presence of Sir Stewart Symes in the United Kingdom on leave, to negotiate a settlement. I replied that this proposal should be made through the Resident at Aden. He toyed with the idea of a direct communication from the imam to London, but evidently feared a rebuff. I endeavoured, while insisting that Aden was the proper channel for such communications, to remove his apprehension that any overtures made through Aden were doomed to meet with an unfriendly reception. In this I was, I fear, not entirely successful.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Sir Stewart Symes.

I have, &c.

PERCY LORAINÉ,
High Commissioner.

[E 5809/2322/91]

No. 55.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Acting Resident in the Persian Gulf.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, November 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, November 6, 1929.

YOUR telegram 2nd November, No. 58.

His Majesty's Government strongly deprecate continued discussion with Faisal-al-Dawish in view of reactions on Ibn Saud and of use to which such discussions might be turned by Dawish himself.

Sheikh of Koweit should accordingly inform Dawish that his questions have been communicated to His Majesty's Government, who have replied as follows:—

"They do not feel called upon to indicate attitude which they would adopt in circumstances referred to by him, but, as regards his point 2, assurances given to Ibn Saud preclude grant of refuge to Dawish's women in Koweit or Iraq. As regards his point 3, they would take very serious view of failure on his part to treat with full consideration any British personnel that might fall into his hands."

In communicating above, it should be made clear that His Majesty's Government are not prepared to enter into any further discussions with Dawish, who should be warned that if he himself or any of his emissaries cross Koweit frontier again they will be liable to arrest or any other action that may be considered necessary.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 347, and Jedda, No. 117.)

[E 5809/2322/91]

No. 56.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Acting Resident in the Persian Gulf.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, November 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Colonial Office, November 7, 1929.

MY telegram of 6th November.

Please report when message has been despatched to Dawish in order that Ibn Saud may be informed of action taken.

[E 5837/2322/91]

No. 57.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 119.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, November 13, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 162 of 4th November: Attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Faisal-ed-Dawish.

You may communicate to Ibn Saud, should you see no objection, the substance of Faisal-ed-Dawish's requests, as reported in Bushire telegram No. 58 to Colonial Office, together with substance of reply thereto (see paragraph 2 of Colonial Office telegram of 6th November to Bushire, repeated to you in my telegram No. 117), which was communicated to Dawish on 8th November.

In making this communication, however, you should remind Ibn Saud of considerations advanced in penultimate paragraph of my telegram No. 107 of 14th October, since His Majesty's Government clearly cannot guarantee that it would in all circumstances be possible for them to prevent women and children from crossing into Koweit or Iraqi territory.

You may also communicate to Ibn Saud substance of last paragraph of Colonial Office telegram of 6th November to Bushire.

[E 6006/94/91]

No. 58.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 275.)

Sir,

Jeddah, October 24, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to 30th September, 1929.

2. Copies of this report have been sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem (two), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Delhi, Singapore, Khartum through Port Sudan, Lagos (two), the senior naval officer, Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 58.

Jeddah Report for the Period September 1 to 30, 1929.

IN fulfilment of the undertaking which he had given to His Majesty's Political Agent at Koweit at his interview on the 30th August, Faisal-ed-Dawish and his following, who had penetrated into Koweit territory, began to evacuate it on the 31st August at dawn, the evacuation being practically completed by the 5th September. The entry into Koweit territory was more or less forced upon him by circumstances, and his various embassies to Koweit gave grounds for thinking that he was at the time in some straits owing to lack of supplies and the difficulty of finding grazing grounds for his animals. The fact that he has been compelled to withdraw does not, however, necessarily imply that his situation is becoming precarious. He may soon expect better climatic conditions, an all-important factor, and he is as yet by no means circumscribed in his movements.

2. Towards the middle of the month His Majesty's Political Agent at Koweit reported that, according to Ibn Saud's agent at Koweit, Ibn Musaad, the Emir of Hail, had completely defeated at Umm-ar-Rudhumma a raiding party of 500 rebels under Azaiyiz, the son of Feisal-ed-Doweish, intercepted on his return from a successful surprise attack on Lauqah, 180 miles north of Hail. Azaiyiz was reported to have escaped with eighty men, and Faisal-al-Shiblan, Feisal-ed-Doweish's chief lieutenant and adviser in the Mutair, with a hundred. On the 21st September His Majesty's agent at Koweit reported that Faisal-al-Shiblan and Ibn Ashwan's son had, in fact, returned to Wafra on the 17th September with a large number of Shammar camels captured in a successful raid near Hail and Shujiba. No definite news had, however, been received of Azaiyiz, although there is strong evidence to believe that he has been killed.

3. Feisal-ed-Doweish was next reported to have moved to Arak, a short distance south of the neutral area below Koweit, on the 18th September and to have announced his intention of marching with the Ajman on Naariyeh, 130 miles south of Koweit. After dealing with the Awazim at Nta, he proposed with the Mutair to carry the war into Nejd proper, leaving the Ajman in control of Hasa.

4. In Southern Nejd and in the Hejaz there has been serious trouble with sections of the Ataibah, who, under the leadership of Al Dahaina, have perpetrated various acts of aggression, and succeeded at one time in interrupting communications between Mecca and Riyadh. Several lorries and cars were attacked and their contents, including arms and gold, were taken. A punitive expedition was sent against them from Taif under Khalid-bin-Lowai, but it would seem that the strength of the Ataibah movement was underestimated and that the expedition received a set-back and was obliged to withdraw to Khurma, while bodies of the Ataibah penetrated as far as Turaba and raided villages in that neighbourhood. Reinforcements under Mohammed-bin-Sahmi were hurried to the support of Khalid-bin-Lowai, but up to the end of the month no news of a decisive action had been received.

5. Meanwhile the Governor of Jeddah was instructed to prevent the sale of food-stuffs to Ataibah tribesmen and to exercise a strict control over their sale to other visiting tribes.

6. There does not appear to have been any improvement in the conditions in the north-west area, and disquieting accounts have been received of the situation at Wejh and El Ula. On the Medina and Henakiya side the Beni 'Amr of the Nejd Harb are believed to have cast off their allegiance, and frequent reports are received of raids and robberies in that region.

7. It is estimated that approximately 7,000 Bedouin have been enrolled at Taif and despatched to the northern areas, while fresh and stringent measures are being applied to levy men and money from the Hejazi tribes.

8. The financial situation (August report, paragraph 9) continues to give cause for anxiety, and the Government has increasing difficulty in raising money to satisfy the King's requirements and to meet other calls. An attempt has been made to raise a loan locally among the Jeddah merchants, but it has met with no success. Cash which merchants at Yambo, Wejh, &c., wish to remit to Jeddah is often commandeered by Government representatives and drafts on the Customs are given in exchange. These drafts, which now constitute the usual method of payment, are rapidly losing value, although it is still possible to negotiate them with the more influential merchants at a 5 per cent. discount; it is impossible, except in rare cases or by irregular methods of persuasion, to realise them on presentation. The sums which are sent to Riyadh are, from all accounts, expended by the King in true Royal fashion. A form of taxation has been introduced among the tribes around Taif by which each tribe is called upon to supply a fixed number of men and camels for the army, failing which a fine of £8 per camel and £13 for each fighting man short of the number is inflicted. This tax has given rise to general discontent. Finally, there is a report from Mecca to the effect that funds held on trust on account of deceased persons' estates are, despite the injunctions of the Koran, being used by the Government for its own needs.

9. A memorandum has been addressed to His Majesty's Government by Ibn Saud, in which he complains of intrigues against him on the part of King Feisal of Iraq, and cites instances to show that, contrary to the undertakings of His Majesty's Government, and no doubt, he says, without their consent, assistance and encouragement is being received by the rebels both from Koweit and from Iraq. He fears that, when driven to extremities, the rebels may make a rush for asylum into Koweit territory or Iraq, and he wishes to pursue and attack them wherever they may be found. In order to intercept them, should occasion arise, he desires to post a force

near the Iraq frontier. He is now ready to attack the rebels, he states, but, before doing so, would like to eliminate any grounds for misunderstanding with His Majesty's Government on the subjects of complaint. At the same time he pays unqualified tribute to the assistance rendered to him by the British officials in Iraq and Koweit.

10. The attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government towards the representations and requests of the Akhwan leaders, Hazam-bin-Hithlain and Al Foqum (July report, paragraph 5), and Ibn Mashbur (August report, paragraph 5), elicited on the 3rd September an appreciative note from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, who stated that the resolute course followed by His Majesty's Government was evidence of firm friendship, and the Hejaz Government welcomed it with thanks and a sense of obligation. A further note was, however, received from Sheikh Fuad a week later of a different tenor. The goodwill of His Majesty's Government and its co-operation with the Hejaz Government appeared to Sheikh Fuad, apparently on second thoughts, to be considerably less manifest than was indicated in his first note. He explained that the interview which His Majesty's Political Agent at Koweit had had with the rebel leaders, coupled with the fact that they had been allowed to return in safety, had caused an unfortunate impression and had given rise to reports that the attitude of His Majesty's Government and of the Governments of Iraq and Koweit had undergone a change and that the undertakings given were no longer being observed. He hoped that instructions would be given to the responsible authorities in future to arrest all such rebels and to hand them over to the Hejaz Government for trial and punishment.

11. On the 22nd September a note was addressed to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs giving full details of the entry into Koweit territory of Feisal-ed-Doweish and his followers and of his subsequent withdrawal. It was pointed out at the same time that His Majesty's Political Agent at Koweit took action in this matter in strict and loyal compliance with the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government to prevent the improper use of Koweit territory by Nejd rebels, as communicated to the Hejaz Government in a note addressed by His Majesty's agent at Jeddah to Sheikh Fuad on the 21st June.

12. It was stated in this note that authority had been given for Feisal-ed-Doweish to be attacked at once in the event of his entering Koweit territory. This phrase was evidently misunderstood by Sheikh Fuad, who did not regard the British undertaking as bearing solely on the maintenance of the neutrality of Koweit and the prevention of the improper use of Koweit territory, but had interpreted it as meaning that His Majesty's forces would at once attack Feisal-ed-Doweish whenever he was found in Koweit territory. He therefore requested that action should be taken accordingly. Sheikh Fuad was informed, in reply, that the British Government had undertaken to prevent Nejd rebels from using Koweit territory as a base for activities against His Majesty the King or as a refuge from His Majesty's forces; with this object in view, authority had been given for Feisal-ed-Doweish to be attacked if this should be necessary in order to eject him from Koweit territory. This authority, it was explained, was not an instruction to attack Feisal-ed-Doweish at sight, but was intended to enable the British authorities to take drastic action against him if and when necessary without reference to higher authority.

13. The following raids are reported on the Transjordan frontier: On the 19th July Ibn Shahil, with a party of 200 camelmén, raided a section of the Shararat at El Hind, south of Qalat Mudawwara. The loot taken amounted to fifteen tents and 200 camels. On the 18th August a party of Billi tribesmen from the Hejaz raided and carried off about 100 camels from the Rukaibat section of the Howeitat who were in camp at Qalat Mudawwara. About the same time and in the same district a camp of Transjordan Beni Atiya and Howeitat was attacked.

14. The Hejaz Government on their side have communicated a further list of ten minor raids carried out by Transjordan subjects between the 24th February last and the 20th June against Hejaz subjects.

15. His Majesty's Government are actively considering, and hope shortly to put into effect, far-reaching measures which they confidently believe will improve the existing situation on the Transjordan-Nejd frontier.

16. The question of arbitration procedure in respect of past raids on this frontier (August report, paragraph 11) is still under consideration; certain matters connected with it have been referred to the Emir of Transjordan.

17. On the 9th September a statement was communicated to the Hejaz Government of the compensation due on account of human lives as well as property in

respect of raids carried out by Nejd subjects against shepherds and tribesmen of Iraq during the period the 1st July, 1928, to the 31st May, 1929. The Hejaz Government was informed that this statement of Iraq claims had the full support of His Britannic Majesty's Government, who considered that the claims should be settled in accordance with article 2 of the Bahra Agreement. If reference to the special tribunal provided for in the article were considered necessary by the Hejaz Government, His Majesty's Government were ready to co-operate in setting it up.

18. As regards the question of interpretation of article 6 of the Bahra Agreement which has arisen between His Majesty's Government and the Hejaz Government (July report, paragraph 10), His Majesty's Government consider that no useful purpose would be served by further discussion of this subject.

19. Similarly, in regard to the renewed representations made by Sheikh Fuad over the question of British responsibilities in Iraq in so far as they concern the Hejaz Government, His Majesty's Government consider that the position has already been fully explained to Sheikh Fuad, and they do not, therefore, propose to continue the discussion.

20. A communication was received from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 23rd September to the effect that the Hejaz Government considered it necessary in the present circumstances to ensure speedy communications with His Majesty's High Commissioner in Iraq, and they had therefore decided to appoint an agent at Bagdad to keep in touch with the High Commissioner. The person selected was Sheikh Mohammed Eid-er-Rowaf, at present assistant representative of the Hejaz Government in Syria. His Majesty's Government was approached in order that the High Commissioner might authorise the appointment.

21. The Hejaz Government have accepted the proposals of His Majesty's Government for the supply of aeroplanes and equipment (August report, paragraph 12). Textual agreement has also been reached over the final form of the contracts of the personnel, and a draft on London for £12,000, representing approximately half the total cost, has been handed to His Majesty's agent and consul at Jeddah. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes to be able to pay the balance shortly.

22. It is expected that the aeroplanes will be based at El Qatif, on the Persian Gulf, or on Darin Island close by.

23. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, in conversation with His Majesty's agent, has expressed his readiness to give the assurance required by His Majesty's Government that no British non-Moslem personnel will be called on or allowed to fly over or near the holy places of Islam.

24. In order to forestall tendentious rumours which might have circulated in the Hejaz as a result of the reports which had been spread in Northern Palestine to the effect that Jews in Jerusalem had laid their hands on Harm-el-Sharif and had dropped bombs upon it, His Majesty's agent communicated to the Hejaz Government on the 12th September the text of the *démenti* published by the president of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Moslem Congress.

25. The Emir Shekib Arslan, the extremist Syrian Nationalist, who had been spending some months in Mecca, passed through Jeddah towards the middle of this month on his way to Europe. He was fêted during his short stay in Jeddah, and was seen off on the 13th September by a large gathering of leading officials and notables.

26. The notorious Indian agitator, Moulvi Obeidullah Muhajir, has been appointed religious teacher at the Holy Mosque in Mecca. The appointment was conferred upon him by the King, with whom he has considerable influence and by whom he is constantly consulted. It carries with it a certain dignity, and it will give Moulvi Obeidullah a standing among pilgrims and others such as he has not possessed hitherto. Moreover, the nature of his duties, for which he is said to have refused a salary, will give him excellent opportunities of disseminating his doctrines among the mutawwifs and the pilgrims themselves.

27. The Italian sloop "Lepanto" arrived in Jeddah on the 20th September and left on the 22nd September.

28. During the period under review one slave, of Abyssinian origin, took refuge in this agency, and was manumitted and repatriated via Massowa.

[E 6009/2322/91]

No. 59.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 279.)

Sir,

Jeddah, October 28, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my telegrams Nos. 139 and 148 of the 21st September and the 10th October last regarding the reported defeat of a punitive expedition sent against the Ataibah under the command of Khalid-bin-Lowai.

2. Further reports of this incident have now been received.

3. It appears, as far as I can judge from the confused accounts which have reached me, that a strong force of the Ataibah under El Dahaina moved southwards across the Mecca-Riyadh road, penetrating as far as the country around Turaba, raiding villages in that neighbourhood, but not venturing near Taif.

4. Khalid-bin-Lowai's expedition against them was not at first successful, and he was compelled to retire or else of his own accord withdrew to Khurma. However, on the arrival of reinforcements sent from Taif under Mohammed-bin-Sahmi, Khalid-bin-Lowai made a detour and threatened the Ataibah communications, thus compelling the forward detachments of the raiders to withdraw. He then appears to have followed up his success by driving those detachments northwards, and an action is reported to have taken place between them and the loyal sections of the Ataibah under Ibn Rubeian, in which they are said to have been defeated with heavy loss. It is now reported that numbers of men, women and children of the rebellious Ataibah have been, and are being, brought in to the camp of Khalid-bin-Lowai, and are being butchered in his presence, some of the more important captives being sent to the King, and, after a nominal trial by the Sharia Court, flogged and put to death.

5. Matters might have become more serious but for the fact that the raiding parties devoted, as usual, too much attention to plunder and too little to tactical considerations. Also, had some of the other Ataibah leaders, such as Sultan Abu-el-Ala, who had apparently been wavering, thrown in their lot with El Dahaina, the danger would have been very much greater. Sultan Abu-el-Ula himself is reported to have been summoned by the King, and to have been sent to a distant region where he can do no harm.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioners for Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan, the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, the Political Representative in the Persian Gulf at Bushire, the Political Resident at Aden and the Political Agent at Koweit.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

[E 6054/2322/91]

No. 60.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, No. 67 of November 19.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, November 20.)

(No. 67.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, November 19, 1929.

EVER since Dawish's departure there have been persistent rumours that he had decided to submit to Ibn Saud, partly as a result of the collapse of the Utaibah, but chiefly because of His Majesty's Government's recent uncompromising reply to his three questions (see your telegram of 6th November, No. 1121). Above has now been confirmed by reliable persons sent by me to enquire the truth of the story from Dawish himself. Latter, who is apparently very despondent, stated that he had given up all hope of receiving support from Koweit or Iraq, and had therefore decided to open negotiations with Ibn Saud whilst still strong and undefeated, especially also as the Mutair were pressing this course.

Suitable opportunity to do so had been offered him in the shape of letter received from Ibn Saud a week ago urging him to take this sensible line. Dawish added that he had replied asking exactly what terms Ibn Saud was prepared to offer; he, for his part, states that he only desired to be allowed to adopt a strictly

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nomad life and be left alone. Sheikh considers, and I agree, that Dawish has definitely decided on submission at an early date. This is further confirmed by verbal message last night to Sheikh from Dawish enquiring if he would act as intermediary.

(Repeated to Bagdad, India and Jedda.)

[E 6096/2322/91]

No. 61.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 170.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, November 24, 1929.

KOWEIT despatch No. 225.

I have received a letter from the King dated 17th November with reference to my letter to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of 1st November. The following is its gist:—

"News regarding Awazim is incorrect; it is possibly a trick of Dawish in order to have friends within Koweit territory whom he can use. Even supposing it were a fact, is it lawful for the Sheikh of Koweit in the present critical circumstances to allow portion of the King's subjects to leave his country and settle in Sheikh's territory?

"The King therefore protests strongly against the action of the Sheikh of Koweit, as also against approval given it by the British Government, and requests that all persons claiming to be Awazim or other subjects of His Majesty who may have taken refuge in Koweit should be expelled at once, as this embarrasses his action against rebellion."

(Repeated to Bushire.)

[E 6109/2322/91]

No. 62.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 172.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, November 24, 1929.

A MESSENGER has arrived from Riyadh to Amir Feisal in Jedda with a report that Dawish has asked for pardon, but that the King has replied that this can only be decided by Sharia. The report adds that the King proposes to attack at once in force.

It is privately stated that Ibn Saud intends to attack Koweit as Sheikh of Koweit is supporting rebels. It is significant in this connexion that in a conversation which I had with Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday the latter restated his case against Koweit somewhat emphatically. He also handed me an aide-memoire, which he stated represented only his own personal views, and which is in the main a tirade against perfidy of Koweit on line of King's memorandum enclosed in my despatch No. 255, 30th September, though it also states that incidents have occurred there which are difficult to explain except on the grounds that His Majesty's Government have gone back on their undertakings.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs also insistently demands that any rebel entering Mesopotamia or Koweit should be arrested, tried and punished, and that, in accordance with international law, he should be disarmed. Here he says he also speaks for Hejaz Government.

He has not yet received news of Dawish's offer to submit.

The coincidence of the King's projected move to the neighbourhood of Koweit border, as foreshadowed by Hafez Wahba (see my telegram No. 165 of 8th November), the present attitude of Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in spite of all past assurances, and rumour referred to above, suggest possibility that Ibn Saud may be tempted to use the opportunity of presence of his forces on Koweit border, which His Majesty's Government has so strongly recommended, in order to teach Koweit a lesson.

Present intention of Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs may therefore be to forestall eventual protests in case of action against Koweit by Ibn Saud.

(Repeated to Bushire and Koweit, No. 226.)

[E 6109/2322/91]

No. 63.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 128.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 25, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 172 of 24th November: Reported intention of Ibn Saud to attack Koweit.

It is important to know how much credence should be attached to the rumour reported in paragraph 2 that King intends to attack Koweit. Please therefore telegraph further particulars of sources of rumour and your estimate of their value.

[E 6169/2322/91]

No. 64.

Agent, Jedda, to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 174.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, November 27, 1929.

FOLLOWING is gist of letter received from the King dated 17th November:—

The rebels have learnt of Ibn Saud's imminent attack and have been advised from high quarters in neighbouring countries to scatter if they cannot withstand him and to save themselves by mingling with Arabs of Koweit and Iraq.

Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of my letter of 16th October (*vide* my despatch No. 268) call, he says, for special attention.

As to paragraph 4, he has not the least desire to cross frontiers of Iraq and Koweit; he requested permission to do this as a precautionary measure to be acted upon when absolutely necessary and in the event of forces in Koweit and Iraq being unable to prevent insurgents from taking refuge there when pursued by him. What does British Government expect him to do in such an event? If he were to withdraw, leaving mutineers safe in Koweit territory, they would be free to create fresh trouble.

As to paragraph 5, it is obvious that intention to scatter amongst Arabs of Koweit and Iraq when hard pressed is known to British Government. As regards hope expressed in this paragraph, he wishes that British Government would have explained how he can prevent rebels entering Koweit and Iraq territory when Government of Koweit has not prevented them and they are still watering their animals within the refuge of Koweit territory, he himself being debarred from entering it.

The position, as British Government must realise, is difficult for him. As he has actually moved off and expects in a few days to establish contact with insurgents, and as in desert warfare it is essential to seize the first opportunity of attack, he suggests the following:—

(a) That Koweit Government should order their subjects to collect in an appointed locality far from any likely scene of action and should cover them with an armed force. He should be informed of the locality chosen. An adequate force should then be placed by Koweit Government on frontier to repel rebels—he does not think air force alone would suffice. British Government officials should with two forces (presumably Ibn Saud's and Koweit frontier force) push back insurgents as far as possible, even operating within Nejd itself. Any rebel who may succeed in crossing frontier should be arrested and handed over. In this event, he says, there would be no need for him to cross it himself.

(b) If all this is impossible he suggests that subjects of Koweit should be concentrated as in (a) and that he should then be left free to pursue rebels anywhere. In this case he undertakes to protect subjects of neighbouring countries from any aggression. He also promises not to leave a single soldier in those countries a moment after pursuit of insurgents is over. Thus the rebels will be annihilated.

This is, in his opinion, the only way of dealing with the problem and exterminating mutineers. After all his efforts, trouble and expense it will be impossible to return without completely crushing them. If British Government does not agree with either suggestion the consequences will be regrettable. He grieves

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for suffering which he is inflicting on part of his subjects and on their women and children when nothing originally obliged him to punish them except the fact that they have violated assurance (given by him to British Government) by attacking Iraq and Koweit subjects. It was incumbent on him to punish them most severely in order to safeguard his pledge.

If neighbouring countries do not wish to assist him in his efforts to secure their safety and that of their subjects, he does not wish his action to result in clash between his forces—particularly as he is commanding them in person—and those of British Government; this is the situation which he is trying to avoid and which, please God, cannot occur. If the immediately foregoing presumption is correct, he would have to abandon not only punitive measures undertaken but also a plan for ensuring internal security. He will not then be responsible for any aggression against neighbouring countries. He will be justified before himself and the world, for he will have fought against his own people for the sake of neighbours who shelter their own deadly enemies and help these against himself.

He is now setting forth. If either of his two suggestions is met, well and good. If not, he will, to his regret, be compelled to adopt last-mentioned attitude, and, declining all responsibility, will take no further measures to prevent attacks against neighbouring countries. The responsibility will then lie with these countries.

(Repeated to Bushire, Koweit and Bagdad, No. 228.)

[E 6170/2322/91]

No. 65.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 175.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, November 27, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 128.

I am now informed that there is a strong pro-Ibn Saud movement inside Koweit; that considerable funds have already been expended there by the King to foster it; and that the main object of Sheikh Hafez Wahba's mission to Koweit is to gauge and, if occasion should arise, to take charge of the movement. I would normally regard my source of information as fairly reliable.

Rumour referred to in my telegram No. 172 is, so far as I can discover, current amongst a few higher officials and persons in contact with them. It is based, I think, on knowledge of contents of the King's letter to me, reported in my immediately preceding telegram, but it is possible also that there may have been some direct communication from the King of which I am unaware. I do not ascribe the rumour to Bedouin origin. In view of new information now received, I attach greater credence to it than its surmised origin alone might perhaps warrant.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Bushire and Koweit, No. 229.)

[E 6156/2322/91]

No. 66.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, November 28.)

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, November 26, 1929.

FOLLOWING summary of reports from Koweit:—

Sheikh has addressed protest to Dawish regarding presence of Akhwan camels in his territory. Dawish has replied admitting that protest was justified, but states that he is moving south immediately to line of Hafar-Safa-Jaryah-as-Siffi. Ibn Shugair has informed Dawish he has been authorised to act as intermediary. Dawish has replied saying that he will submit with his whole force on the following conditions:—

1. That he be free to purchase supplies in any town in Iraq, Koweit or Nejd.
2. That he should not be required to meet Ibn Saud.
3. That he be allowed to lead the Bedouin's life in the future and not be ordered to reside in any town.

Dawish stated that, in order to test his loyalty, he knew Ibn Saud would order him to attack Koweit, but under no circumstances would he agree, and, in order to strengthen his hand in the coming negotiations, he had ordered raids south to recommence at once.

Political agent, Koweit, has carried out personal reconnaissance on southern border of Koweit, and reports no Akhwan camp inside the border, though a few of their camels making for Jahra water.

Air reconnaissance is being carried out to-day, and armoured cars standing by to proceed if required.

(Repeated to Government of India and Jedda. Copy to Bagdad.)

[E 6157/2322/91]

No. 67.

Acting High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, November 28.)

(No. 421.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, November 27, 1929.

KOWEIT'S Nos. 640 and 641.

Air reconnaissance of 26th November shows numerous herds of camels still watering at Jahra well. Exact location of Dawish and following and his future intentions, especially after threat of his followers to sheikh's guards, still remain uncertain. In view of our promise to Ibn Saud that His Majesty's Government will prevent Koweit and Iraq being used as refuge by rebels, and that military authorities will, if necessary, take drastic action to achieve their object, Air Officer Commanding proposes that two armoured car sections, with special service officer and wireless, proceed Jahra as soon as possible from Basra to deny Jahra well to the rebels. Air reconnaissance will be carried out as required. He also suggests that—

1. Dawish might be warned that air action will be taken unless his followers are removed altogether from Koweit territory by 2nd December.
2. In view of difficulty of identifying tribes from the air, sheikh be asked to remove all non-rebel tribes north of Jahra forthwith.
3. That the sheikh be requested to send representative to join armoured cars at Jahra.

Please let me know as soon as possible whether you concur.

(Addressed to Bushire, No. 334. Repeated to Koweit, No. 334.)

[E 6157/2322/91]

No. 68.

Acting High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, November 28.)

(No. 422.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bagdad, November 27, 1929.

MY immediately preceding telegram, No. 334.

I see no objection to proposal of Air Officer Commanding, from Iraq point of view. I understand his object is not only to expel Dawish, but also to be prepared for possible incursion into Koweit by Ibn Saud in violation of article 6 of Anglo-Nejd Treaty, May 1927. In this connexion, see Jedda telegram No. 226.

(Addressed to Bushire, No. 95 S. Repeated to Koweit.)

[E 6174/63/91]

No. 69.

Agent, Jedda, to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 178.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, November 28, 1929.

MY telegram No. 174.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs is informed that Dawish, if pressed, may also attempt to escape into Transjordan territory, with active co-operation of Transjordan border tribes.

[21087]

Emir Neshmi has therefore been ordered to transfer his force from Tebuk to Jauf to deal with such an eventuality, and also to control the situation as described in my telegram No. 173.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 232.)

[E 6205/2322/91]

No. 70.

Headquarters, Royal Air Force, to Air Ministry.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, November 29.)

(No. Z. 150.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

November 28, 1929.

SEE the High Commissioner's messages Nos. 421 and 422 of the 27th November to Secer. Following is present situation in Koweit:—

Rebels watering within the border as far as Jahra, and have threatened with general reprisals from whole tribe the sheikh's men who tried to prevent them. Feisal-ad-Dawish himself reported camped near Umm-al-Amara on the 22nd November, and may actually be within Koweit border. Loyalist forces reported at Awania, south of Koweit town, about 160 miles, and other parties at Bashuk area and Hafar-al-Ats, but up till now no appreciable forward move has occurred. There is considerable evidence that both parties are endeavouring to terminate dispute by diplomatic methods, but telegram No. 172 to Foreign Office from Jedda, read in conjunction Mutair threat above reported, indicates such agreement may not be without danger to Koweit eventually.

[E 6189/2322/91]

No. 71.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, November 29.)

(No. 73.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, November 28, 1929.

MY telegram No. 1200 (repeated to Colonial Office as No. 71).

Koweit reports that all Akhwan camels watering have left. Jedda has been informed.

Consequently, while grateful to the High Commissioner and Air Officer Commanding for their prompt offer to expel the rebels' camels, sheikh no longer requires assistance. The camels seen by the aeroplanes are his own and Koweit animals, which are now all drinking at Jahra.

As regards threat from Ibn Saud, such a possibility appears remote, and the sheikh does not think counter-measures necessary for the present. Should threat materialise, however, he will not only ask for, but gratefully accept, fullest assistance.

In these circumstances I now consider situation to be normal, and the request for armoured cars may be definitely cancelled.

(Addressed to Bagdad, No. 1206.)

[E 6188/2322/91]

No. 72.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 130.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 29, 1929.

FOLLOWING sent to-day by Colonial Office to Resident, Bushire:—

"Your telegram No. 73 of 28th November and Jedda telegrams Nos. 174 and 175 of 27th November to Foreign Office. In view of importance of giving Ibn Saud no justification or excuse for attempting to invade Koweiti territory or allowing his tribes to resume raiding, His Majesty's Government consider it essential that every possible measure should be taken to implement more fully and effectively the pledges already given to Ibn Saud, and thus place His Majesty's Government in a position to satisfy him that this has been done.

Rebels have had clear warning of consequences of crossing frontier, and methods of persuasion must now give place to measures of compulsion. Furthermore, all communication with Dawish and his associates must definitely cease.

"In these circumstances, (1) measures on general lines of those advocated in Bagdad telegrams Nos. 421 and 422 of 27th November and No. 425 of 29th November should forthwith be taken. His Majesty's Government attach particular importance to removal of all Koweiti tribes and refugee Awazim from vicinity of frontier or scene of possible conflict; (2) you should immediately concert with Air Officer Commanding, Iraq, necessary military measures for ejection of any of contending forces (whether those of rebels or of Ibn Saud) that may enter Koweiti territory. Every effort should, moreover, be made to intercept isolated groups of rebels entering Koweit for the purpose of merging with Koweiti tribes in manner suggested by Ibn Saud (see Jedda telegram No. 174), and secure their immediate ejection from Koweit.

"Political agent should at once approach Sheikh of Koweit to secure his concurrence and co-operation in these measures, which in the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government are essential.

"(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 376, Koweit and Jedda, No. 130.)"

[E 6188/2322/91]

No. 73.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 131.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 29, 1929.

FOLLOWING sent to-day by Colonial Office to High Commissioner, Bagdad, No. 377:—

"My telegram to Bushire, repeated to you, No. 376.

"You will doubtless impress on Iraq Government desirability of keeping Iraqi tribes away from frontier regions likely to be affected, and of taking effective measures to prevent infiltration of rebels into Iraqi territory.

"(Repeated to Bushire and Jedda, No. 131.)"

[E 6188/2322/91]

No. 74.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 132.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 29, 1929.

FOLLOWING sent to-day by Colonial Office to High Commissioner for Transjordan, No. 68:—

"Jedda telegram, 28th November, No. 178, repeated to you as No. 232.

"Jedda telegram No. 174, to which reference is made, reports receipt of letter from Ibn Saud, dated 17th November, in which he states that rebels have learned of his imminent attack and have been advised from high quarters in neighbouring countries to scatter if they cannot withstand attack and to save themselves by mingling with Arabs in neighbouring territories. In view of importance of giving Ibn Saud's forces no justification or excuse for attempting to invade Transjordan, it is essential that every possible measure should be taken to prevent Transjordan tribes raiding into Nejd or co-operating with rebels in any way.

"You should also concert with Air Officer Commanding necessary military measures for ejection of any of contending forces (whether those of rebels or of Ibn Saud) that may enter Transjordan. Every effort should in addition be made to intercept isolated groups of rebels attempting to enter Transjordan for the purpose of merging with Transjordan tribes in manner suggested by Ibn Saud. You should take steps to secure concurrence and co-operation of Emir Abdullah in these measures.

"(Repeated to Jedda, No. 132.)"

[E 6189/2322/91]

No. 75.

Acting High Commissioner of Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, November 30.)

(No. 425.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bagdad, November 29, 1929.

REFERENCE Bushire telegram No. 1200 (No. 71, Colonial Office, which presumably was despatched before he had seen Jedda telegram No. 228).

Air Officer Commanding now considers it essential to send into Koweit forthwith two armoured car sections. In view of the serious situation which would arise in Iraq should Ibn Saud occupy Koweit for any reason, I fully concur that such steps should be taken as Air Officer Commanding considers necessary to preclude all possibility of this happening, and I support his proposal. Please reply urgently.

(Repeated to Bushire, Koweit and Jedda.)

[E 6205/2322/91]

No. 76.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 133.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, November 30, 1929.

JEDDAH telegrams Nos. 174 and 175 to Foreign Office of 27th November: Rebellion in North-Eastern Nejd, and Colonial Office telegrams of 28th November to Bushire (Foreign Office telegram No. 130 to Jeddah), No. 377 to Bagdad (No. 131 to Jeddah) and No. 68 to Jerusalem (No. 132 to Jeddah).

My immediately following telegram contains text of reply of His Majesty's Government to Ibn Saud's note of 17th November, and to subsequent representations regarding Transjordan reported in Jeddah telegram No. 178 of 28th November. Please arrange to have text sent to His Majesty personally by quickest possible route.

Political Resident at Bushire should also, on receipt of this telegram, arrange for communication of a copy of text of reply to Ibn Saud by quickest route available.

(Addressed to Jeddah, No. 133. Repeated to Bushire for necessary action, and to Koweit, Bahrein and Bagdad.)

[E 6205/2322/91]

No. 77.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 134.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, November 30, 1929.

FOLLOWING is message referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"His Majesty's Government have learnt of contents of your Majesty's letter of 17th November to British agent at Jeddah with regret.

"They have never failed in the undertakings which they have repeatedly given to your Majesty to use all the means in their power to prevent the improper use of Koweit and Iraqi territory by your Majesty's rebellious subjects. The efforts which the latter have made to take refuge in Koweit territory have, indeed, already been frustrated more than once, and on 3rd September your Majesty's Government recognised the sincerity and efficiency with which the British authorities in Koweit had carried out their undertakings by formally thanking them for their efforts.

"As your Majesty is aware, His Majesty's Government were approached as recently as 1st November by Sheikh Feisal-ed-Dawish with requests for guarantees for his women and children. They are credibly informed that the overtures for peace which Feisal-ed-Dawish is reported recently to have addressed to your Majesty were principally due to the uncompromising attitude which His Majesty's Government have taken up in reply to these requests.

"His Majesty's Government have, moreover, given material proof of their earnest desire to co-operate with your Majesty in the suppression of the rebellion in North-East Nejd by assisting your Majesty to obtain from India the arms which you urgently required and by arranging to supply in the near future on specially favourable terms four aeroplanes of the latest type with the

necessary British personnel. Further supplies of material for use with these aeroplanes are already on the way out to the Persian Gulf and should reach Darin early in December. His Majesty's Government feel certain that these explanations will dispel any misunderstanding as to their attitude.

"Careful enquiries have convinced His Majesty's Government that your Majesty must have been misinformed as to the assistance which the rebels have obtained from Koweit and Iraq. His Majesty's Government desire in this connexion to place your Majesty on your guard against the acceptance of reports from interested and unreliable sources.

"Turning now to the specific requests contained in your Majesty's communication, His Majesty's Government, in addition to the strict instructions already given to their authorities in Koweit and Iraq, of the nature of which your Majesty has been informed, have taken the following action: In their desire to meet your Majesty's wishes as far as possible and to show their readiness to co-operate wholeheartedly with your Majesty in the re-establishment of peace and order in your dominions, (1) they have now issued renewed instructions which should ensure that the pledges already given to your Majesty shall be fully implemented; (2) instructions have been given to secure the removal of all Koweit tribes and of the refugee Awazim from the vicinity of the frontier or from any scene of possible conflict; (3) instructions have been given to concert the necessary military measures for the ejection of any of the contending forces that may enter Koweit or Iraqi territory, and to intercept wherever possible isolated groups of rebels entering such territory for the purpose of merging with local tribes in the manner which your Majesty suggests. With regard to the communication addressed by your Majesty's Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to the British agent at Jeddah, suggesting that the rebels may attempt to escape into Transjordanian territory, instructions on similar lines have now been sent to the High Commissioner for Transjordan which should effectively guard against this danger.

"Your Majesty will see from the foregoing that His Majesty's Government have gone to the farthest possible limit in their endeavour to co-operate with your Majesty on the lines suggested by you. They regret, however, that they cannot in any circumstances modify their decision against allowing your Majesty's armed forces to enter Koweit, Iraqi or Transjordanian territory.

"Apart from the risk of which your Majesty has already been informed by the British agent at Jeddah that such forces might be mistaken for rebels, the instructions issued to the British local authorities for the ejection of any of the contending forces that may cross the frontier would inevitably result in your forces coming into conflict with those of His Britannic Majesty, a contingency which His Majesty's Government and your Majesty would equally deplore.

"In conclusion, His Majesty's Government would again point out that the task of their military authorities would be rendered less difficult if your Majesty could designate an emissary from your military forces to keep the local frontier authorities in Koweit informed of the movements of your Majesty's troops and of the rebels."

(Addressed to Jeddah, No. 134. Repeated to Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Bagdad.)

[E 6285/6285/91]

No. 78.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 286.)

Sir,

Jedda, November 2, 1929.

IT will be recalled that, as a result of the Hejaz-Egyptian controversy over the Mahmal in 1926, the Hejaz Government decided to manufacture the holy carpet at Mecca instead of obtaining it from Egypt as before. In connexion with arrangements for the weaving of the holy carpet for next year's pilgrimage, it may be of interest if I review briefly the manner in which the decision of the Hejaz Government was carried into effect.

2. The prime mover in advocating the new scheme was Ismail Gaznavi, and he was supported by Abdul Qadir Dusuri and Zafar Ali Khan, all well-known Indian agitators who had gained the King's ear.

3. Ismail Gaznavi, whose misappropriation of Khilafat funds is a matter of common knowledge, was entrusted with the whole of the organisation of the factory, and he appointed the notorious Mohammed Khan Ghazi Khan as manager.

4. I understand that last year the price of the kiswa made in Mecca was immoderately high, but that the King chose to ignore this fact and, furthermore, listened to a proposal of Ismail Gaznavi's, who suggested that the work of the factory should be extended, and that a regular carpet-making industry for the production of Indian carpets (durries) at cheap rates should be instituted. The King was encouraged to believe that such an industry would create a new source of revenue for the Government.

5. This proposal was put into effect, but the durries supplied to the King and to the Government proved to be far more expensive than those obtained from India.

6. Gaznavi's conduct of affairs has now brought him into bad repute, and I am informed that this year the King ignored all telegrams and communications received from him from India. He thus arrived for the pilgrimage without obtaining previous sanction, and, realising that he had lost favour, tendered his resignation. This was accepted, but apparently the King's agent at Bombay, Abderrahman Quseibi, interceded on his behalf, and he was reinstated on the condition that the control of all financial matters in India should be exercised by Quseibi, and that all purchases of material should pass through his hands.

7. I now learn that telegrams sent by Gaznavi from India in connexion with arrangements for next year are again being ignored, but that Quseibi, on his own account, has ordered £500 worth of silk from Germany for the weaving of the holy carpet. It will be remembered that, as a result of trouble with the manager, eight of the weavers were repatriated to India by this agency as destitutes in July last, and four more left at the same time at their own expense. Arrangements will have to be made very soon to replace them.

8. There is one other point worth mentioning in this connexion. Under the influence of Ismail Gaznavi and his fellow-agitators the carpet factory has become a recognised *foyer* of anti-British propaganda and the resort of all Indians who are opposed to the British Government and the present régime in India.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt, and the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

I have, &c.
W. L. BOND.

[E 6289/94/91]

No. 79.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 291.)

Sir,

Jedda, November 8, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to the 31st October, 1929.

2. Copies of this report have been sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Delhi, Singapore, the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Federated Malay States, Khartum through Port Sudan, Lagos (2), the senior naval officer, Red Sea sloops.

I have, &c.
W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 79.

Jedda Report, period from October 1-31, 1929.

THE outstanding event of the month has been the defeat of the Awazim tribe at Injair, in Northern Hasa, by the combined forces of the Mutair and Ajman under Feisal-ed-Doweish.

2. According to the information obtained by His Majesty's political agent at Koweit, the main action started at 4 A.M. on the 5th October and ended at noon on that day by Feisal-ed-Doweish planting his standard in the heart of the Awazim camp in front of the tent of Al Suhalli, the Awazim commander. The Awazim finally surrendered on the 11th October.

3. His Majesty's political agent estimates the probable strength of the forces that were engaged as follows: Awazim 3,000 to 3,500; Akhwan 3,500. The losses of the Mutair are believed to be approximately forty killed; of the Ajman forty, including Sheikh Hazam-al-Hithlain, their leader, and Sheikh Hamad-bin-Musamah; those of the Awazim are believed to be in the neighbourhood of 400, although some reports place this figure considerably higher. Nearly 8,000 of the camels of the Awazim were captured by the Akhwan and their camp was looted.

4. With the consent of Feisal-ed-Doweish, the remnants of the Awazim tribe applied to the Sheikh of Koweit for shelter and protection. The Sheikh of Koweit decided to grant this, and His Majesty's Government acquiesced in his decision. The leading sheikhs of the Awazim and a large following accordingly arrived at Koweit on the 30th October and formally asked protection of the Sheikh of Koweit and his permission to camp at Kahrah. They made it clear at the same time that they did not desire temporary protection but wished to return to their old allegiance. The alternative, they said, was to throw in their lot with the rebels and fight Ibn Saud. They wished to avoid the latter course as Ibn Saud had treated them well, in spite of the fact that he had failed them utterly when pitted against the whole strength of the rebels. The Sheikh of Koweit granted his protection, and ordered them to move up to the Jahrah area.

5. Feisal-ed-Doweish's victory has been represented to the Hejazis as being of no military value, as the Awazim are said to be a non-combatant tribe similar to the Huteim of the Hejaz, who are looked down upon as of inferior status.

6. To judge from further reports received regarding the punitive expedition under Khalid-bin-Lowai sent against certain recalcitrant sections of the Ataibah (September report, paragraph 4), Khalid-bin-Lowai met with a greater measure of success than seemed probable after his initial check. It appears that the raiding parties devoted as usual too much attention to plunder and too little to tactical considerations, with the result that on the arrival of reinforcements, Khalid-bin-Lowai was able to make a detour and to threaten their communications, thus compelling them to withdraw. He then appears to have followed up this success by driving them northwards, and an action is reported to have taken place between them and the loyal sections of the Ataibah under Ibn Rubeian, in which they are said to have been defeated with heavy loss.

7. It was hoped that the successful measures taken against them would suffice to keep the Ataibah quiet for some time to come, at any rate in so far as any concerted movement in the Hejaz is concerned. This hope may be belied, however, if Feisal-ed-Doweish's victory over the Awazim is followed by other triumphs.

8. An unconfirmed report was received at the end of the month to the effect that Ibn Rubeian had quarrelled with Khalid-bin-Lowai, and with a small band of followers had left his tribe; it is even suggested that he may have gone over to Feisal-ed-Doweish. The attitude of the Ataibah is indeed a big problem for Ibn Saud, and he can ill afford to lose the support of any of its influential leaders. It is almost impossible to tell to what extent they are loyal. The sections which are definitely dissident are, however, reported to represent only a small proportion of the whole, but it is feared that there are many waverers who would give trouble if things began to go badly for Ibn Saud.

9. There have been rumours and counter-rumours of the death of Ibn Bujad at Riyadh, but it is now practically confirmed and generally believed that he and a number of other Ataibah sheikhs were put to death recently by Ibn Saud on the occasion when Abdulla-bin-Hassan, in consequence of his arrest by the Ataibah on his way to Riyadh and his undertaking to procure the release of Ibn Bujad in return for his own safe conduct, presented a petition in this sense to the King on his arrival.

10. In reply to the memorandum addressed by Ibn Saud to His Majesty's Government (September report, paragraph 9), in which, among other things, he expressed apprehension lest the rebels when driven to extremities might make a rush for asylum into Iraq or Koweit territory, the King has been informed that His Majesty's Government gladly agree to the posting of a force near the Iraq frontier in order to intercept the rebels, they would, further, welcome any proposals which he might be prepared to make for the establishment of a close liaison on the frontier, and they suggest that he should designate emissaries to keep the local frontier authorities of Iraq or Koweit informed of the movements of his troops and of the rebels. His Majesty's Government cannot, however, reconsider their previous decision against permitting Ibn Saud's forces to cross either frontier. While repeating the assurance that all possible steps will be taken to prevent the use of

Iraq and Koweit as a refuge by the Akhwan rebels, His Majesty's Government wish the King to realise that, if the rebels should succeed either in crossing the frontier with their women and children, or in effecting a junction with the latter in Iraq or Koweit territory, the local military authorities may be placed in a most embarrassing position. His Majesty's Government have therefore expressed the hope that Ibn Saud will be able to take effective measures himself to prevent such a contingency arising. Ibn Saud is further warned that, if his own forces should cross the Iraq or Koweit frontiers, it may be impossible from the air to distinguish them from rebels, and thus there may be serious risk of their being bombed in error.

11. Further raids are reported to have been carried out against Transjordan subjects by tribes of the Hejaz and Nejd. In the first, on the 18th July, a caravan of the Transjordan Beni Atiya was attacked, six persons being killed and fifty-two camels loaded with grain, together with the effects of the deceased, being taken. In another attack on a Transjordan caravan, on the 19th September, ten camels were captured, together with three rifles and loot. On the 25th September a party of Hejaz tribesmen crossed to Transjordan territory and carried off 800 sheep and 150 camels of the Takatka and Zalabia tribes of Transjordan together with all their tents. One man was killed and another wounded.

12. There has been no further raiding on the Iraq frontier. One may recall in this connexion the statement made by Feisal-ed-Doweish to the Sheikh of Koweit at the interview which he had with Sheikh Ahmad and His Majesty's political agent at Koweit, near, Subaihiyeh on the 30th August, to the effect that the Akhwan had no quarrel with the Hakuma (His Majesty's Government) and had already told her that she need have no fear from them. "Our words," he said, "are those of true Moslems and we do not lie. Since we gave our word, has Iraq or Koweit seen anything but peace on her frontiers?"

13. During the month there has been a forced levy on the tribes around Taif and in the Hejaz proper, which is stated to have produced a sum of £60,000. This will, to some extent, help the Government to tide over the difficult period intervening before the arrival of the pilgrims.

14. The Hejaz Government have now paid to His Majesty's Government the sum of £13,256, which represents the balance due for the aeroplanes, equipment and bombs supplied to them, as well as the advance payments, amounting to £2,017, due to the personnel. The Hejaz Government have also signed the contracts for the engagement of the personnel.

15. It has been decided that the aeroplanes are to be based for the present on Darin Island, opposite El Qatif, in the Persian Gulf. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed His Majesty's agent and consul that arrangements for the landing of aeroplanes and for the accommodation of the aviators there are now complete, and he requests that the aeroplanes and personnel should be sent there as soon as possible. At the same time he accepts a proposal of His Majesty's Government that, as a preliminary measure, an Air Force Officer from Iraq, accompanied by a political officer, should proceed to Darin Island in a flying boat in order to inspect the proposed aerodrome and to advise as to arrangements for the accommodation of the personnel.

16. As regards a second proposal that, in the course of this flight, an emergency landing-ground should be selected and marked out on the Hasa coast approximately half-way between El Qatif and Koweit, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs finds some difficulty in permitting the exploration of a site as suggested, in view of the possible presence of rebels in that area and the consequent risk to the flying boat and its occupants. If, he says, it is eventually found difficult for the aeroplanes to reach Darin in a single stage, it will be necessary to adopt other means for their conveyance.

17. A satisfactory assurance has been received from the Hejaz Government to the effect that the British personnel will in no circumstances be allowed to fly over the sacred zones of Mecca and Medina.

18. A committee was formed in Mecca early in the month to collect funds for the Moslem sufferers in Palestine, and a subscription list was opened in the "Um-el-Qura" headed by a contribution of £100 from His Highness the Emir Feisal. The opportunity thus afforded of helping their fellow-Moslems does not, however, seem to have made a very powerful appeal to the Hejazis. In fact, a sum of £438 pounds only had been collected—one may almost say exacted—by the end of the month. Some doubts have been expressed as to the wisdom of forwarding so small a sum, as it is thought that to do so might only serve to provoke a lavish response on the Jewish side, which would invite awkward comparisons. It is understood that this aspect of the matter has been represented to the King.

19. In ignorance, presumably, of the *démenti* published by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Moslems Congress, communicated by His Majesty's agent to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 12th September (September report, paragraph 24), Ibn Saud has addressed a letter to His Majesty the King stating that he and all his people have received with deep sorrow the news that certain Jews have thrown hand-grenades into the holy mosque in Jerusalem while Moslems were assembled there for Friday prayer.

20. In connexion also with the Palestine disturbances, a note was addressed to the Hejaz Government on the 18th October embodying the text of an official communiqué published in Palestine with the object of eliminating any doubt as to the nature and scope of certain instructions which have been issued in order to regulate observances at the Wailing Wall.

21. Hafiz Wahba, the Hejaz representative in London, passed through Jedda on the 25th October on his way to Mecca. His enemies have actively exploited a recent statement made by him in London concerning Ibn Saud's attitude towards recent events. He is consequently a little doubtful of the reception which he will receive from the King, and, unless he can talk over the King, it is possible, he thinks, that he may not return to London.

22. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has intimated to His Majesty's agent that the Hejaz Government would appreciate an invitation from His Majesty's Government to accede to the Arms Traffic Convention of the 17th June, 1925, and would be glad of British support of the application which it would then address to the French Government in accordance with the provisions of the convention.

23. The freedom of the transit trade between Nejd and Syria has become the subject of discussion between the Hejaz Government and His Majesty's Government in connexion with the detention in January last of a Nejd caravan which was leaving Maan for Nejd with arms and 10,000 rounds of ammunition concealed in baggage; on that occasion eight members of the caravan were arrested and their arms and ammunition were temporarily confiscated.

24. To the enquiries of the Hejaz Government His Majesty's Government replied that the quantity of ammunition being in excess of the reasonable needs of the caravan, a seizure was made and the eight persons were arrested in virtue of the Ottoman Penal Code in force. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs was also notified that the law against clandestine traffic in arms would be strictly applied.

25. The Hejaz Government contested that such an action would be contrary to the Hadda Agreement (article 13), and they could not consent to it. They were, however, informed that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the provisions of article 13 of the Hadda Agreement concerning the free passage of merchandise could not be considered as overriding legitimate regulations made for the purpose of checking irregular traffic in arms. At the request of the Government of Transjordan, a suitable opportunity was also taken by His Majesty's agent to explain to the Hejaz Government that a distinction was to be drawn between the carriage of arms and ammunition for the purpose of protection, and traffic in those commodities for the purpose of trade. With regard to individuals and caravans who carried arms in excess of their reasonable protectionary needs, the Transjordan Government would continue to apply the relevant provisions of the Ottoman Penal Code in force, as was done in the case of the Nejd caravan which was arrested at Maan.

26. The Hejaz Government now contends that the Ottoman Penal Code is not applicable to the transit trade between Syria and Nejd, whether the goods in transit be arms or any other kind of merchandise. It applies, they claim, only to the purchase and sale of arms within Transjordan territory itself, the transit trade between Syria and Nejd being governed exclusively by the provisions of article 13 of the Hadda Agreement which stipulates that in the case of *bona fide* merchants, and subject to certain minor conditions to facilitate surveillance, it shall be free. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs therefore requests that the arms confiscated may be returned to their owners.

27. His Majesty's Government have not found it possible to agree to the proposal of the Hejaz Government to appoint a delegate in Bagdad in order to serve as a channel of communication between the Hejaz Government and the High Commission (September report, paragraph 20).

28. The increased dues on the importation of tobacco, motor cars and spare parts (July report, paragraph 13 *et seq.*) has suddenly and without warning been abolished; the dues are in fact lower than before. It is believed that the reductions are the result of a direct order from the King. The higher officials who had taken

precautions before the rise to buy up large stocks in the hopes of making a handsome profit are thus hoist with their own petard. The dues on benzine have not yet been reduced, but it is believed that a reduction in this commodity is contemplated as soon as a large consignment, which a local British firm expects to bring in shortly, has arrived and has been admitted at the higher rate.

29. There is to be no change in the quarantine dues at Kamaran during the coming pilgrimage season. They thus remain at 10 rupees per head pilgrim dues for each pilgrim over seven years of age, 10 rupees per ship for station dues and 5 rupees per ship for sanitary guards. The official tariff of harbour dues levied at Kamaran is 10 rupees per 100 tons on net registered tonnage.

30. Signor Guido Sollazzo, until recently Italian consul at Lourenço Marques, arrived in Jeddah on the 4th October in order to assume the post of Italian consul in place of Signor Theodorani, a complacent nonentity who has been in charge since the death of the late Dr. Cesana. Signor Sollazzo appears to be an able man and has held a position of importance in Rome in the Fascist organisation.

31. H.M.S. "Dahlia" arrived in Jeddah on the 15th October and left on the 17th. The usual official visits were exchanged.

32. During the period under review five slaves took refuge in this agency. Of these, three were manumitted by the local authorities and remained in Jeddah, one, an Abyssinian, was manumitted and sent to his home via Massowa, and the fifth, of Sudanese origin, was repatriated to Suakin.

[E 6096/2322/91]

No. 80.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 140.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 4, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 170: Ibn Saud's protest against admission of Awazim into Koweit.

Please send reply to King's letter of 17th November as expeditiously as possible on following lines:—

1. You should explain view of His Majesty's Government contained in second paragraph of my telegram No. 113 that Awazim cannot be considered either as insurgents or as part of Ibn Saud's forces and that attitude of His Majesty's Government was therefore correct.

2. You should add that, according to statements of leading Awazim sheikhs (see Bushire telegram to Colonial Office No. 54, repeated to you No. 1069), if refuge in Koweit was not granted their only alternative was to throw in their lot with rebels and fight against Ibn Saud, a course which they wished to avoid. In these circumstances it appeared to be entirely in interests of Ibn Saud that the Awazim should be definitely neutralised by admission into Koweiti territory.

3. The expulsion of the Awazim in accordance with Ibn Saud's request could only be effected by the use of force, and it is out of the question to contemplate such a breach of the obligations which the Sheikh of Koweit assumed when he gave the Awazim permission to escape from the rebels by taking refuge in his territory. Nor do His Majesty's Government consider, in view of the considerations referred to in (1) above, that their pledges to Ibn Saud necessitate any such action in present case.

(Addressed to Jeddah, No. 140. Repeated to Bushire and Koweit.)

[E 6335/2322/91]

No. 81.

Resident in the Persian Gulf (at Basra) to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, December 6.)

(No. T. 8.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Basra, December 3, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 376 of 29th November to Bagdad.

On 2nd two sections of armoured cars proceeded to Jahra and several air reconnaissances have been carried out.

The following arrangements were decided upon at conference held to-day between Air Officer Commanding and myself, which was attended by political agent at Koweit:—

- (1) Koweit tribes should not proceed south of a line Umm Amarat Mahazul to Umm Rus.
 - (2) Koweit shepherds, woodcutters, &c., occupy the sector east of a line from Koweit to north-west corner of neutral area and it was not considered practicable to clear this area, on which economic life of Koweit towns largely depends.
 - (3) Awazim have not yet entered Koweit. They are at present camped in neutral area and are drawing their supplies from Koweit. If they do migrate into Koweit they will be ordered to proceed north of line referred to in (1).
 - (4) On the 5th December armoured cars will carry out reconnaissance to frontier accompanied by Political Agent at Koweit.
 - (5) Periodical air reconnaissances will be carried out as required.
- (Repeated to Jeddah, Koweit, Government of India.)

[E 6398/2322/91]

No. 82.

*Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Resident in the Persian Gulf.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, December 10.)*

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, December 7, 1929.

YOUR telegram of 3rd December, No. T. 8.

From my telegram of 29th November you will have seen that His Majesty's Government regard the removal of Awazim from vicinity of frontier or possible scene of conflict as particularly important. You will also have seen from Foreign Office telegram No. 134 of 30th November to Jeddah, which was repeated to you, that Ibn Saud is being informed that instructions have been given for the above measure to be taken. I learn with some apprehension from your telegram under reference that Awazim are in the neutral zone at present, and that no attempt is apparently contemplated to move them into Koweit. I regard their presence in neutral zone as inconsistent with the assurances which have been given to Ibn Saud and as most undesirable in itself. It will tend to confirm Ibn Saud's belief that rebels intend to use the Awazim as an agency for obtaining supplies from Koweit (*vide* Jeddah telegram No. 170), and should they be defeated to escape by mingling with Arabs in neighbouring territories. Moreover, Awazim's present position would provide Ibn Saud with an incentive for taking his forces into the neutral zone.

You should at once arrange with Sheikh of Koweit, unless it is impracticable, for removal of Awazim from the neutral zone, and for their concentration in some region in Koweit at a distance from the frontier or possible scene of conflict. If they decline to leave neutral zone, I suggest they should be informed that, on account of undertakings given to Ibn Saud, His Majesty's Government and the sheikh have no option but to treat them as part of the contending forces, in which case they would be liable to attack should they subsequently attempt to enter Koweit territory, and in the meantime they would be denied all supplies from Koweit.

Please report what action is taken on this telegram.

[E 6398/2322/91]

No. 83.

*Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, December 10.)*

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, December 8, 1929.

REFERENCE your telegram of 7th December (No. 391 to Bagdad).

I have arranged for Sheikh of Koweit to issue immediate ultimatum to Awazim that they must either move into the Koweit tribal area within ten days or be treated as though they were part of the contending forces and be denied access to Koweit

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territory and supplies. It is necessary to allow a period of ten days, as, owing to loss of camels at Ingair, they are short of transport. I am expecting to hear their decision in six days.

(Repeated to Bagdad and Jedda.)

[E 6521/63/91]

No. 84.

Agent, Jedda, to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 187.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, December 15, 1929.

MY telegram No. 178.

Force now at Jauf, numbering about 1,500 to 2,000, is to be supplied from Syria. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs enquires whether special measures can be taken to protect caravans from raiders in Transjordan, and requests early reply.

He will be able to give full information regarding caravans later.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 246.)

[E 6584/2322/91]

No. 85.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 190.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, December 17, 1929.

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that rebels are at Shab-al-Batin, near point where Iraq-Koweit and Nejd boundaries meet, and are communicating with Captain Glubb regarding possibility of entering Iraq territory.

(Repeated to Bushire, Koweit, Bagdad and Jerusalem, telegram No. 247.)

[E 6627/6627/91]

No. 86.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 192.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jedda, December 19, 1929.

WITH the approval of the King a reform committee has been constituted and has published notice in the press inviting services of foreign experts holding high diplomas and equipped with their own instruments for the following purposes:—

1. To make surveys and borings for minerals in certain areas to be appointed, to submit full reports on their discoveries and give estimates of expenditure necessary for extraction of any metals or minerals found. Appointment will be by contract of one year; the Government reserve the right to renew for another year.
2. The Government intend to construct an up-to-date quay and custom-house, and require qualified engineer to study possibilities, submit plans and full reports, together with an estimate of expenditure. Appointment is for six months, including voyage to Hejaz and back. Voyage will be at Hejaz expense. On receipt of his report Hejaz Government may extend period of his employment so that he may personally supervise the work. I am informed by Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that it is desired to construct quay and custom-house in inner anchorage and run a mole out to it.

Applications, presumably stating remuneration required, should be addressed to "The Committee for Study of Property Reform, Department of Finance, Mecca."

Leading European firms in Jedda have been approached, and Government are having notices published in Egyptian press.

[E 6541/6541/91]

No. 87.

Sir P. Loraine to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 995.)

Sir,

Cairo, December 7, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, according to the Cairo press, a Persian delegation is shortly expected in Egypt on its way to the Yemen for the purpose of negotiating a treaty with the Imam. The delegation is headed, it is said, by Habibullah Ain-ul-Mulk, who, as Persian consul-general in Damascus, has been on former missions to Arabia, notably to the Hejaz in 1925.

2. I am forwarding copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and the British Political Resident at Aden.

I have, &c.

PERCY LORAINÉ,
High Commissioner.

[E 6571/6571/91]

No. 88.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 303.)

HIS Majesty's agent and consul at Jedda presents his compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him copy of correspondence with the Acting Hejaz Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting the celebration of anniversary of Ibn Saud's accession.

Jedda, November 27, 1929.

Enclosure 1 in No. 88.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Bond.

His Excellency His Britannic Majesty's
Agent and Consul,

17.6.1348 (November 19, 1929).

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that His Royal Highness the Viceroy of His Majesty the King has, after His Majesty's approval and permission, issued an order to the effect that the 8th day of January every year is to be considered as a national holiday to be celebrated in the Kingdom of the Hejaz, Nejd and its dependencies on the occasion of the anniversary of His Majesty's accession to the throne of the kingdom.

In this connexion I wish to inform your Excellency that His Majesty and His Majesty's Government accept official congratulations on that day.

I shall be glad if your Excellency would inform your Government accordingly.

With the highest respects.

FUAD HAMZA.

Enclosure 2 in No. 88.

Mr. Bond to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(After compliments.)

Your Excellency,

Jedda, November 27, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to refer to your letter acquainting me with the decision of His Majesty the King to institute a national holiday on the 8th of January each year in commemoration of the occasion of his accession, and to state that I have transmitted the information to His Majesty's Government as requested.

I note with pleasure the opportunity thus given of presenting official congratulations to His Majesty and His Majesty's Government.

Respects.

W. L. BOND.

[E 6586/2322/91]

No. 89.

High Commissioner of Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, December 18.)

(No. 445.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, December 16, 1929.

INFORMATION was received on 12th December that Feisal-al-Dawish and a considerable portion of his following with flocks were moving up Batin towards Riqai, south of the eastern extremity of Iraq-Nejd neutral zone. Aerial reconnaissances have confirmed the presence of numerous tents and camels in that area. On 13th December Glubb, when reconnoitring near Shaib-al-Auja with police car[s], was approached by two horsemen, one of whom was said to be relative of Dawish. They said Dawish himself was close by and wished to speak to him; also that rebel leader with Ibn Mashhur and Rufidi with Mutair and Ajman tribesmen were all camping together in the neighbourhood. Glubb refused to see Dawish.

Glubb has since received letter from Dawish professing friendship and readiness to obey Government orders and requesting interview. He is waiting at Riqai for reply. Iraq Government have instructed Glubb not to meet or communicate with Dawish or any other rebel, but to give out that any attempt by rebels to cross Iraq frontier will be prevented.

As additional precaution two sections of Royal Air Force armoured cars have been moved down Batin to Adhaibah, and are carrying out reconnaissance to the frontier.

(Repeated to Persian Gulf, Koweit, Jerusalem and Jedda.)

[E 6606/2322/91]

No. 90.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, December 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, December 17, 1929.

FOLLOWING from Koweit, No. 702, 16th December:—

"Sheikh just seen me; reports arrival of express camel-rider from Amir in charge of Koweit tribe with message that Ibn Hithlain slipped across the frontier just east of Riqai and has camped at Anag, 30 miles inside Koweit territory between Umm Ruaisat and Batin, and that the whole Ajman appear to be following up Batin. That two messengers arrived from Dawish whilst he was trying turn Ajman back; these report Dawish still at Qar Bilal near Wafra. Sheikh says nothing but armed forces will now turn Ajman, who will be certainly followed by Ibn Mashur. Sheikh has sent urgent orders Amir to force Ajman back all costs, but, as he cannot rely on his people bring this about alone, he requests assistance of armoured car from Athaiba. Sheikh almost certain that twenty-five white tents reported in aero 4 SA 356 3 miles east Ubaid belong to Ibn Mashur and fifty tents north-west of Riqai belong to Jiblan."

I have supported sheikh's request.

(Repeated to Jedda.)

[E 6621/63/91]

No. 91.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 148.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 20, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 183 of 6th December: Transjordan frontier situation.

My immediately following telegram contains reply of His Majesty's Government to Ibn Saud's note of 23rd November regarding Transjordan. Please arrange to forward it to His Majesty by quickest possible route.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 148. Repeated to Jerusalem.)

[E 6621/63/91]

No. 92.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 149.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 20, 1929.

FOLLOWING is message referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"His Majesty's Government have been informed by the British Agent at Jedda of your Majesty's note of 23rd November regarding the Transjordan situation, which has long been engaging their earnest attention.

"Your Majesty suggests three possible solutions of the problem of raiding and counter-raiding. Of these His Majesty's Government regret that, for reasons of general policy which your Majesty will readily understand, they cannot contemplate either the second or the third.

"The measures which they have already taken or are in process of taking are, however, practically identical with the first solution advocated in your Majesty's note.

"In view of your Majesty's acceptance of the suggestion put forward in Mr. Bond's note of 13th July for the appointment of a British investigator to deal with the question of the restitution of loot, and of the recent unconditional acceptance of that proposal by His Highness the Amir of Transjordan, they are proceeding forthwith to the selection of a suitable officer for this purpose, who will be instructed to proceed to the affected area at the earliest possible moment. On the receipt of his report His Majesty's Government will proceed to give their arbitral award and to take the necessary measures for their execution in Transjordan. The awards will also be communicated to your Majesty without delay for similar action in your Majesty's territories.

"As regards the measures to be taken to prevent attacks and to punish offenders, punitive action has within the last few months been taken in a large number of cases against Transjordanian tribes convicted of having carried out raids into Nejd and the Hejaz, and in some cases loot has actually been restored, whereas no loot has yet been returned by your Majesty's tribesmen. The measures taken in the case of Transjordanian tribes have, however, been rendered exceedingly difficult by the fact that no corresponding measures have apparently been taken against Hejazi and Nejdian tribes who have been guilty of raids against Transjordan on a more extensive scale.

"In view, however, of the increasingly unsatisfactory situation as regards raids both from Transjordan and from your Majesty's dominions, His Majesty's Government are now reconsidering the whole problem in consultation with the High Commissioner for Transjordan."

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 149. Repeated to Jerusalem.)

[E 6621/63/91]

No. 92A.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Transjordan.

(Telegraphic.) R.

December 20, 1929.

MY telegram No. 71 of 12th December.

You will have seen from Jedda telegram No. 183 of 6th December and Foreign Office telegrams Nos. 148 and 149 to Jedda repeated to you that it is becoming increasingly urgent to establish better control in the eastern and southern Transjordan frontier districts.

Foreign Office have strongly represented that continuance of present unsatisfactory situation must react unfavourably on general relations between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud, and largely vitiate measures already taken in other directions to improve such relations. Air Ministry point out that absence of adequate administrative control in Eastern Transjordan involves military forces in emergency work outside their proper sphere, and leads eventually to counter-raiding, which is most difficult to deal with in area where, owing to absence of adequate administration, intelligence is necessarily inadequate.

I shall be glad if you will reconsider, in consultation with Air Officer Commanding, the whole situation in Eastern Transjordan, in light of above, and

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report as soon as possible whether existing and contemplated arrangements, as authorised in my despatch of 6th September, are in your opinion still sufficiently comprehensive to remedy a situation of increasing gravity, or do you consider new measures necessary?

Please report in detail by telegram with particulars of expenditure involved.
(Addressed to Jerusalem. Repeated to Jedda, No. 150.)

[E 6670/2322/91]

No. 93.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, December 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, December 19, 1929.

FOLLOWING is repetition of Koweit telegram No. 708 of 18th December:—

"Returned late last night. Route via Qraa Umm Ruaisat Athaiba down Batin and back via Hassu Dhabbi Afri. West of Umm Ruaisat met large number of Mutair (Suhaba section) camels with men, women and children in full retreat in south-westerly direction, obviously from Hauma. They said that Dawish had sent for them. Saw several hundred Ajman camels also moving out of Batin in search of water, a little of which left at Hauma. Their attendants said that Dawish had sent for Ajman also. Met Amir of Koweit tribe in Batin, near Athaiba; he had received no orders from the sheikh, this later found to be due to breakdown of messenger's camel. I ordered the Amir to put himself in touch with Glubb and carry out the latter's instructions.

"Met Glubb and three sections of armoured cars close to Ibn Hithlain's tents, which already struck, about 15 miles south of Athaiba in Batin. Glubb, who had already issued personal warning to Ibn Hithlain, reported that Ajman going peacefully and the situation satisfactory; understood that his column had instructions to shepherd them right across frontier. I told Glubb not to hesitate to enter Koweit territory anywhere he desired in achieving this object.

"While discussing situation, Ibn Hithlain came out from his camp and joined us.

"I warned him that he had committed grave error in moving north, and that His Majesty's Government required his immediate return across the frontier. I added that he must obey Glubb's orders to the letter, as I was going back to Koweit. He promised to do so. I arrived at Koweit 8 p.m., travelling 182 miles in thirteen and a half hours.

"Repeated to Aviation."

(Repeated to Jedda.)

[E 6758/2322/91]

No. 94.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, December 26.)

(No. 89.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, December 23, 1929.

MY telegram No. T. 69 of the 18th December. I have now received copy of letters addressed to me and Dickson by Ibn Saud. In both cases customary preliminary compliments are omitted. Following is gist of letters to me:—

Ibn Saud acknowledges receipt of my letter transmitting message constituting your telegram No. 134 to Jedda. He states that he did not intend to cast doubt on the intentions of His Majesty's Government, and gratefully acknowledges sale to him of munitions and aeroplanes. The only thing of which he complained was rebels obtaining supplies from and watering in Koweit. If His Majesty's Government make investigations they will be convinced of the truth of his allegations regarding encouragement given to the rebels from high quarters in Bagdad, but it is unnecessary to discuss the matter further now. He thanks His Majesty's Government for the orders issued to eject the rebels from Koweit, Iraq and Transjordan, which, if enforced, will render it unnecessary for his forces to

enter the neighbouring territories. He is now encamped at Safa, and has sent trackers after Dawish, whom he proposes to attack, and trusts that the British forces will prevent the rebels from fleeing for refuge or escaping. He will inform the nearest military station on the frontier of any fresh developments. He renews protest regarding Awazim. In the letter to Dickson he adds the following: Dawish has asked him for pardon and security, and he has promised him his life but demanded return of all plunder. Dawish has refused. He states that one Ali-bin-Shuwairibat recently arrived at Dawish's camp, alleges that he was sent by King Feisal, and invited Dawish to enter Iraq. He has sent documentary evidence in support of this through Hafiz Wabha (these have not been received in Bushire yet). Letter concludes with personal message of friendship to Dickson.

[E 6721/2322/91]

No. 95.

Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, December 27.)

(No. 91.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bushire, December 24, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 403 to Bagdad.

Your assumption is correct. As Awazim have not entered Koweit within ten days, they are now being treated as part of the contending forces and are being denied supplies.

[E 6790/94/91]

No. 96.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 315.)

Sir,

Jedda, December 9, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz for the period the 1st to the 30th November, 1929.

2. Copies of this report have been sent to Egypt, Bagdad, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Beirut, Damascus, Aden, Delhi, Singapore, the Chief Secretary to the Government of the Federated Malay States, Khartum through Port Sudan, Lagos (2), the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops, and His Majesty's consul at Basra.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 96.

Jedda Report for Period November 1-30, 1929.

FOLLOWING the defeat of the Awazim tribe and the formal assurance of protection given to the leading sheikhs, who arrived at Koweit on 30th October, the remainder of the Awazim sheikhs, with a caravan of 400 camels, proceeded to Koweit on the 13th November to interview the Sheikh of Koweit. In a speech made to a gathering of all the Awazim sheikhs on the 16th November, the sheikh offered them the country between Khabra Dalaiyil, west of Jahrah, down to Subaihiyah, in which to graze their camels, and advised them to move up from Hazaim without delay.

2. The action taken *vis-à-vis* of the Awazim has called forth a strong protest from the King, who disbelieves the news of their defeat and suggests that it may be a trick of Dawish's in order to place friends of his inside Koweit territory whom he can use for his own purposes. He also condemns the action of the Sheikh of Koweit in the present critical circumstances in allowing some of the King's subjects to leave his country and settle in Koweit territory. He therefore requests that all members of the Awazim tribe and any other of his subjects who may have taken refuge in Koweit should be ejected at once. Their presence in Koweit, he adds, embarrasses him in his action against the rebels.

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3. In the evening of the 30th October, a message was received by the Sheikh of Koweit from Feisal-ed-Dawish, in which the latter asked for an interview the following day or the day after at Jahrah or Saada. The following morning, the 31st October, Dawish's nephew arrived in Koweit and stated that Dawish, impatient at not receiving a reply, was himself coming to Koweit and was at the moment only 6 miles away from the town. Orders were at once issued for Dawish to proceed to Jahrah and there await the reply to his message. Abdulla-bin-Jabir was then sent to inform him that no meeting could be held at all with him until he recrossed the border. Abdulla-bin-Jabir was further instructed to obtain from the rebel leader either verbally or in writing exactly what he desired to say, and to tell him that it would be reported to His Majesty's Government, and if the latter thought necessary, both the Sheikh of Koweit and His Majesty's political agent would be sent out to his camp to interview him. Following an all-night discussion, Dawish recrossed the border soon after dawn on the 1st November.

4. In the course of his interview with Abdulla-bin-Jabir, Dawish stated that he was moving into Nejd at once. He also made the following three requests: (1) He begged to be assured by His Majesty's Government that they would not permit the tribes of Iraq or Koweit to molest the families of the Mutair and Ajman, whom he was leaving behind in their present camping ground south of the Koweit border; (2) he enquired whether His Majesty's Government would allow his women to cross the Koweit border and take refuge at Jahrah if they were raided by the King's Bedouin while he was absent; (3) he wished to be informed whether he would be held responsible by His Majesty's Government if he shot down the aircraft which, as he was aware, had been sold to the King by the British Government, or if they were captured by him.

5. The Sheikh of Koweit subsequently informed Feisal-ed-Dawish that his questions had been communicated to His Majesty's Government, who had replied to the following effect:—

6. His Majesty's Government did not feel called upon to indicate the attitude which they would adopt in the circumstances referred to by him, but, as regards his second point, the assurance given to Ibn Saud by His Majesty's Government precluded the grant of refuge to his women in Koweit or Iraq. As regards his third point, His Majesty's Government would take a very serious view of failure on his part to treat with full consideration any British personnel that might fall into his hands.

7. His Majesty's Government furthermore expressed the desire to the Sheikh of Koweit that, in communicating the above to Feisal-ed-Dawish, it should be made clear that they were not prepared to enter into any further discussions with him; he should be warned that if he himself, or any of his emissaries crossed the Koweit frontier again they would be liable to arrest, or any other action that might be considered necessary.

8. In bringing the foregoing to the knowledge of the King, His Majesty's agent at Jedda emphasised again the recommendation already given that the King should himself also take effective measures to prevent the crossing of the Iraq or Koweit frontiers by the rebels or their women and children.

9. At the beginning of the month it was found that camels of the rebels were again being watered at the Subaihiyah and Tawil wells, inside the Koweit border. A message was, therefore, sent to Dawish's camp on the 5th November by His Majesty's political agent at Koweit to the effect that, unless the practice ceased immediately, the camels would be bombed. The Sheikh of Koweit was also requested to issue a similar warning and to post a guard on the wells in question in order to prevent a recurrence of the incident. Dawish, in reply, promised to stop the practice complained of. He had received the information that Ibn Saud had, at any rate for the moment, satisfactorily dealt with the Ataibah. He himself was about to move to Wabra Safa and perhaps the Hafar area, whence he would deliver an attack on Ibn Saud's forces at Ajibba. He proposed to hasten the move of the Awazim into Koweit so as to release the Ajman, who were for the present watching them.

10. On the 12th November Dawish, with the whole of the Mutair, moved towards Nafar-al-Batin and the district south-east of it. As the Ajman had been instructed to follow, it appeared that Dawish had abandoned the idea of watching the Awazim. The latter at that date were still in Hazaim, although their caravans were daily in Koweit purchasing supplies.

11. On the 19th November His Majesty's political agent at Koweit reported that ever since Dawish's departure from Koweit there had been persistent rumours that he had decided to submit to Ibn Saud, partly as a result of the collapse of the

Ataibah, but chiefly because of His Majesty's Government's uncompromising reply to his three questions. It was subsequently confirmed that Dawish had given up all hope of receiving support from Koweit or Iraq, and had, therefore, decided to open negotiations with Ibn Saud while still strong and undefeated, especially as the Mutair were pressing him to adopt this course. A suitable opportunity had been offered him in the shape of a letter received from Ibn Saud a week before, urging him to take this sensible line. Dawish stated that he had replied asking exactly what terms Ibn Saud was prepared to offer; he himself only desired to be allowed to adopt a strictly nomadic life and to be left alone. He later offered to submit with his whole force on the following conditions: (1) That he be free to purchase supplies in any town he liked in Iraq, Koweit or Nejd; (2) that he should not be required to meet Ibn Saud; (3) that he be allowed to lead a Bedouin life in future and not be ordered to reside in any town.

12. On the 23rd November a messenger reached Jedda, from Riyadh, with the report that Dawish had asked for pardon, but that the King had replied that it was a matter which could only be decided by Sharia. The King, it was stated, proposed to attack Dawish immediately in force.

13. Towards the end of the month news was received that Dawish was proceeding with all the Mutair and Ajman to Jaryah and Safah.

14. Further representations were made, verbally, on the 22nd November, by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's agent in Jedda regarding alleged breaches of neutrality by the authorities in Koweit and their attitude towards the rebels. In addition to the points on which he had already received assurances, he requested that any rebel entering Iraq or Koweit should be arrested, tried and punished, and that his weapons should be confiscated.

15. On the 24th November His Majesty's agent received a letter from the King, dated the 17th November, in which Ibn Saud draws attention to the difficulties created for him and the obstacles placed in the way of the accomplishment of his task by the attitude of the British Government in regard to the neutrality of Iraq and Koweit and the failure of the authorities in Koweit to prevent the rebels crossing the border. The rebels, he says, have been informed that he is about to attack them, and they have received advice from high quarters in adjacent countries to disperse if they are unable to withstand him and to seek safety by mingling with the Arabs in Iraq and Koweit. He himself has no desire to cross these frontiers, but he asks what he is to do if the forces of Iraq and Koweit are unable to prevent the rebels from taking refuge there when he pursues them. Is he to retire, leaving them free to create new difficulties? As regards the proposal that he should take effective measures himself to prevent the crossing of the border, how can he do this when the forces within Koweit and Iraq have failed to do so, and when he himself is debarred from entering Koweit territory?

16. He has, he says, already set his forces in motion and expects shortly to establish contact with the rebels. He therefore suggests that the British Government should agree to one of the following two alternatives:—

(a.) That Koweit subjects should be ordered to collect in a given place, far removed from any likely zone of hostilities, and that they should be protected there by an armed force. He should be informed of the place selected. The Koweit Government should then man the frontier with a sufficient force to repel the rebels and to drive them back as far as they can, even pursuing them in Nejd territory itself. If any rebel succeeds in crossing the frontier he should be seized and handed over. If this alternative were adopted it would then be unnecessary for him to cross into Koweit territory himself. Liaison officers should be attached to the two forces engaged in dealing with the rebels.

(b.) If this is not agreed to, he proposes that the subjects of Koweit should be ordered to concentrate in one locality as above and that he should be at liberty to pursue the rebels anywhere. He would then take upon himself to protect the subjects of neighbouring countries from aggression, and he would undertake to withdraw every single soldier as soon as the pursuit of the rebels was at an end.

17. In the King's opinion there is no other method of dealing with the problem and exterminating the rebels. If neither alternative is accepted, he sees nothing for it but to give up his punitive measures, as also a plan for establishing internal security. He will not then hold himself responsible for any acts of aggression against adjacent countries.

18. Having regard to the importance of allowing Ibn Saud no excuse for an attempt to enter Koweit territory, or for permitting his tribes to recommence raiding, His Majesty's Government regard it as essential that all possible measures may be taken to carry out more completely and effectively the pledges already given by them to the King. They have accordingly issued instructions that certain military dispositions, in addition to those already adopted, should be taken at once. These measures contemplate the forcible ejection of any of the contending forces of either side that may penetrate into Koweit territory and also of any isolated groups of rebels who may cross the border in order to mingle with the tribes of Koweit in the manner suggested by the King. His Majesty's Government have also strongly urged that the tribes of Koweit and the refugee Awazim should be removed from the neighbourhood of the frontier or other possible scene of hostilities. The Sheikh of Koweit has been asked to give his consent to the execution of these measures in his territory and to co-operate in carrying them out.

19. The concurrence and co-operation of the Governments of Iraq and Transjordan has similarly been sought in order to prevent the infiltration of rebels into their territories.

20. On the 8th November, Sheikh Hafiz Wahba left Jedda for Koweit with the alleged purpose of discussing the situation with the Sheikh of Koweit and of enquiring into the allegations made against Koweit in regard to assistance rendered to the rebels. His presence in Koweit, where he arrived without credentials or introductions, caused some embarrassment to the sheikh, who considered that Ibn Saud had treated him with scant courtesy in this matter. A letter dated the 13th November was, however, subsequently received from Ibn Saud by His Majesty's political agent at Koweit, informing the latter that he was on that date leaving for Hafar-al-Az to commence operations against the rebels, and that he had sent Sheikh Hafiz Wahba to Koweit to keep in touch with the sheikh and with His Majesty's political agent and to act as his intermediary in any conversations that might ensue.

21. It appears that the rumour of the departure of Ibn Rubeian, a leading Ataibah sheikh, as a result of a quarrel with Khalid-bin-Lowai (October report, paragraph 8) is without foundation. According to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, there has been a quarrel between Ibn Rubeian and another influential sheikh of the Ataibah, which has now been settled.

22. Two more raids have been reported from Transjordan. On the 5th October a Hejaz raiding party under Sultan-bin-Doushan-al-Faqir, after attacking a Druse camp near Qariyat-al-Nilh, seized ten camels belonging to one of the Transjordan Howeitat sections under Sabah Abu Nuwair. On the 17th October a party led by Suleiman-al-Awazi, of the Anaiza tribe, attacked the Nuwasara section of the Howeitat, under Ibn Sham at Nashash-al-Hadraj, and carried off three herds of camels. The loot was recovered in both cases, and in the latter case a number of the raiders were killed.

23. On the 23rd November the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed a note to His Majesty's agent in Jedda to the effect that attacks by the tribes of Transjordan on Nejd subjects were becoming more frequent, despite the confidence expressed in a letter addressed to him by His Majesty's agent on the 27th September, in which it was stated that His Majesty's Government were actively considering, and hoped shortly to put into effect, far-reaching measures which they confidently believed would improve the existing situation on the Transjordan frontier. It had been reported to Sheikh Fuad Hamza that the tribes of Transjordan were organising expeditions on a large scale within Nejd territory on a line from the Wadi Sirhan to the Red Sea. He quoted, in particular, a raid carried out by the Transjordan Arabs against the Shararat near Jauf about the 30th August, and another against a caravan which had left Maan for Nisheitiya and Halaj, near Tebuk, when seven men of the caravan were taken prisoner, one of them was killed, and the whole caravan looted. Sheikh Fuad also complains that several other attacks in force by Transjordan raiders have taken place near Tebuk and much property captured, including sheep and cattle of the Government and of the Emir of Tebuk himself. Strong measures, he says, are required to stop this, and he hopes that His Majesty's Government will co-operate to this end.

24. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, in acknowledging receipt of the note addressed to him by His Majesty's agent on the 9th September enclosing a statement of claims in respect of raids carried out by Nejd subjects against shepherds and tribesmen of Iraq during the period the 1st July, 1928, to the 31st May, 1929 (September report, paragraph 17), refuses to take cognisance of four raids by Nejd subjects against the Dahamshah tribe, and he reiterates the claim

already made by the Hejaz Government in the past that the Dahamshah are themselves a Nejd tribe. The question of their allegiance has, in fact, long formed the subject of dispute between Ibn Saud and the Government of Iraq.

25. Evidence has been forthcoming which tends to prove that the facts concerning the death of Sheikh Enad-bin-Jumaian as stated by the Hejaz Government (June report, paragraph 21) are incorrect, and that he was, in fact, murdered while pinioned by a certain Ibn Oun and his party, who had been sent by the King to enumerate the cattle of the Beni Atiya and others.

26. The personnel, with the exception of one mechanic, who have been engaged by the Hejaz Government as pilots and mechanics for the four aeroplanes which are being supplied to them left London on the 15th November.

27. Information has been received that a contract with the Marconi Company in England has been approved by the King for the establishment of two main and eleven smaller wireless stations in the Hejaz and Nejd, and that the King desires the work to be carried out as soon as possible.

28. An order has also been placed with the Renault Company for the supply of four six-wheeled lorries and two armoured cars, as used by the French troops in North Africa. Specifications of British lorries and armoured cars suitable for desert work have also been requested.

29. The financial situation of the Government is still bad, although the tension is to a small extent relieved by the influx of Javanese pilgrims, who are beginning to arrive in considerable numbers. Government salaries and wages in the interior remain unpaid; the wages of Emir Feisal's bodyguard itself, for example, are said to be now five months in arrear.

30. The number of pilgrims from Java and Malay is expected greatly to exceed last year's figure.

31. An arrangement has been made between Abdulla Suleiman and the local motor-car companies, subject to the approval of the King, by which he guarantees the companies against the requisitioning of their cars by the Government in return for a sum payable according to a fixed tariff for each pilgrim carried by these companies. He is constructing a large garage at Mecca, and has already purchased a considerable number of cars in order to meet Government calls.

32. The Emir Feisal visited Jedda on the 16th November for the first time for about eight months and stayed until the 25th. On the day following his arrival he received the foreign representatives, and the same evening he was the guest of honour at a banquet given by the Governor of Jedda, to which about 100 persons were invited, including the foreign representatives, members of the local European firms and the leading citizens. His Highness took advantage of his stay in Jedda to discuss various questions of importance, such as a proposal for supplying the town with an electric power station and for the construction of docks, two projects which periodically come up for discussion but have not yet, however, taken any definite shape.

33. The fund created at the beginning of October to provide assistance for the Moslem sufferers in Palestine had only amounted to £11,050 by the end of November in spite of a subscription, included in the above total, of £500 received from the King.

34. An order has been issued by the Emir Feisal, with the approval of the King, to the effect that the 5th January every year is to be celebrated as a national holiday in the Kingdom of the Hejaz, Nejd and its dependencies as being the anniversary of the King's accession to the throne. His Majesty and His Majesty's Government will accept official congratulations on that day.

35. During the period under review two slaves have taken refuge at this agency and applied for manumission and repatriation. One, of Abyssinian origin, was sent to his home via Massowa, and the other, a female slave of Sudanese parentage, was repatriated to Suakin.

[E 6721/2322/91]

No. 97.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 156.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 31, 1929.

MY telegram No. 140 of 4th December, repeated to Bushire (explanation of admission of Awazim into Koweit), and Bushire telegram No. 89 of 23rd December to Colonial Office, repeated to you.

Please send to Ibn Saud by quickest route note of which text is contained in my immediately following telegram, and communicate contents to Hejazi Government. Political Resident at Bushire should also arrange to send note to Ibn Saud by quickest means available.

(Repeated to Bushire, Koweit and Bagdad.)

[E 6721/2322/91]

No. 98.

Mr. A. Henderson to Mr. Bond (Jedda).

(No. 157.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, December 31, 1929.

FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"His Majesty's Government learn from the Political Resident at Bushire that your Majesty has in a recent letter to him made a further protest against the action of His Majesty's Government in regard to the Awazim tribe. They cannot but believe that this protest is based upon a misapprehension, which the following explanation will remove:—

"In reply to your Majesty's letter of the 17th November, in which anxiety was expressed lest your Majesty's rebellious subjects when pressed should escape by mingling with the tribes in the adjacent countries and in which the request was made that these tribes should be removed from the vicinity of the frontier, His Majesty's representative informed your Majesty that measures would be taken to this end. Being under the impression that the Awazim had already entered or were about to enter Koweit in order to seek sanctuary, His Majesty's Government gave instructions that they, as well as the Koweiti tribes, should be ordered to move into the interior of Koweit.

"Subsequently, however, His Majesty's Government learned that the Awazim had not availed themselves of the permission given to move into Koweit territory, but remained in the neutral area. On the receipt of this information, in order that the doubtful position of the Awazim might be cleared up and the assurances given to your Majesty regarding the clearing of the frontier zone fully implemented, instructions were given that a message should be sent to the Awazim to the effect that they must either move at once into the interior of Koweit or, alternatively, they would be treated as part of the contending forces. His Majesty's Government now learn that they have not entered Koweit and that instructions have therefore been given for the denial to them of all supplies from Koweit and for the use of force, if necessary, to expel them should they cross the frontier."

(Repeated to Bushire, Koweit and Bagdad.)

CHAPTER II.—SYRIA.

No. 99.

Consul-General, Beirut, to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Beirut, August 29, 1929.

AS a result of Palestine troubles large peaceful protest demonstration [? group omitted] on 28th August by Moslems in association with Christians and Jews. All the shops closed and also to-day. Another demonstration probable to-morrow and also at Tripolis.

Authorities have afforded amply sufficient protection to [? group omitted] and to Anglo-Palestine Bank, and are ready to cope with disorders which, anyhow, seem quite unlikely.

No. 100.

Consul-General, Beirut, to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 7.)

(Telegraphic.) Code.

Beirut, September 2, 1929.

FRENCH have already taken special military measures of precaution in Southern Syria and Lebanon, which are being sent by liaison officer to the proper authorities. It is important that French intelligence officer should get into touch with Palestinian authorities and Squadron-Leader Elliot is to arrange this. Despite invitation of the Mufti of Jerusalem, Roualla and other Syrian Bedouin have not moved and will not be allowed to move, but it is almost impossible to prevent individuals or small parties getting into Palestine. Two bombs have been recently dropped on Lebanese territory. No complaint has been made, but as French troops, including irregular cavalry, will be in proximity to the frontier, the greatest care is necessary if bombing takes place.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 14.)

No. 101.

Consul-General, Beirut, to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Beirut, September 3, 1929.

ALTHOUGH the French make no complaint and realise the difficulties, they are clearly perturbed by the fact that on 2nd September British aeroplanes dropped at Khiam, north of Metulla, some fifty copies of proclamation of the High Commissioner of Palestine, the terms of which, when known here, may, they fear, revive Moslem agitation. The Nationalists are of course making all they can of Palestine troubles everywhere, and their influence, which was declining, is reviving.

(Repeated to Jerusalem.)

[E 4532/182/89]

No. 102.

Mr. Parr to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 79.)

Sir,

Damascus, August 26, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that a communication has been addressed to me by four residents of this town making strong protest against the prorogation of the Constituent Assembly by the mandatory Power, and requesting me to forward it through you to the League of Nations. The four signatories, Adib Safadi, Rida Churbagi, Khaled Chulak and Chafic Sleiman, two of whom are journalists, are people of little importance, and I do not consider it worth while to transmit the text of their communication.

2. After reference to the suppression on the 11th August of a public demonstration of protest against the prorogation of the Constituent Assembly, regarding which an exaggerated account has appeared in the Egyptian press, the memorandum complains of the economic results of the division of the Arab countries, intensified for Syria by the further subdivisions imposed on that State, the denial of religious, social and political freedom, the continued exile of various notables, the imposition of an ill-considered tariff and the disposal of various economic privileges. The French Government is accused of serious breaches of the terms of the mandate, and the active intervention of the League is demanded.

3. There is little doubt that Syria will continue to suffer economically by the divisions of which complaint is made, and for which, perhaps, the only effective remedy would be a customs union between the various Arab States, and agitation on such grounds carries greater weight than diatribes against the mandatory Power for a political situation largely brought about by the rashness and obstinacy of the Syrians themselves. Where they allege that the action of the Allies in dividing up the provinces detached from the Ottoman Empire has crippled their trade and reduced the general level of prosperity and that the administrative divisions imposed on them by the French have involved the multiplication of an unwieldy and inefficient bureaucracy it is not easy to traverse their statements. On the other hand, they have offered, from the very outset, opposition to the French mandate, of an active or a passive nature as circumstances offered, and the present political situation is very largely of their own making.

4. It is common talk here that the proposal recently made for the liquidation of the Egyptian question may stiffen the nationalist attitude in Syria.

5. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.

ROBERT PARR.

[E 4604/4198/65]

No. 103.

Consul Monck-Mason to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 10.)

(No. 59. Confidential.)

Sir,

Aleppo, September 2, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that the local repercussion of recent events in Palestine has been feeble and unimportant.

2. In the morning of the 30th August a mob, composed mainly of students and men of the poorest classes, were allowed to reach this consulate (which is almost contiguous to the French delegation), where a few anti-Zionist cries were uttered, the meeting being then dispersed with cavalry. A similar gathering which formed in the evening was broken up in the main street. The Jewish quarter was visited but no harm done.

3. On the 31st the consulate was not molested and no public meetings were allowed. The students persuaded many shopkeepers to close their doors, but, in spite of a certain feeling of nervousness, business was hardly affected.

4. On Sunday, the 1st September, the heads of the various Christian churches, acting on the suggestion of a leader of the Syrian Nationalist party, celebrated masses of requiem, which were attended by a few Moslems. There is a suggestion that this was a political move.

5. A demonstration took place before the consulate in the afternoon, but it was soon dispersed.

6. The acting assistant delegate stated to me frankly that the disturbances at Aleppo had never at any moment become serious; in spite of rumour, there have been no deaths to report. The consulate was well guarded, and the crowds, which assembled without any support from the recognised Moslem leaders, were small, not exceeding 200 or 300 persons. There is no reason for thinking that the Moslem population of Northern Syria has developed strong anti-British feeling overnight.

7. Copies of this despatch have been forwarded to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Jerusalem and Bagdad and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.

I have, &c.

A. MONCK-MASON.

[E 4866/4198/65]

No. 104.

Consul-General Satow to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 90.)

Sir,

Beirut, August 30, 1929.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 6 of yesterday, I have the honour to report that the recent disorders in Palestine have had in Beirut, as in other parts of Syria and the Lebanon, their repercussion.

2. In Beirut, on the 28th, all the shops were closed and a large but orderly demonstration took place. Its orderliness was no doubt largely due to the fact that the authorities had taken quite efficient measures to prevent disorder. I was unfortunately not able to see the demonstration at close quarters, but I understand that it comprised all kinds, from recognised Moslem religious chiefs, such as the Mufti, the Kadi, and the "Nakib-el-Ashraf," down to the usual riff-raff hopeful of a chance of plunder. Christians and Jews also took part in the demonstration, the latter possibly as much from policy as from conviction. The processions visited the Lebanese Government headquarters, where deputations went in and recorded with the President of the Lebanese Republic protests against the action of the Zionists in provoking trouble in Palestine, and it also visited the Maronite and Greek Orthodox cathedrals, where it was joined by young Christians with banners having religious emblems. A copy of the Beirut protest sent to me is enclosed.*

3. It had apparently been the intention of the organisers of the demonstration, chief among whom was a certain Riad-el-Solh, a somewhat discredited Moslem politician anxious to rehabilitate himself as a national "leader," that the demonstration should visit the High Commission offices, and in so doing pass in front of the British consulate-general. The roads in that neighbourhood being under repair, a number of missiles in the shape of stones of handy size were available. The authorities, not feeling sure that by peaceful persuasion the demonstrators could be prevented from passing in front of the consulate-general, took measures of protection, which, if it had not been for the existence of so much broken stone in the neighbourhood, might have seemed excessive, for, in addition to fifty Senegalese in the garden, there were two armoured cars in the street as well as police. However, nothing happened, and I managed to get even the police withdrawn by 5 o'clock. I was somewhat anxious about the Anglo-Palestine company's premises, but on both days the French at my request provided adequate protection and nothing happened.

4. On the 29th the shops remained closed, although this had not been the original intention. However, in view of the extreme heat, many shopkeepers were doubtless not averse to a holiday in the Lebanon, and responded more willingly than they might otherwise have done to those who bade them close. It was believed that there would be further manifestations to-day after the midday prayer, but the authorities seem to have let it be known that enough had already been done. Also, the closing of the shops for still another day would have led to undesirable loss and inconvenience. So all that happened was that the faithful who attended the mosque were invited to contribute money for the relief of their brethren in Palestine.

5. Manifestations on more or less similar lines have occurred elsewhere. The shops at Sidon were closed on the 28th, and I enclose a copy of the protest sent to me.* A demonstration took place to-day at Tripoli and passed off without untoward incident. Translations of the protests sent to me are enclosed.* I should say here that I received on the 28th from Hama, which is of course outside my consular district, a telegram of protest signed by about fifty-eight persons stating that the whole of Hama was closed and that both Moslems and Christians were showing their disapproval of Zionist atrocities.

6. Nothing definite as to what has really happened in Palestine is known here, and the papers have published the wildest stories. Although I had received no information as to the course of events, I endeavoured, both through the authorities and privately, to curb these dangerous exaggerations, and owing to the efforts of my emissary, one newspaper, which admitted that it was selling 4,000 copies a day, agreed not to publish a violent editorial which had been prepared.

7. Although there must be among many Frenchmen here a feeling akin to satisfaction that we in our turn have had to go through troubles not unlike those they suffered in 1925-26, I must say that I have seen no trace of such a feeling among those with whom I have come in contact. At the High Commission the officials, who have

* Not printed.

given me all the news they have, seem to be really anxious to be helpful, and I learn from the British liaison officer that he has found the military authorities anxious to do what they can. General Pichot-Duclos, who is in temporary command in the absence of General Bigault de Granrut, was especially sympathetic and helpful. The French are naturally anxious to keep out any elements from Palestine which might help to stir up trouble here, and French consular officers have received orders to refuse all visas for Syria. Exceptions are only made on the authority of the Acting High Commissioner himself.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Aleppo (No. 40), Bagdad, Cairo, Damascus (No. 54) and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.
H. E. SATOW.

[E 4865/4198/65]

No. 105.

Mr. Parr to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 81.)
Sir,

Damascus, August 29, 1929.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 80 of the 26th August, I have the honour to report that further demonstrations took place here both yesterday and the day before. But for the precautions taken by the French there would undoubtedly have been a massacre in the Jewish quarter. Various collisions took place between the mob and the gendarmerie. On two occasions the latter fired on their assailants. On one occasion a baton charge was made. There have been unimportant casualties on either side. On the whole it appears that the French have handled a critical three days with firmness and discretion.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch direct to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.
ROBERT PARR.

[E 5828/182/89]

No. 106.

Consul-General Satow to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 99. Confidential.)
Sir,

Beirut, October 22, 1929.

WITH reference to my confidential despatch No. 54 of the 13th May, I have the honour to report the occurrence of yet another Lebanese ministerial crisis. M. Bechara Khoury has for some time past been desirous of abandoning office, and also, it is believed, politics, in order to take up the post of legal adviser to the newly-formed Lebanese branch of the Bank Misr. He resigned a few days ago and has been succeeded by M. Emile Eddé, a clever lawyer, who may one day become President of the Lebanese Republic.

2. The new Cabinet is composed as follows:—

President of the Council, Minister of the Interior and Minister of Public Health: Emile Eddé.
Minister of Finance: Moussa Nammour.
Minister of Agriculture: Sayed Ahmed Husseini.
Minister of Justice and Minister of Education: Negib Aboussouan.
Minister of Public Works: Hussein-el-Ahdab.

The two last-named are survivors from the previous Ministry. M. Aboussouan is a quiet if rather clerically-minded lawyer, who is doing his best in an Augean stable, while Hussein-el-Ahdab seems to be regarded as the one man who knows anything about public works, which in the Lebanon mean mainly roads. Of the newcomers, Moussa Nammour, another lawyer, who has previously held office in different capacities, is the only one who counts. His reputation is not of the best, but he is a crafty politician.

3. There are thus once more five Ministers. To placate the Greek Orthodox element, M. Eddé has introduced a novelty in the shape of an "Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs." This post has been given to a young lawyer named Gabriel Menassa. It does not appear that he has any special qualifications for it.

4. M. Eddé, who has yet to meet the Chamber, is credited with the intention of introducing drastic reforms and economies. If he reduces, as it is said he intends to do, the number of officials by one-half, he will certainly become widely unpopular. It remains to be seen to what extent his plans, which involve administrative and judicial reorganisation on a large scale, will be carried out. It is permissible to feel a certain scepticism as to what he will actually do.

5. There seems to be a tendency in the press to regard M. Eddé, who is reputed to enjoy the confidence and to be able to count on the support of the French authorities, as the last hope of the Lebanon. It is suggested that, if he fails to bring about an improvement in the general situation and in the administration of the country, there will have to be drastic constitutional changes. This may be so, but it seems much more likely that when he fails someone else will gladly take on the task. There is undoubtedly much latent discontent, but the time is probably far off when a drastic revision of the cumbersome and costly Constitution devised by M. de Jouvenel will be demanded by Lebanese public opinion, such as it is. The French certainly cannot initiate a change. Complaints are made that they, having invented the Constitution, are responsible for what goes wrong, but these complaints would be as nothing compared to the complaints which would arise if they of their own initiative introduced changes.

6. Things will therefore probably muddle along as they do now, and nothing much more will be achieved by M. Eddé than by his predecessors. The Administration is undoubtedly inefficient, its cost is excessive and is growing, and the number of officials is absurdly high. On the other hand, the politicians are enjoying themselves, and with so many useless posts there seems to be a place in the Administration for almost any idler who wants one.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.
H. E. SATOW.

[E 6580/182/89]

No. 107.

Consul-General Satow to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 111.)
Sir,

Beirut, November 26, 1929.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 99, Confidential, of the 22nd October, reporting that M. Emile Eddé had become Lebanese Prime Minister, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of his ministerial declaration which was read to the Chamber on Friday, the 22nd November.* This is, so far as I know, the first time that a Lebanese Prime Minister has come before the Chamber with a definite programme. It will be seen that it is quite clear, and that if it is carried out even only in part, many reforms of which there is great need will undoubtedly result.

2. The administrative machine is to be simplified. Instead of eleven districts there are only to be five, while the thirty-six mudirs in charge of sub-districts will be replaced by seventeen kaimakams in charge of kazas. It is hoped that with a lesser number of posts to fill it will be possible to find more able officials to fill them.

3. A simplification of the judicial machine will, it is hoped, render it possible to raise both the professional standard of the magistrature and the pay of the magistrates and judicial functionaries. There will be an increased number of peace justices, at least one per kaza, five courts of first instance and one higher court which will perform the duties hitherto falling to the Court of Appeal and Court of Cassation. As the result of these changes it is expected that the number of magistrates, now 150, will be reduced by about half, and that an even greater proportion of the existing 340 minor judicial officials will disappear. Other matters which are to receive attention are the revision of the existing codes, an inheritance from Turkish days, and the withdrawal of Christians from the jurisdiction of the Moslem religious courts in questions affecting personal status.

4. A general reform of the present fiscal system is contemplated. There is great need of improvement here. As stated in the declaration, the trouble is not so much the amount of the taxes as the unfair way in which they are collected. It has long been admitted that the "temettou" as at present collected is a most unfair tax,

* Not printed.

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but for years past there has been no suggestion that the unfairness should be remedied. To permit of the reform of the tax on real property, funds are to be made available for speeding-up the completion of the cadastral survey.

5. To allow of funds being available for public works, i.e., the upkeep of roads plus some irrigation work, reductions will be made in the budgets of the Education and Public Health Departments. As regards the former, it is a well-known fact that private enterprise already caters adequately and well for secondary and higher education. The Government has decided to save money by concentrating on primary education where needed. As regards hospital treatment, the State will make greater use of private establishments.

6. It is to be hoped that more attention will really be paid to agriculture, which has hitherto been consistently neglected. The declaration, which is of course the work of a town dweller, mainly deals with irrigation schemes.

7. Section 8 of the declaration deals with a variety of subjects of a more or less economic nature. The modest reference to the possibility of a decrease in the import duty does not suggest that much will be achieved in that direction. The transformation of Beirut seems to have become a fetish with the authorities, and especially with the President of the Republic, who are full of grandiose and costly schemes for the development of the city. They seem to be almost unmindful of the fact that the scavenging and street-cleaning are still done on very rudimentary lines and that the noise is enough to drive away any tourist in search of peace and quiet. The declaration suggests that some satisfaction may be obtainable from the High Commission in regard to the thorny question of the share of the excess customs revenue falling to the Lebanon, and that the question of the régime under which tobacco is to be grown is at last to receive a solution.

8. M. Eddé, fearing that even if his programme is formally approved by the Chamber and a vote of confidence given, the Deputies will shortly after change their minds, has decided that powers must at once be given him to carry out his programme. He has therefore incorporated in his programme, and will ask for a vote of confidence on it, as being an integral part of the programme, a draft law which will give him these powers.

9. After the reading of the declaration, the Chamber was adjourned for a fortnight to enable it to consider the programme therein outlined, and a committee of fifteen was appointed to that end. The opinion seems to be that the Deputies will end by accepting M. Eddé's programme and giving him the powers for which he asks. Their decision will, it is thought, be influenced by the belief that if they do not do this the Chamber will be dissolved. M. Eddé is apparently both fearless and determined, and he is believed to have the support both of the French High Commissioner and of the President of the Republic. If he gets his way then there is chance that reforms which cannot fail to benefit the people of the country will be put through. Further, the prestige of the Administration, which had sunk to a low ebb, will be revived.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

CHAPTER III.—IRAQ.

[E 3786/124/93]

No. 108.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 316.)

Sir,

Constantinople, July 23, 1929.

IT is with great regret that I have to report the death of Sahib Bey Nishet, the Iraq Minister in Angora, which occurred suddenly at his house on the Bosphorus on the 18th instant.

2. Iraq was very fortunate in its first representative in Turkey. Not only was Sahib Bey an ex-Minister and a personality in his own country, but as a former and very popular Turkish officer, and a comrade-in-arms of the Ghazi he at once found himself at home with the ruling class of Angora, which conceals beneath the black jackets of Deputies most of the prominent generals and colonels of the revolutionary army. No other foreign representative had a position similar to that of Sahib Bey, who was treated by the Turks as one of themselves, and was even kept informed of the squabbles and rivalries which are sedulously kept from the knowledge of other foreigners. He was thus in a position which enabled him to give his Government valuable and accurate information, and Iraq could have had no more loyal or trustworthy servant.

3. For His Majesty's Embassy the death of Sahib Bey is a great loss. He was genuinely fond of England and an admirer of the English and a great upholder of the British connexion with Iraq. The result was that, not only was he an invaluable source of inside information, but he was indirectly of great assistance to us, for in his close association with the Turks he was always ready to champion our view and to explain the reasonableness of any attitude of ours which might otherwise have aroused the very ready suspicions of the uncomprehending Turks.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the British High Commissioner for Iraq at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

[E 4385/6/93]

No. 109.

Paraphrase Telegram from the High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, September 2.)

September 1, 1929.

IMPORTANT. No. 299 of 1st September.

Tewfik Beg Suwaidi's resignation on account of incompatibility with the King, which must in any case have come to pass when Parliament met, has produced a deadlock. The King had reckoned on Abdul Muhsin taking office, but latter is unwilling to do so; nor in present circumstances could he form a Cabinet which would have much hope of facing Parliament successfully. Abdul Muhsin's argument, and that of other suitable candidates for office, is that country, especially after the Egyptian conversations, will expect any Government taking office to approach His Majesty's Government immediately with a view to securing a definite assurance as to the entry of Iraq into the League of Nations and a satisfactory arrangement of the relations of the past and future between His Majesty's Government and Iraq. On the other hand, they are, in the light of past experience, unwilling to undertake such a programme, being afraid that they will only find His Majesty's Government unwilling to meet them, and thus a Ministerial crisis will be provoked on the grounds of political disagreement with His Majesty's Government.

I have studied situation, and, although personal elements enter into question to some extent, I believe above statement to be based on correct premises.

To turn to general situation, I find it still good but gradually deteriorating as a result of doubt and uncertainty as to His Majesty's Government's real policy. Until that doubt is dispelled, no improvement can be expected and none but ineffective and makeshift Ministries can be formed.

[21087]

Now to come to events in Palestine which have profoundly stirred the country. So far there has been no disturbance with which police have not been able to deal, but Friday last might have seen very serious outbreak if careful precautionary measures had not been taken with a view to nipping trouble promptly in the bud. Up to the present there is no indication of undue excitement in the provincial towns or country districts, but news and propaganda travels slowly from the centre.

I would recall the fact that our available ground troops for dealing with urban disturbance consist only of two armoured car sections at Bagdad, three at Basra (which are designed to watch southern desert situation), and one at Mosul. There are also two Assyrian infantry battalions, but they are mainly required on the Kurdish frontier, and there are only about 500 men in Bagdad, including recruits; in any case, to use them in the streets against an Arab mob would only provoke trouble which it was desired to prevent. We are therefore largely dependent in the towns on the local police, with the Iraq army in reserve.

I am not thus setting forth situation in any alarmist spirit, but I cannot ignore the lessons of 1920, and I desire to emphasise urgent necessity for a strong and responsible Ministry which will co-operate effectively in maintaining control over the country and will also tackle various questions which require settlement.

In order to obtain such a Ministry I must have something in my hand to offer them, and in this connexion I draw attention my despatch of 22nd July, Secret, B. I believe it will suffice if I am authorised to give assurance suggested in paragraph 13 of that despatch. I recommend now, however, that September 1931 be substituted for June 1932. The actual difference is not great, but the effect of advancing date from 1932 to 1931 would be considerable, and the gesture would be in accordance with principle recommended in paragraph 12 of the same despatch.

In conclusion, I beg that this be treated as a matter of extreme urgency. The moment has come for immediate decision whether to advance on generous and liberal lines or to remain stationary, with the possible early consequence of being obliged to reinforce our military forces in the country by an adequate proportion of ground troops. I beg that I may be promptly informed of any important developments of events or policy in Palestine. Up to the present I have been entirely dependent on wireless news agencies and on garbled and exaggerated reports which come across from Syria by the desert route. The Air Officer Commanding, to whom I have shown this telegram, concurs.

[E 4637/6/93]

No. 110.

Paraphrase of a Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Iraq.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, September 12.)

(No. 264.)

Downing Street, September 11, 1929.

YOUR telegram of the 1st September, No. 299.

You are authorised to inform Iraq Government, without proviso or qualification, that His Majesty's Government will be prepared to support the candidature of Iraq for admission to the League of Nations in 1932, and that at next session His Majesty's Government will inform the Council of the League of Nations that they have decided not to proceed with the unratified treaty of 1927, but that they propose, in accordance with article 3 (1) of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1926, to recommend Iraq for admission to the League of Nations in 1932. It will be noted that His Majesty's Government do not see their way to accept your suggestion that date should be advanced to 1931.

2. The Iraq Government should also be informed that, as it will be necessary to conclude a treaty before 1932 in order to regulate the relations between the United Kingdom and Iraq after the latter's admission to the League, the necessary steps will now be taken to prepare a draft treaty for that purpose, which will be based generally upon the recent proposals for an Anglo-Egyptian settlement. The draft treaty will be communicated to the Government of Iraq in due course.

3. I will address you further on the points raised in paragraph 14 of your despatch of the 22nd July. Meanwhile, however, pending further instructions from me, nothing should be said to the Iraq Government on either point.

[E 4672/3303/34]

No. 111.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 14.)

Sir,

Downing Street, September 13, 1929.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of Mr. Secretary Henderson, copy of a note from the High Commissioner for Iraq to Sir R. Clive and copy of a note from the Council of Ministers, Bagdad, to the Ministry of Justice, both dated the 12th August, on the subject of the provisional agreement between Iraq and Persia.

I am, &c.

S. H. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 111.

Sir G. Clayton to Sir R. Clive.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Bagdad, August 12, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to refer to correspondence ending with my despatch, Confidential, dated the 29th July, 1929, regarding the provisional agreement between Iraq and Persia.

2. I am now glad to be able to report that the agreement was concluded by exchange of letters in due form during the morning of the 11th August, 1929. The text of the letters was as given in your despatch No. 193 dated the 14th July. They were signed on behalf of the Persian and Iraq Governments by his Excellency Sami'i Khan and his Excellency Tawfiq Beg-al-Suwaidi respectively.

3. At the same time the Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to the Persian Minister the letter, of which a copy is enclosed, undertaking that there will be no change in the procedure now in force for the disposal of the estates in Iraq of deceased Persians pending the conclusion of a specific agreement on the subject between the two States.

I have, &c.

GILBERT CLAYTON,

High Commissioner for Iraq.

Enclosure 2 in No. 111.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Iraq, to Persian Minister.

M. le Ministre,

August 11, 1929.

WITH reference to our conversation on the 7th August, 1929, on the subject of the making of inventories and handing over of the estates of Persians who die in Iraq without heirs or with heirs in Persia.

At your request, I have the honour to inform you that the procedure now in force in Iraq in this connexion is the same as in the past, and will continue in force pending the conclusion of a new agreement on the subject between the two kingdoms.

Please accept, &c.

Enclosure 3 in No. 111.

Council of Ministers to the Ministry of Justice.

(No. 1966.)

Bagdad, August 12, 1929.

I AM directed to forward to you herewith, for information, copy of the provisional agreement between Iraq and Persia which was signed yesterday morning by his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his Excellency Sami'ee Khan on behalf of their respective Governments, also copy of a letter which has been addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs* to Sami'ee Khan on the subject of the making of inventories and handing over of estates of (deceased) Persians in Iraq.

ABDUL QADIR RASHID,
Secretary to the Council of Ministers.

* Enclosure 2.

[21087]

Enclosure 4 in No. 111.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Iraq, to Persian Minister.

M. le Ministre,

Bagdad, le 11 août 1929.

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que mon Gouvernement, animé du désir sincère de porter à leur conclusion dans le plus bref délai possible les négociations en cours avec le Gouvernement persan et relatives à la conclusion du traité d'amitié, des conventions d'établissement, commerciale et de navigation ainsi que des accords particuliers réglant les questions demandant à être réglées entre les parties intéressées, m'a chargé de vous communiquer, en son nom, les dispositions suivantes, pour constituer règlement provisoire des relations entre nos deux pays :

1. Les représentants diplomatiques et consulaires de la Perse en Iraq jouiront, sous condition de réciprocité, des droits, privilèges, immunités et exemptions consacrés par les principes et la pratique du droit commun international et qui ne seront en aucun cas inférieurs à ceux accordés aux représentants diplomatiques et consulaires de la nation la plus favorisée.

2. Sous condition de réciprocité, le Gouvernement persan aura la faculté de nommer sur le territoire iraquien ses représentants consulaires, qui pourront y résider en toute place où ses intérêts économiques et culturels paraîtront de nature à justifier leur établissement. Ils ne peuvent, toutefois, exercer leurs fonctions qu'après avoir reçu l'exequatur d'usage.

3. Les ressortissants persans seront admis et traités sur territoire iraquien conformément aux règles du droit international et en aucun cas, sous condition de réciprocité, plus défavorablement que les ressortissants de la nation la plus favorisée.

La compétence des autorités à connaître les questions de status personnel devant être réglée ultérieurement entre les deux États, les ressortissants de l'un sur le territoire de l'autre resteront provisoirement soumis en cette matière aux tribunaux de leur pays de résidence.

4. Sous condition de réciprocité, les produits du sol et de l'industrie persans importés en Iraq bénéficieront à tous égards du régime accordé aux produits de même nature de la nation la plus favorisée.

5. Les dispositions susmentionnées entreront en vigueur à dater d'aujourd'hui et resteront en force jusqu'à la conclusion, des traités, conventions et accords respectifs, ci-dessus prévus, et au plus tard jusqu'à un an.

Veuillez, &c.

[E 4710/6/93]

No. 112.

Paraphrase Telegram from the Acting High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, September 16.)

September 14, 1929.

THE substance of your telegram No. 264 of 11th September was communicated to the Iraq Government this morning. First I had a personal interview with King Faisal, at which I informed him that, though my message was for the Iraq Government, he should be the first to know. He was highly pleased when he heard the contents of your telegram. He said that now there was no obstacle to the formation of a strong and stable Ministry, and that any Iraqi who refused to co-operate in it would be a traitor. Then he sent for the Prime Minister, who was in the Palace, and to whom I also communicated the contents of your telegram. He, too, was highly pleased. King Faisal said he would immediately set about the formation of new Ministry. He did not refer to the question of accelerating date of admission of Iraq to the League of Nations. I said nothing about the two points referred to in paragraph 14 of Clayton's despatch, Secret (B), of 22nd July. I told King Faisal that I did not know the date of the next session of the League, but that I presumed it would be in November. Faisal is pleased at hearing of Young's early arrival. He enquired about the new High Commissioner, and suggested that Sir Edgar Bonham Carter would be most acceptable in Iraq and to him personally.

I consider that the effect of your telegram will be excellent, and wish that Clayton could have communicated it himself.

[E 4838/6/93]

No. 113.

Telegram from the Acting High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, September 21.)

(Nos. 328 and 329.)

September 19, 1929

ABDUL MUHSIN has formed new Cabinet as follows :—

1. Interior : Naji Suwaidi.
2. Justice : Naji Shawkit.
3. Defence : Nuri.
4. Finance : Yasin-al-Hashimi
5. Irrigation : Abdul Aziz Qassah.
6. Communications : Amin Saki.
7. Education : Abdul Hussein Chalabi.

All have had previous ministerial experience.

All are members of the Progressive party except Yasin, who is a Nationalist. No. 6 is a Kurd, No. 7 a Shiah; the remainder, Sunni. No. 7 is a nonentity, but the others are men of character. It seems unfortunate that a Shiah was chosen for Education, otherwise the selections appear to be sound and a strong Cabinet if Abdul Muhsin can hold it together. Please inform Air Ministry.

[E 5032/3/91]

No. 114.

Sir G. Clayton to Lord Passfield.—(Communicated by the Colonial Office, October 1.)

(Confidential.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, September 6, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that, shortly after my arrival in this country, I took up the question of the organisation required for the administration of the southern desert. It was very undesirable that the normal protection and, to some extent, the administration of that area should remain in the hands of the military authorities longer than was absolutely necessary. The only way to produce a really satisfactory situation in the desert area was to encourage the growth of normal civil administration.

2. I therefore pressed the Iraq Government, with the assistance of the adviser to the Ministry of Interior, who was entirely in agreement with my views, to appoint a regular civil staff for this purpose and to form the southern desert area into a separate liwa.

3. There was at first some reluctance on the part of the Iraq Government to approve of this measure, which entailed a certain amount of expenditure at a time when economy was very necessary. On the other hand, considerable expense had fallen hitherto upon the Ministry of Defence every year in respect of various operations which had been necessary from time to time in the southern desert. The expenses of this nature during the preceding year had reached a total of approximately 4 lakhs.

4. At the beginning of June the Government decided on the policy suggested, and the Ministry of Interior instructed the inspector-general of police to start forming and training the police force necessary to carry out the work.

5. It is less than six months since this work was started and already the posts of Busaiyah, Salman and Shabaichah, over which there has been so much trouble, have been transferred from military forts into administrative posts and are now occupied by police only. The post of Nukhaib has been abandoned, at any rate for the summer months.

6. I enclose herewith a copy of a report* received from the inspecting officer of police in the southern desert, describing a small affair which took place at the end of August, and which gives some idea of the rapidity with which the police force have been trained and organised into a really efficient body.

I have, &c.

GILBERT CLAYTON,
High Commissioner for Iraq.

* Not printed.

[21087]

[E 4921/6/93]

No. 115.

Foreign Office to Secretary-General, League of Nations (Geneva).

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 4, 1929.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Henderson to request that you will be so good as to make the following communication to the members of the Council:—

2. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have decided, after full consideration of all the circumstances, not to proceed with the treaty between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Iraq, signed at London on the 14th December, 1927 (copies of which were forwarded to you, together with the annual report on Iraq for 1927, in Foreign Office letter of the 28th August, 1928), which has not been ratified or brought into force. They propose, however, in accordance with article 3 (1) of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of the 13th January, 1926, copy of which was enclosed in Foreign Office letter of the 2nd March, 1926, to recommend Iraq for admission to membership of the League of Nations in 1932.

I am, &c.

G. W. RENDEL.

[E 6662/6/93]

No. 116.

Verbal Communication to Sir R. Lindsay by the French Ambassador, December 20.

NOTIFICATION, le 4 novembre 1929, de la décision du Gouvernement britannique de recommander l'admission en 1932 de l'Irak dans la Société des Nations.

Observations de la Commission des Mandats sur les conditions à remplir pour cette admission.

Il n'est pas dans les intentions du Gouvernement français de contrecarrer en quoi que ce soit le développement de la politique britannique en Irak. Pas plus qu'il ne s'est opposé à cette politique, quand elle a substitué au régime strict du mandat le régime des traités anglo-irakiens, le Gouvernement français ne compte élever d'objection de principe contre le projet d'admission de l'Irak dans la Société des Nations. Mais l'indépendance de l'Irak, qui résulterait de son admission si l'Assemblée la prononçait en 1932, poserait dès maintenant un problème grave dont les conséquences doivent à plusieurs égards préoccuper la Puissance mandataire de la Syrie.

Cette Puissance doit veiller au maintien du régime de la "porte ouverte" en faveur des ressortissants et établissements français et syriens en Irak. Elle est aussi obligée de prévoir l'influence du précédent de l'Irak sur la Syrie. Toute concession sur des principes essentiels du mandat faite par la Grande-Bretagne à l'Irak risquerait d'être exploitée par ceux des Syriens qui désirent s'émanciper de toute contrainte. Les principes généraux du mandat, rappelés par la Commission de Genève, fourniraient, au contraire, à la Puissance mandataire un point d'appui contre ces mêmes Syriens.

Aussi le Gouvernement français approuve-t-il les observations de la Commission des Mandats et serait même favorable à la mise à l'étude des conditions à exiger pour l'admission d'un État sous mandat dans la Société des Nations.

No. 117.

High Commissioner for Iraq to Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received, Colonial Office, December 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

December 30, 1929.

ON the 24th December, Ibn Mashhur, with following of 200, including 30 women, having entered Iraq and refused to leave, under threat of force surrendered unconditionally to Iraq police, who were supported by Royal Air Force

armoured cars. They were disarmed and escorted to Busaiyah post. On 29th December Dawish and his following were routed by loyalist Harb force, who were assisted by some Iraqi tribesmen, near Riqai, close to Iraq frontier. Mutair fugitives on foot, mainly women, are collecting on the Iraq frontier. Iraq police on the frontier met fugitives who claimed to be Dawish. They refused to parley. In the meantime the Royal Air Force armoured cars are evicting Ajman rebels who crossed the Nejd frontier some days ago and camped on Koweit-Iraq boundary. It is probable that the latter will refuse to go and will surrender to the armoured cars in view of Dawish's defeat.

Disposal of refugees presents problem which I am actively discussing with Iraq Government, and I will telegraph further on this subject as soon as possible.

(Addressed to Secretary of State for the Colonies, No. 453. Repeated to Bushire, Koweit, Jedda, Jerusalem, No. 354.)

CHAPTER IV.—PALESTINE.

[E 4546/4198/65]

No. 118.

Sir E. Howard to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 1618.)

Sir,

Washington, August 30, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that recent events in Palestine have aroused intense agitation among the principal Jewish communities in this country.

2. As I reported in my telegram No. 390 of the 27th instant, as soon as news of the Arab-Jewish disturbances appeared in the press, the heads of Jewish organisations in such cities as New York, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh began to address telegrams to the State Department and to this Embassy, urging upon the former the necessity of intervention on behalf of the American Jewish interests involved, and intimating to the latter in the clearest terms that American Jewry attaches grave responsibility to His Majesty's Government for their alleged failure, despite repeated warnings, to afford adequate protection to the Jewish population of Palestine. Specimens of the telegrams received at this Embassy are enclosed herewith.*

3. On the 26th instant some 15,000 Jews paraded in New York under the leadership of Messrs. Julius Berg, commander of the "Jewish War Veterans of the United States," and Elias Ginsberg, of the "American Palestine Jewish Legion." The majority of these people marched to His Majesty's consulate-general, where a deputation of their leaders was received by Sir Harry Armstrong in the circumstances described in his despatch No. 644 of the 27th instant, a copy of which he forwarded direct to the Foreign Office.

4. On the 27th instant, as reported in my telegram No. 392 of that date, a delegation, representing numerous Jewish organisations, called first at the White House and the State Department, and subsequently at this Embassy. While at the State Department the delegation handed to Mr. Stimson a letter, signed by Mr. Bernard Deutsch, president of the American Jewish Congress, with the request that it might be transmitted to me. The text of this letter will be found in the enclosed extract from the "United States Daily."* According to the "New York Herald-Tribune," Mr. Stimson informed the delegation that the letter should either be transmitted direct by them—a step which they were perfectly free to take—or phrased more diplomatically, with controversial matters deleted, should they insist upon the State Department serving as the channel for transmission. Identification of the State Department with the letter, he is said to have pointed out, would have given it a semi-official character. It appears that efforts were then made by the delegation to withdraw the letter, of which a copy had already been handed to the Associated Press, but that these efforts were too late to prevent publication. Finally, I received the letter by post from New York on the 29th instant. In accordance with the statement I made to the delegation (see penultimate paragraph of my telegram No. 392), I am returning the letter to them, informing them that any communication they have to make to His Majesty's Government should pass through the United States Embassy in London.

5. The substance of what passed at my interview with the delegation was reported in my telegram No. 392. I enclose herewith a copy of a communiqué embodying my reply to their representations.* This was given to members of the delegation as well as to the various press agencies.

6. On the 28th instant I received two telegrams, one from Mr. Samuel Friedman, chairman of the Executive Committee of the "American Palestine Jewish Legion," and the other from the above-mentioned Mr. Julius Berg, on behalf of his organisation, offering to recruit Jewish war veterans for service in Palestine. The substance of the former telegram was contained in my telegram No. 394 of the 28th instant; a copy of the latter is enclosed herewith.*

7. As might be expected at this time of year, when newspaper "copy" is scarce, reports of the events in Palestine have occupied a prominent place on the front pages of the newspapers. Many of these reports have displayed a distinctly pro-Jewish tinge, and have tended to be critical of the British administration in

* Not printed.

Palestine, which is said to have shown partiality in its efforts to conciliate the Moslem and Arab element. Moreover, a certain Lieutenant-Colonel Edmund Gabriel, described as "financial adviser and assistant administrator in Palestine in 1918-19," is said to have spoken somewhat critically of the British administration at Williamstown Institute of Politics, declaring that, while "Jewish arrogance," by alarming the Arabs and arousing their resentment, was partly responsible for the tension which had arisen, the British Government could clear up the situation if it took decisive action in either its Arabian or its Zionist policies, which were mutually contradictory.

8. On the other hand, a report in the "New York World" of the 26th instant from Mr. Vincent Sheehan, commissioned by the North American Newspaper Alliance as their special correspondent in Jerusalem, stated that "a fearful responsibility rests on the Zionist Fascisti, who precipitated the present crisis on Wednesday, the 14th August, by assembling in Jerusalem from all parts of the country to make a nationalist demonstration of the most dangerous and provocative character in the heart of the Moslem district," and much more to the same effect. This was indignantly denied in an article published in the same newspaper on the following day by Mr. Elias Ginsberg, to whom reference was made in paragraph 3 above. Mr. Ginsberg stated that "there are no Fascists among the Jews," and laid the whole responsibility for recent events upon the Arabs and the British administration—more particularly the latter.

9. Editorial articles have, on the whole, been fair and friendly to Great Britain. There is a certain criticism of "the official laxness which permitted the present situation to develop," and the opinion appears to be widely held that insufficient protective forces were held in readiness on the spot; "if Great Britain had looked ahead with her usual prevision, the riots might not have occurred at all." On the other hand, stress is generally laid on the facts that the fires of religious and racial hatred have smouldered for centuries throughout the Middle East, and nowhere more hotly than in Palestine; that the great majority of the country's inhabitants are Arabs, who have viewed with growing resentment the increase of Jewish numbers and influence in their midst, and have never been reconciled to the policy expressed in the Balfour declaration; and that British interests forbid the adoption of any measures which might antagonise the many millions of British Moslem subjects. In the words of the "Journal of Commerce," "the task of the English is not an enviable one, and the United States may be glad that the responsibility for keeping the peace in Palestine has not fallen to our lot."

10. Moreover, with the exception noted below, I have nowhere observed any tendency to urge interference on the part of the United States Government or the despatch of an American war vessel. On the contrary, the "Chicago Tribune" asserts that such a demand for intervention would be "improper," and emphasises this assertion with a cartoon depicting John Bull, with the aid of a fire-hose marked "Military and Naval Resources," about to extinguish the conflagration in Palestine "before it spreads," while Uncle Sam, gazing from the background through field glasses, exclaims: "He must protect my citizens as I must protect his when the trouble is in my part of the world."

11. The exception is, of course, the "Washington Post," which expresses scarcely veiled disgust at the idea of American citizens being dependent on Britain for protection ("it is gratifying to be assured that the Union Jack will protect Americans in the absence of vessels flying the Stars and Stripes"); hints that only a lack of available vessels should prevent the United States from intervening (with the implication that more vessels should be made available); rejoices in the dilemma of a Socialist Government compelled to apply "the British policy of force"; declares, nevertheless, that, "if necessary, British resources must be taxed to the limit to command respect for lives and property in territory over which the British assume to exercise control"; and, the wish being father to the thought, avers that, "if the spreading disorders are not speedily checked, the British Prime Minister will be too busy explaining his failure to his own people to bother about a naval disarmament trip to America. . . . Under the circumstances, it may become more important for Mr. MacDonald to scrap some of his socialistic policies than to consider scrapping cruisers that are now unexpectedly needed to assert British authority in foreign lands."

12. Finally, I should refer to the attitude of the Administration, which has gone out of its way to show its friendly disposition. Not only did Mr. Stimson, as reported in my telegram No. 390, deliberately draw an analogy between Nicaragua and Palestine in emphasising his refusal to despatch an American warship; not only

was the press fain to report that "the general attitude of the State Department is that the British are fully equipped to take care of the situation"; but, according to the "United States Daily," Mr. Stimson even went so far, in speaking to press correspondents, as to draw their attention to press reports, "to the effect that the original demonstrations were not religious, but were started by Jewish students and were nationalistic in their origin" (see paragraph 8 above), although, in so doing, he evidently ran the risk of drawing upon himself the censure of that very section of American opinion which is most vitally interested in the whole question.

13. To sum up, I have the impression that, while Jewish circles have naturally been profoundly agitated by the events in Palestine, both the Administration and public opinion at large are content to leave the restoration of order wholly to the British authorities, and are not in any hurry to attribute blame to any particular party involved in these events.

I have, &c.
ESME HOWARD.

[E 4575/4198/65]

No. 119.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 736.)

Sir,

Ramleh, August 31, 1929.

RECENT developments in Palestine have been followed in Egypt with keen, but by no means impartial, interest. Public opinion is definitely biased in favour of the Arabs as against the Jews.

2. The local Jewish communities have wisely avoided any public expression of their feelings, though it is understood that these have been interpreted in cables of protest to London. The more responsible newspapers have, with equal wisdom, refrained from provocative comment; but there is no doubt that popular sentiment is reflected in the pronouncements of the Indian Khilafit Committee, which have received wide publicity here, and in the inflammatory articles of the Watanist "Alam" and "Akhbar," which represent the Arabs of Palestine as fighting for the essential rights of Islam against the iniquity of the Balfour Declaration, and call upon Moslems the world over to support their martyred brethren. Violent expressions of opinion of this kind are highly dangerous in Egypt, and I have asked the Ministry of the Interior to arrange, through the Press Bureau, for a check to be set to such partisan enthusiasms. The attitude of the local European press is inclined to be pro-Jew.

3. Some alarm still, I understand, prevails in the Jewish quarters of Cairo and Alexandria lest the local population should be infected with the same spirit that has inflamed the pogroms in Palestine. The Public Security Department has arranged to have these quarters specially patrolled, and I hope that no incident will arise to precipitate a tragedy. That the elements of combustion are present is proved by an urgent telegram addressed to Messrs. Barclay's Bank in Alexandria by their representative in Sohag, asking that the sub-agent in Girga (a Jew) should, for his own safety, be immediately transferred, and by the action of two (Arab) Palestinian students, who were apprehended while distributing inflammatory tracts in a Cairo mosque after yesterday's noonday prayer. In the latter case the parquet is taking action.

4. The problem of Jewish refugees who may apply for permission to come to Egypt until the storm in Palestine blows over is at present under consideration in the Ministry of the Interior. I gather that the arrival of such refugees would be definitely unwelcome to the Egyptian Government.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Sir John Chancellor in Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

R. H. HOARE,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 6015/204/65]

No. 120.

Foreign Office to Secretary-General, League of Nations.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 18, 1929.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Henderson to transmit the accompanying memorandum containing a proposal of His Majesty's Government that, for reasons set out therein, a special *ad hoc* commission should be appointed forthwith, under the terms of article 14 of the Palestine mandate, to study, define and determine finally the rights and claims of Jews and Moslems at the Western or Wailing Wall at Jerusalem. The memorandum concludes with the earnest hope that the Permanent Mandates Commission will be able at the present session to commend this proposal to the Council, whose approval is necessary under the terms of article 14 of the mandate.

2. Mr. Henderson will be glad if you will be so good as to communicate the memorandum to the chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission in the course of their present session.

I am, &c.
MONTEAGLE.

Enclosure in No. 120.

Memorandum respecting Jewish and Moslem Rights and Claims at the Western or Wailing Wall, Jerusalem.

WHEN Sir John Chancellor, the High Commissioner for Palestine, appeared before the Permanent Mandates Commission at the fifteenth session of that body in July last, he described the recent developments and the existing situation in regard to the question of Jewish and Moslem rights and claims at the Western or Wailing Wall. Sir John Chancellor explained, on that occasion, that his efforts to facilitate an agreement between the Jews and Moslems which would minimise the risk of disputes and incidents at the Wall in the future had not met with success, and that it had consequently become necessary to define and determine the rights and claims of the parties concerned in this connexion.

2. Subsequent events in Palestine have accentuated the need for a final and early settlement of this question. Pending the report of the commission of enquiry into the recent disturbances in Palestine, it is not possible for His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to express an opinion on the causes of those disturbances. Whatever part questions relating to the Wall may have played in the disturbances themselves, recent reports received from the High Commissioner indicate that the absence of a final ruling on Jewish and Moslem rights and claims at the Wall constitutes a definite danger to future peace and good order in Palestine. In this connexion it should be stated that in September last it was deemed necessary in the interests of good order and decorum to issue temporary instructions setting out the facilities which would be accorded to Jewish worshippers at the Wailing Wall, pending the final determination of Jewish and Moslem rights and claims there. Since these instructions were issued there have been no disturbing incidents of importance at the Wall, and this temporary measure thus appears to have fulfilled, so far, the special purpose for which it was designed. The instructions themselves, however, were met with vigorous protests on the part of both the Jewish and Moslem authorities, in spite of an explicit assurance to the effect that they were provisional and that they would not prejudice the existing rights and claims of Jews and Moslems at the Wall. It is evident that the present position is viewed with great dissatisfaction by both parties, and the temporary instructions, which were undoubtedly necessary, have rendered the need for an early and final settlement of the question still more urgent.

3. Article 14 of the Palestine Mandate provides for the appointment of a commission to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connexion with the Holy Places, and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The text of that article reads as follows:—

"A special commission shall be appointed by the mandatory to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connexion with the Holy Places, and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in

Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of the commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the Council."

4. The Holy Places Commission contemplated in the article has never, in fact, been set up. Proposals for its constitution were drawn up by the British Government in 1922, but they were found to be unacceptable to certain of the Powers represented on the Council of the League of Nations, and were subsequently withdrawn by His Majesty's Government. Lord Balfour, at a meeting of the Council held on the 4th October, 1922, referred to the difficulties which had arisen on account of disagreement between those Powers themselves, and expressed the view that he was not capable of suggesting a remedy for those difficulties. He then appealed to his colleagues in the following terms:—

"We ask for the co-operation of our colleagues around this table to help us to solve their own difficulties, and to arrive at a solution of the whole question which shall be regarded as equitable over all the world, whether it be Catholic, whether it be Orthodox, whether it be Protestant, or whether it be indifferent to all these religions, but only desirous that justice shall be done, that peace, order and decorum be preserved within the limits of Palestine."

Unfortunately, Lord Balfour's appeal has not so far borne any fruit, and the position still remains as described by him in 1922.

5. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom hold the view that, as the mandatory Power responsible for the maintenance of peace, order and good government in Palestine, they would not be justified in taking the risk of deferring the settlement of the question pending the solution of the difficulties referred to by Lord Balfour, and the appointment of the Holy Places Commission as contemplated by article 14 of the mandate. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government are assured that the situation calls for the appointment of an authoritative body to deal with the question. It is, moreover, highly desirable that the findings of the body to be appointed shall have the *finality* attaching to a decision by the Holy Places Commission contemplated by article 14 of the mandate, and that there shall be no question of these findings being subject to review.

6. On a full consideration of the question in all its aspects, having regard especially to the considerations set forth in the foregoing paragraph, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom propose that a commission should be appointed under the terms of article 14 of the mandate to study, define and determine the rights and claims of Jews and Moslems at the Western or Wailing Wall. The activities of the commission would be limited by its terms of reference to the specific question of the Wall. By reason of this limitation of its activities, the commission would in effect be an *ad hoc* commission. Its findings, however, would be final in regard to the Wall, and they would not be subject to review by the full commission contemplated by article 14 of the mandate to determine questions relating to the Holy Places and religious communities of Palestine in general. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would propose that the composition of the Western or Wailing Wall Commission should be decided by the President of the Council of the League of Nations. At the same time, they venture to express the opinion that it is highly desirable that the members of the commission should be chosen as impartial persons, and not in any way as representing the different racial or religious interests.

7. In conclusion, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom desire again to emphasise that an early and final settlement of the question is important, not only in the interests of the parties concerned themselves, but also from the point of view of future peace, good order and decorum in Palestine. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom earnestly trust that their proposals outlined in the foregoing paragraph, which are formulated after the fullest consideration, will be commended by the Permanent Mandates Commission for the early approval of the Council of the League of Nations.

November 1929.

...the rights and claims of Jews and Moslems at the Western or Wailing Wall at Jerusalem.

[E 6202/204/65]

No. 121.

Sir E. Drummond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 29.)

Sir,

Geneva, November 27, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 18th November, 1929, with which was transmitted a memorandum containing a proposal of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain that, for reasons set out therein, a special *ad hoc* commission should be appointed forthwith, under the terms of article 14 of the Palestine mandate, to study, define and determine finally the rights and claims of Jews and Moslems at the Western or Wailing Wall at Jerusalem.

The memorandum, together with your covering letter, were, in compliance with your request, circulated to the Permanent Mandates Commission.

After having fully considered the British Government's proposal at its meeting of the 22nd November, the Permanent Mandates Commission reached certain conclusions, the terms of which were finally adopted at its meeting of the 25th November, 1929.

I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of these conclusions, which have been inserted in the report of the commission to the Council on the work of its sixteenth session.

I have, &c.

ERIC DRUMMOND,

Secretary-General.

Enclosure in No. 121.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.—PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION: PALESTINE.

Text adopted by the Commission in regard to the Communication dated November 18, 1929, from the British Government.

(Confidential.)

THE Permanent Mandates Commission has carefully considered the memorandum from the mandatory Power dated the 18th November, containing a proposal that, for reasons set out therein, a special *ad hoc* commission should be appointed forthwith, under the terms of article 14 of the Palestine mandate, to study, define and determine finally the rights and claims of Jews and Moslems at the Western or Wailing Wall at Jerusalem. This memorandum concludes with the hope that the Permanent Mandates Commission would be able, at its present session, to commend this proposal to the Council.

According to the British Government's proposal, the rights and claims in connexion with the Wailing Wall would be finally settled without appeal by an *ad hoc* commission. The Wailing Wall, however, is one of the "Holy Places" referred to in article 14 of the mandate for Palestine, which lays down that all questions connected with the Holy Places in Palestine shall be settled by a special commission to be set up under that article. The British Government wishes to confer upon an *ad hoc* commission, for matters relating to the Wailing Wall, powers which are exclusively vested in the special commission contemplated by article 14 of the mandate; this would constitute a derogation from the terms of that article.

The British memorandum further proposes that the *ad hoc* commission for matters relating to the Wailing Wall should be appointed by the president of the Council of the League of Nations, whereas article 14 of the mandate lays down that the special commission for the Holy Places shall be appointed by the British Government with the approval of the Council of the League. On this point also the commission considers that the solution proposed by the British Government is not in conformity with article 14 of the mandate for Palestine.

For these reasons the commission, since its duty is to supervise the observance of the mandates, cannot comply with the British Government's request by recommending the Council to adopt its proposal.

The commission is fully prepared to consider, with a view to a future recommendation to the Council, any proposal which may be submitted to it and which, without being contrary to the terms of the mandate, might settle the differences at

present existing between Jews and Moslems with regard to the Wailing Wall, calm strong feelings and permanently ensure peace and order in Palestine.

The commission will follow with interest and sympathy all efforts made by the mandatory Power to reach in the near future a solution, the impartiality of which will be unquestioned, for it realises the difficulties with which the mandatory Power has had to contend in dealing with extremely difficult questions on which feeling runs high.

Geneva, November 25, 1929.

[E 6381/4198/65]

No. 122.

Mr. R. I. Campbell to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 2215.)

Sir,

Washington, November 29, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith an extract from the "New York Times" of the 24th instant,* giving the text of an interesting statement regarding the situation in Palestine cabled by Dr. Judah L. Magnes, chancellor of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, to Dr. S. Margoshes, editor of the "Day," a New York Yiddish daily newspaper.

2. It will be seen that Dr. Magnes emphasises the "international, inter-religious and inter-racial" character of Palestine, as the land of two peoples and three religions; expresses the opinion that in order that the full rights of all elements of the population may be safeguarded, the country must always remain under the League of Nations mandate; draws attention to the difficulty of discovering an appropriate form of responsible self-government, and states that if such could be found, then he would favour a Parliament in Palestine, but that "in any event, the transition from the present absolutist colonial régime must be gradual." Finally, Dr. Magnes denounces the idea of "building up Palestine on the basis of force and against the will of the Arab world," as "repugnant to the spirit of Judaism," and declares the Jewish task to be that of "trying to uplift the Arab world, through genuine understanding, through education and through a system of economic, social and political co-operation, while at the same time making our own community stronger and greater."

3. Dr. Magnes's statement was made in reply to an enquiry from the editor of the "Day" resulting from criticism caused in Jewish circles here by an earlier statement made by the doctor at the convoking of the winter semester of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem on the 18th November. He is reported on that occasion to have made the following remarks:—

"It is better that the Eternal people that has outlived many mighty empires should possess its soul in patience, planning and waiting to enter the promised land bringing peace, culture, hard work, sacrifice, love and determination, and doing nothing that cannot be justified before the conscience of the world." Opposition seems at once to have been aroused amongst some groups of American Jews, who appear to have regarded what Dr. Magnes said as a counsel of abandonment of guaranteed Jewish rights and a surrender to the terrorist assaults of Arab fanatics, and as giving the impression that Jews desire political domination in the Holy Land. On the 22nd November the American Jewish Congress issued a statement expressing its administrative committee's "sense of outrage over the utterances of the chancellor" and, specifically, among other things, "that the chancellor should call upon his fellow Jews 'to renounce all ideas of political domination' and that 'he should repeatedly demand such renunciation of such domination' which is 'to speak of something which he well knows does not exist and carries an implication which is bound to inflict the greatest possible hurt upon the Jewish people.'" The committee most of all deplores "the mistaken impression created by the utterance of the chancellor that there is an irreconcilable conflict between a Jewish national home in Palestine and an international Holy Land for Jew, Christian and Moslem." The remarks of Dr. Magnes have, in its opinion, done "most grievous harm," being susceptible of interpretation as suggesting that the Jews have been "bringers of war and doers of injustice to the Arabs."

* Not printed.

4. In general, Dr. Magnes's two statements appear to have aroused considerable discussion in Jewish circles, and comment is reported to have been "largely critical," critics maintaining that the statement is untimely ("such a proposal, if it came at all, should have come, not from the victims, but from the aggressors"), and that, in the words of a certain Mr. S. Y. Jacobi, of London, member of the Central Committee of the Zionist-Revisionists, the adoption of the policy advocated by Dr. Magnes would tend to "suppress the age-old ideal of the Jewish people," i.e., presumably the ideal of a predominantly Jewish Palestine.

5. On the other hand, Rabbi Isaac Landman, editor of the "American Hebrew," took up the cudgels strongly in Dr. Magnes's defence. In a signed editorial he declared that "we are thoroughly convinced that the salvation of Palestine, as regards the Jews, depends not upon political dominance, but upon peaceful domicile. . . . Most Jews, whose watchword and prayer has always been 'shalom' (peace), will not participate in the creation of a homeland for their brethren that must be won at the point of bayonets and protected by battleships." Again, Rabbi Samuel Schulman, of Temple Emanu-El, the principal New York synagogue, is reported to have said that, as a non-Zionist, he had always held that the Jews were not committed to any political ambitions in Palestine. "We non-Zionists believe that Judaism as a religion, as a spiritual and cultural force is quite sufficient. I believe that a spiritual centre for Jews who wish to live in Palestine will be established. I believe that the indispensable condition for Jewish life in Palestine is a complete understanding with the Arabs."

6. Further indications of the American-Jewish attitude were afforded at a conference of Jewish leaders held in Washington on the 24th instant at the instance of Mr. Felix Warburg, when the following resolution was adopted:—

"Whereas this conference is of firm belief that funds may be invested in Palestine on a business basis, and has received reports indicating the practical possibility and need for increasing the amount of such investment;

"Therefore, be it resolved, that the necessary steps be taken forthwith to organise an American business corporation with a view to furthering the economic development of Palestine.

"To carry out the purpose of this resolution, be it resolved that the chairman of the conference appoint a committee of five or seven to consider the most effective action required to carry out the purpose of this resolution.

"Be it further resolved, that the said committee may, in its discretion, add to its members any person or persons, and that a report of the progress in carrying out the purposes of this resolution be made within three months from date."

7. Various experts spoke on the possibilities of economic development, and Mr. Warburg, referring to the discussions at the Zionist Congress at Zurich last August, stated that "those of us who are deeply in sympathy with the business development of Palestine made it very clear that, if it is to progress at all, it must be built up on business lines pure and simple. . . . Speechmaking will not build it up, politics will retard it." Mr. Warburg also mentioned the assistance given by Lord Melchett in this connexion.

8. Mr. Justice Brandeis, of the United States Supreme Court, however, while stating that "the road is economic and the opportunity is open," made various remarks which indicate that, in his view at least, the goal is political. He expressed his conviction that "a group of American business men, co-operating under the leadership of Mr. Warburg, can assure a Jewish Palestine"; referred to "our will to make Palestine Jewish"; and averred that "when the Jew is there in number, there will be no anti-semitism." Such views are not entirely surprising in Justice Brandeis who, in his younger days as a practising lawyer, had a reputation for a certain ruthlessness and who has certain characteristics (e.g., his asceticism and puritanism) reminiscent of a prophet of the Old Testament.

9. Thus it seems evident that Jewish opinions in this country regarding Palestine are of two kinds: the one would eschew politics and is chiefly interested in the development of cultural and economic activities; the other has in mind the ideal of Jewish political and possibly even numerical predominance. In fact, the division seems to be between those who look for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, and those who seek to convert Palestine into the Jewish national home. It would seem very much to the interest of His Majesty's Government that the influence of American Jewry should be exerted on the side of the former party rather than the latter.

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10. There has always been the more or less remote danger that if great contributions of money flowed from Jews in this country to Palestine, an inclination might be created to interfere in the administration of the mandate either directly or by means of pressure on Congress. The Jews, however, of course, labour here under the disadvantage of general unpopularity; moreover, the disappointing results of Zionist appeals for funds, the division between Zionist and non-Zionist Jews here, and the internal divisions amongst Zionists themselves have hitherto impeded the creation of such an inclination. Even so, recent events have aroused an active interest in the work of His Majesty's Government in the Holy Land. If, however, any large measure of success attends the movement described above for the formation of a business corporation to further the economic development of Palestine, the possibility of danger will have come measurably closer, and it will, I think, be desirable to keep opinion in this country constantly before our eyes in dealing with matters arising out of our administration of the mandate. The American Jews are, I believe, generally very well disposed towards Great Britain. But anything which affects the Holy Land touches in them, as in their co-religionists elsewhere, something inborn and stronger than themselves, and any cause for a grievance, real or imaginary, would, I think, be quickly and actively resented.

11. A copy of this despatch is being forwarded to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom at Ottawa.

I have, &c.

RONALD CAMPBELL.

CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 3324/313/89]

No. 123.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 279.)

Sir,

Constantinople, June 24, 1929.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 403 of the 10th June, I have the honour to report that, according to an official announcement in the press, the agreement reached between France and Turkey regarding the Turco-Syrian frontier was signed on the 22nd June at Angora.

2. I have as yet had no opportunity of seeing my French colleague, who is on the point of leaving Angora just as I am proceeding there, but I shall not fail to furnish any further details which it may be possible to obtain later.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

H. A. CLARKE.

[E 3421/313/89]

No. 124.

Sir G. Clerk to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 284.)

Sir,

Constantinople, July 1, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 279 of the 24th June, regarding the agreement on the Turco-Syrian question which was at length reached on the 22nd June.

2. My French colleague tells me that the communiqué, of which a copy is transmitted herewith, gives an accurate outline of the settlement. According to this statement the agreement bears on four main points. Firstly, the frontier has been agreed upon. Secondly, the Mersina-Adana Railway is restored to Turkey. Thirdly, security on the frontier is provided for. Fourthly, it is agreed that property claims arising on the two sides of the frontier shall be settled by negotiation.

3. The further agreement regulating police and customs procedure on the frontier, mentioned in the penultimate paragraph, was concluded on the 29th June, while the Turkish Ambassador in Paris is stated already to have begun negotiations for a treaty of friendship.

I have, &c.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

Enclosure in No. 124.

Communiqué of June 22, outlining the Agreement on the Turco-Syrian Question.

TEVFIK RUCHTU BEY, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, et M. Dechambrun, Ambassadeur de France, ont procédé aujourd'hui à la signature des accords turco-français négociés ce printemps à Ankara.

Ces accords comprennent :

1. Le protocole d'abornement du 3^e et dernier secteur de la frontière turco-syrienne entre Nissibine et Djeziret-ibn-Omar sur le Tigre. Le tracé, qui donne satisfaction aux deux hautes parties contractantes, s'inspire à la fois de la décision de la commission turco-française instituée par la convention d'Ankara du 30 mai 1926 et de l'intérêt commun des deux pays de donner à la Turquie les moyens pratiques de remplir les obligations de surveillance et de protection qui lui incombent.

2. Un échange de lettres par lequel le Gouvernement français reconnaît l'opération de rachat de la ligne Mersine-Tarsous-Adana par le Gouvernement turc, à qui la ligne sera remise dans un délai de quinze jours par la société française. De son côté, le Gouvernement turc donne quitus définitif de tous les comptes d'exploitation de la société française et garantit la liberté du trafic de Derbissie à Nissibine. Pour le Gouvernement turc aussi bien que pour le Gouvernement français, tous les droits découlant des traités et accords déjà intervenus sont maintenus intégralement.

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3. Une déclaration conjointe sur la sécurité, en vue de donner pleine efficacité aux dispositions de la convention d'Ankara de 1926 et de les mettre en harmonie avec la situation nouvelle résultant de l'affermissement des relations d'amitié entre la Turquie et la France, et une déclaration relative au prolongement du trafic ferroviaire au delà de Nissibine en territoire syrien.

4. Un engagement réciproque de négocier dans l'esprit le plus amical un règlement équitable et pratique de l'ensemble de la question des biens en Turquie et en Syrie. Cette négociation sera poursuivie à partir du mois de septembre prochain.

Enfin, le Sous-Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères, Menemenli Numan Bey, et M. Reclus, délégué du Haut-Commissaire en Syrie, ont activement collaboré à la préparation d'un accord sur la surveillance de la frontière et le régime économique et politique des confins, dont la signature est également imminente.

L'ensemble de ces ententes particulières, qui règle de la façon la plus heureuse toutes les difficultés entre la Turquie et la Syrie, sera complété et couronné par un traité d'amitié entre la Turquie et la France que l'Ambassadeur de Turquie à Paris, Fethi Bey, est chargé de négocier dès maintenant avec M. Briand.

[E 3502/313/89]

No. 125.

Sir W. Tyrrell to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 1001.)

Sir,

Paris, July 11, 1929.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 919 of the 26th June, I have the honour to inform you that an official communiqué appeared in the "Temps" of yesterday evening regarding the agreements signed between the French and Turkish Governments respecting the Turco-Syrian frontier, &c. A member of my staff called upon the competent official at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-day and enquired whether copies of these agreements, which had apparently been given to the newspapers, could also be furnished to this Embassy. Copies were at once supplied, and I have the honour to transmit herewith—

1. A protocol respecting the supervision of the frontier, the regulations to be applied to the frontier, the fiscal measures to be applied to herds crossing the frontier, and the control of nomads.
2. A protocol delimiting the Turco-Syrian frontier between Nissibin and the River Tigris.
3. A joint declaration on the immediate commencement of negotiations to settle the question of properties in Turkey and in Syria.
4. A joint declaration on the maintenance of security in the Turco-Syrian frontier zone and on the continuance of traffic beyond Nissibin.
5. A letter addressed by the French Ambassador at Angora to the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding the repurchase of the branch line Mersina-Tarsus-Adana by the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.

W. TYRRELL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 125.

Protocole relatif à la Surveillance de la Frontière, au Régime frontalier, au Régime fiscal applicable aux Troupeaux franchissant la Frontière et au Contrôle des Nomades.

Chapitre I^{er}.—Surveillance de la Frontière.

LES dispositions du présent chapitre sont applicables à la zone frontière fixée par la Convention d'Amitié et de bon Voisinage du 30 mai 1926.

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Les deux Gouvernements s'engagent réciproquement à mettre obstacle, par tous les moyens en leur pouvoir, aux agissements d'un ou plusieurs individus qui, à titre isolé ou collectif, utiliseraient la zone frontière pour préparer des actes de banditisme sur le territoire de l'État voisin ou des actes de nature à nuire à cet État.

ARTICLE 2.

Lorsqu'elles apprendront que des préparatifs sont faits par un ou plusieurs individus dans le but de perpétrer, dans la zone frontière, des actes de banditisme ou des actes de nature à nuire à l'État voisin, les autorités compétentes s'en aviseront immédiatement et communiqueront tous renseignements qu'elles pourraient recueillir à ce sujet.

Elles s'avertiront réciproquement de tout acte de banditisme, de quelque nature qu'il soit, commis sur leur propre territoire, dont les auteurs pourraient chercher refuge dans le pays voisin.

Les autorités de l'un ou l'autre pays prendront toutes mesures utiles tant pour prévenir ces agressions que pour empêcher leurs auteurs de franchir la frontière.

ARTICLE 3.

Lorsqu'un crime ou acte de banditisme est commis dans la zone frontière fixée ci-dessus et que les auteurs ont cherché refuge dans la zone frontière du pays voisin, les autorités de ce pays prendront toutes mesures en vue de l'arrestation immédiate des coupables et de la réparation des dommages.

Si les coupables sont ressortissants de l'État où le crime a été commis, ils seront remis, sans autre formalité, à cet État. S'ils sont ressortissants de l'État sur le territoire duquel ils se sont réfugiés, ils y seront poursuivis conformément aux lois de ce pays.

La saisie des armes, du butin et, le cas échéant, celle des biens, sera immédiatement opérée en vue d'assurer les réparations légales.

ARTICLE 4.

Les auteurs d'actes de banditisme seront dans tous les cas, éloignés de la zone frontière où ils ne seront plus autorisés à séjourner.

ARTICLE 5.

Le désarmement de la zone frontière sera effectué d'une façon progressive et aussitôt que possible. Les autorités compétentes se concerteront pour assurer l'exécution de ces mesures, simultanément de chaque côté de la frontière, dans le secteur où elle sera décidée et en tenant compte des circonstances locales.

Dans chaque village et suivant son importance il pourra être laissé au maximum quatre gardes armés portant un insigne distinctif apparent (brassard, plaque de cuivre, etc.). Il est bien entendu que ces gardes doivent être désignés par les autorités responsables et choisis parmi les autochtones jouissant d'une parfaite honorabilité.

Chapitre II.—Régime frontalier.

La zone dans laquelle s'appliquent les dispositions du présent chapitre est une zone de 5 kilom. de part et d'autre de la frontière.

Toutefois, dans le cas où des groupes de propriétés appartenant à des ressortissants du pays voisin se trouveraient situés dans une zone ne dépassant pas 10 kilom. à compter de la frontière, les dispositions du présent chapitre leur seront appliquées après décision, pour chaque groupe de la Commission permanente de Frontière prévue à l'article 13.

ARTICLE 6.

Les habitants sédentaires ou semi-sédentaires ayant, à la date de la signature du présent protocole, des propriétés ou des droits de pâturage, d'abreuvoir ou de culture, de l'un ou de l'autre côté de la frontière continueront, comme par le passé à jouir de leurs droits.

Ils pourront, pour les nécessités de leur exploitation, traverser la frontière librement, sur présentation d'une carte frontalière annuelle, délivrée par les autorités administratives des circonscriptions dans lesquelles ils sont domiciliés et circuler dans la zone définie ci-dessus.

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Ils pourront, dans les limites de cette zone, faire passer d'un côté à l'autre de la frontière, leur bétail, le croit et les produits de leurs troupeaux, les instruments agricoles destinés à leur exploitation, leurs voitures, leurs semences, les produits du sol de leurs propriétés, sans avoir à payer aucun droit de douane, de pâturage ou d'abreuvoir ou toute autre taxe relative à l'entrée en territoire voisin.

Par contre, les habitants visés ci-dessus seront tenus de payer les impôts fonciers concernant leurs biens immeubles au Gouvernement sur le territoire duquel ces biens sont situés.

Les impôts et taxes frappant le cheptel vivant ou mort servant à l'exploitation de ces propriétés seront payés au Gouvernement du pays dont le propriétaire est ressortissant et à la diligence de ce Gouvernement agissant sur son propre territoire.

En cas d'épidémies, d'épizooties, d'épiphyties, les deux Gouvernements se réservent le droit d'appliquer dans la zone frontalière les mesures sanitaires spéciales et les prohibitions d'importation ou d'exportation qui seraient édictées dans le pays.

Chapitre III.—Régime fiscal applicable aux Troupeaux franchissant la Frontière.

ARTICLE 7.

Les bergers des troupeaux traversant la frontière, qu'ils soient au service de sédentaires, semi-sédentaires ou nomades, devront être obligatoirement munis d'un titre indiquant le nombre de leurs animaux, le régime sous lequel ces troupeaux traversent la frontière et, le cas échéant, la région où ils exercent leurs droits coutumiers de pacage. Ceux de ces troupeaux ayant droit de pâturage ne sont soumis à aucune taxation dans le pays où ils viennent pâturer.

En cas de contestations sur les droits de pacage invoqués, le litige sera soumis à la Commission permanente de Frontière prévue à l'article 13.

Les troupeaux qui pénètrent dans l'un des deux pays pour raison de commerce ou de transit sont soumis aux taxes douanières.

Chapitre IV.—Contrôle des Nomades.

ARTICLE 8.

Les tribus d'allégeance turque ou syrienne, qui jouissent d'un droit coutumier de pâturage sur certains territoires de l'État voisin, doivent, avant de franchir, la frontière, obtenir des autorités compétentes, les autorisations nécessaires.

A cet effet, le chef de tribu ou mouktar responsable avisera l'autorité du territoire dont il dépend de son intention de se déplacer. Il fera connaître le nombre de tentes, le nombre des hommes de la tribu et le nombre d'armes à feu qu'elle possède; le nombre, par catégorie, des animaux transhumant; le point où la tribu franchira la frontière; le lieu de destination et la durée prévue de son séjour dans le territoire de l'État voisin.

Si l'autorité saisie de cette demande autorise la sortie de la tribu de son propre territoire, elle en avisera l'autorité du pays voisin, en lui communiquant toutes les indications qui précèdent, dix jours au moins avant la date prévue pour le passage de la frontière.

L'autorité du pays voisin accordera le passage sous réserve que la tribu en question se soumette, pendant son séjour dans le pays où elle se rend, à toutes les lois et règlements intéressant l'ordre et la sécurité publics ainsi qu'aux règles relatives à la santé publique, notamment en cas d'épidémies ou d'épizooties.

La Commission permanente de Frontière prévue à l'article 13 fixera au cours de sa première réunion de chaque année, le nombre des fusils que chaque tribu ayant des droits de pâturage hors de son pays d'origine sera autorisée à détenir pour assurer la garde de ces troupeaux.

A défaut d'une telle fixation par la Commission permanente et dans les cas non prévus par elle, l'autorité du pays dans lequel se rend la tribu, fixera le nombre de fusils que cette tribu sera autorisée à détenir.

Les bergers de troupeaux appartenant à des sédentaires, semi-sédentaires ou nomades pourront être autorisés, par l'autorité du pays dans lequel pénètrent ces troupeaux, à porter les armes nécessaires pour assurer leur garde.

ARTICLE 9.

Au cas de déprédations, la tribu transhumante est astreinte à la réparation immédiate des dommages causés.

Si cette réparation n'a pu être effectuée complètement avant le retour de la tribu sur le territoire de l'État dont elle relève, celui-ci s'engage à faciliter, par toutes voies utiles, le règlement des dommages causés.

En cas de retour de cette même tribu dans le pays où le dommage a été causé, sans que réparation complète ait été effectuée, l'affaire sera portée devant la Commission permanente de Frontière et la décision de celle-ci sera exécutoire par toutes voies légales.

ARTICLE 10.

Les différends qui viendraient à se produire entre tribus ou fractions de tribus la zone frontière seront réglés par les autorités prévues au chapitre 5 ci-dessous.

ARTICLE 11.

Toute tribu ou fraction de tribu qui se sera insurgée contre les autorités du pays dont elle relève et qui aura pénétré sur le territoire d'État voisin sera, si elle y trouve refuge, désarmée et éloignée de la frontière de telle manière qu'elle ne puisse poursuivre ou reprendre ses agressions.

Chapitre V.—Dispositions générales.

ARTICLE 12.

Les deux Gouvernements désigneront les autorités compétentes qu'ils chargeront :

- (a.) De l'échange des renseignements locaux et des communications urgentes ainsi que du règlement des incidents nécessitant des mesures immédiates ;
- (b.) A l'échelon supérieur : de la coordination et de la responsabilité des mesures générales à prendre.

ARTICLE 13.

Il sera constitué, dans le plus bref délai possible, une Commission permanente de Frontière composée d'un nombre égal de représentants nommés par les Gouvernements respectifs.

Cette commission se réunira au moins une fois tous les six mois et plus souvent si les circonstances l'exigent, alternativement en Turquie et en Syrie.

Elle devra s'efforcer de régler à l'amiable toute question concernant l'exécution du présent protocole et toutes autres questions frontalières sur lesquelles l'entente n'aurait pu se faire entre les autorités qualifiées en vertu de l'article précédent.

La première réunion aura lieu en octobre 1929 à Beyrouth.

Les deux Gouvernements se communiqueront les noms de leurs délégués au moins un mois avant la date fixée pour chaque réunion.

ARTICLE 14.

Les deux Gouvernements se donnent quitus de tous impôts et taxes perçus contrairement aux dispositions du présent protocole et antérieurement à la date de sa signature.

Les dispositions de ce même protocole, en ce qui concerne spécialement les impôts fonciers, seront appliquées à dater du 1^{er} janvier 1930.

ARTICLE 15.

Le présent protocole, qui entrera immédiatement en vigueur, est pris en exécution de la Convention d'Amitié et de bon Voisinage du 30 mai 1926.

Fait à Ankara, le 29 juin 1929.

Protocole d'Abornement de la Frontière turco-syrienne entre Nissibine et le Tigre.

VU les accords d'Angora du 20 octobre 1921 et du 30 mai 1926 stipulant que la frontière turco-syrienne suivra la vieille route de Nissibine à Djeziret-ibn-Omar;

Vu la définition que la Commission franco-turque de Délimitation instituée par l'accord précité du 30 mai 1926 a donnée de ladite route par décision du 10 janvier 1928;

Considérant que l'intérêt commun des deux pays est de donner au Gouvernement turc les moyens pratiques de remplir les obligations de protection et de surveillance qui lui incombent sur la route en question;

Conviennt que :

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

L'abornement de la frontière, déjà terminé pour les premier et deuxième secteurs, sera, pour le troisième secteur, effectué par les soins de la Commission d'Abornement suivant le tracé indiqué ci-après :

La frontière dans le troisième secteur commence au point désigné par la Commission d'Abornement dans sa séance du 28 octobre 1927, comme étant le point de départ de la vieille route. Voir procès-verbal No. 25, paragraphe IV, ainsi rédigé :

"La commission fixe à l'unanimité comme point de départ de la vieille route le point à l'ouest du pont sur le Jagh-Jagh où la piste de Kamechlie quitte la route de Djeziret-ibn-Omar afin de se diriger vers le sud."

Elle sera ensuite déterminée :

1. Par la route (Turquie) de Nissibine à Guirhassin jusqu'au croisement de cette route par un ruisseau semi-permanent d'orientation générale nord-ouest-sud-est coulant à l'ouest de Guirhassin—croisement situé sur la route précitée à 400 mètres à l'ouest de Guirhassin.
2. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir à un point situé à 200 mètres au sud de Guirhassin.
3. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir à un point situé sur la piste Guirhassin-Latife et à 200 mètres de Guirhassin.
4. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir à un point situé à 400 mètres au nord de Latife.
5. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir à un point situé sur la piste Nerkisli-Tel Ziouane et à 300 mètres de Nerkisli.
6. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir à un point situé à 800 mètres au nord de Tel Djihan.
7. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir à un point situé sur la piste de Tel Djihan-Aznaour et à 1,000 mètres d'Aznaour.
8. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir à un point situé à 400 mètres au sud d'Aznaour.
9. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir à un point situé sur le chemin Aznaour-Hadjourlou (ruines) et à 400 mètres d'Aznaour.
10. Par le chemin (Turquie) partant de ce dernier point et se dirigeant sur Derouna Agha (ruines) par Hadjourlou (ruines) et Bavord (ruines) jusqu'à un point situé sur cette route à 700 mètres à l'est de Bavord (ruines).
11. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir au point trigonométrique coté 667.
12. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir au croisement des pistes Baneh-Derouna Agha (ruines) et Alakamich-Badian—croisement situé à 500 mètres au sud-est de Dinik (ruines).
13. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir au sommet de l'Izzeddine Dag.
14. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir en un point situé à 300 mètres au sud de Kharab Raze.
15. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir en un point situé sur la piste Kharab Raze-Kergho (ruines) et à 500 mètres de Kharab Raze (ruines).
16. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir au croisement des pistes Ain Ser-Delavikiran et Tel Ibel-Delavikiran—croisement situé à 1,200 mètres environ au nord-nord-est de Delavikiran.

17. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir sur la piste Tel Afritt-Sarmsack (ruines) en un point situé à 300 mètres au sud de Tel Afritt.

18. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir à l'embranchement des pistes Tel Afritt-Babil et Tel Afritt-Ayaka par ruines—embranchement situé à 1,500 mètres environ à l'est de Tel Afritt.

19. Par la piste Tel Afritt-Babil (Turquie) à partir de l'embranchement ci-dessus défini jusqu'au moulin (Turquie) situé au croisement des pistes Zergous-Kharabrecheque et Tel Afritt-Babil—moulin situé à 1,700 mètres environ au sud-ouest de Kelani.

20. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir à un point situé sur la piste Babil-Kharabrecheque à 500 mètres au sud-sud-ouest de Babil.

21. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir à un point situé sur le ruisseau d'orientation générale nord-sud et coulant à l'est de Babil—point situé à 500 mètres au sud de Babil.

22. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir à un point situé sur la piste Babil-Tel Bagha et à 500 mètres à l'est-sud-est de Babil.

23. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point et se dirigeant sur le centre du village de Domboulie jusqu'en un point situé sur cette droite à 600 mètres au sud-ouest de Domboulie.

24. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir à un point situé sur la piste Domboulie-Kasa Redjeb et à 400 mètres de Domboulie.

25. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir à un point situé sur la piste Domboulie-Kerdessi à 400 mètres de Domboulie.

26. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point et prolongeant vers le nord-nord-est la ligne définie au paragraphe précédent jusqu'en un point situé à 100 mètres au sud-est de la piste de Domboulie-Kanissipi.

27. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir à un point situé à 400 mètres au sud de Kanissipi.

28. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir à un point situé à 400 mètres à l'est-sud-est de Kanissipi sur le ruisseau semi-permanent orienté sensiblement ouest-est et coulant au sud de Kanissipi.

29. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir au croisement de piste situé à 1,900 mètres environ au nord-nord-est du village de Kasr Dib (village du Nord) et à 2,800 mètres environ au nord-est de Kanissipi.

30. Par une ligne droite partant de ce dernier point pour aboutir au croisement de la piste d'Andivar-Arnabat par un ruisseau semi-permanent d'orientation générale sud-ouest-nord-est, coulant à 800 mètres environ au nord-ouest d'Andivar ouest. Ce point de croisement est situé à 2,600 mètres environ à l'est-nord-est du village d'Arnat et à 1,100 mètres environ au nord-ouest du village d'Andivar ouest.

31. Par une ligne droite d'orientation sensiblement nord-est gagnant la ligne de crête qui domine le cours du Saklan. Le point de jonction de la ligne droite et de la ligne de crête ci-dessus indiquées se trouve à 1,600 mètres environ au nord-nord-ouest du village d'Andivar ouest.

32. Du point ci-dessus par la ligne de crête qui domine d'abord le cours du Saklan, puis s'engage entre deux ruisselets semi-permanents d'orientation générale sud-ouest-nord-est coulant vers le Saklan et enfin vient aboutir au point de croisement de la route Andivar-Djeziret-ibn-Omar par le cours du Saklan—croisement situé à 1,000 mètres environ à l'est-nord-est du moulin de Djeidit.

33. Du croisement ci-dessus indiqué, par la route Andivar-Djeziret-ibn-Omar (Turquie) jusqu'en un point situé à 350 mètres au nord du précédent.

34. Du point ci-dessus, par la ligne de crête passant près de l'arbre isolé situé à 700 mètres environ au sud-est du point précédent et rejoignant le Tigre à 750 mètres environ au sud-est de l'embouchure du petit bras du Tigre qui encercle au sud la ville de Djeziret-ibn-Omar.

35. Par une ligne droite orientée nord-est partant du point ci-dessus et gagnant le thalweg du Tigre.

ARTICLE 2.

Le tracé de la ligne frontière dans le troisième secteur défini dans le présent protocole a été reporté sur une carte au 1/50,000 dont deux exemplaires sont remis à chacun des deux Gouvernements. En cas de divergences entre le protocole et la carte, le protocole seul fera foi.

Les distances indiquées dans le présent protocole sous la rubrique : à tant de mètres de tel village, se comptent de l'extrémité de la dernière maison du village indiqué, dans le sens de la mesure à effectuer.

Les routes, chemins ou pistes dont il est fait mention dans le présent protocole sont tous reproduits sur la carte au 1/50,000 annexée. Au cas où certains d'entre eux auraient disparu ou se seraient déplacés avant l'abornement, ils seront rétablis topographiquement sur le terrain au moment de l'abornement.

ARTICLE 3.

La frontière sur le Tigre sera déterminée par le thalweg du fleuve depuis le point défini au paragraphe 35 de l'article 1^{er} jusqu'au confluent du Khabour.

ARTICLE 4.

En ce qui concerne les ballistères prévues par le Traité turco-syrien d'Amitié et de bon Voisinage signé à Angora le 30 mai 1926—Protocole annexe I, Délimitation de la Frontière, deuxième secteur, paragraphe troisième—les deux Gouvernements approuvent les propositions qui leur furent soumises à ce sujet par leurs délégués techniques le 2 octobre 1927.

ARTICLE 5.

La Commission d'Abornement commencera ses travaux dans le troisième secteur aussitôt que possible. Les décisions, au sein de la commission, seront prises à la majorité des voix et seront obligatoires pour chacune des hautes parties contractantes.

ARTICLE 6.

L'échange simultané des territoires, sur l'ensemble de la frontière, sera fixé à une date aussi rapprochée que possible de la clôture officielle des travaux de la commission. Cette date sera proposée au préalable par la Commission d'Abornement à l'approbation des deux Gouvernements.

Le 22 juin 1929.

Enclosure 3 in No. 125.

Déclaration conjointe sur l'Ouverture prochaine de Négociations au sujet du Règlement de la Question des Biens.

LE Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement turc s'engagent à négocier dans l'esprit le plus amical un règlement équitable et pratique de l'ensemble de la question des biens en Turquie et en Syrie.

Cette négociation sera poursuivie au début du mois de septembre prochain.

Le 22 juin 1929.

Enclosure 4 in No. 125.

Déclaration conjointe sur le Maintien de la Sécurité dans la Zone frontière turco-syrienne et sur la Continuité du Trafic au delà de Nissibine.

LES deux Gouvernements expriment leur volonté commune d'affirmer les relations d'amitié et de bon voisinage entre la Turquie et les Etats placés sous l'autorité de la République française (territoires détachés de l'Empire ottoman) en donnant à cet égard pleine efficacité aux dispositions de la Convention d'Angora du 30 mai 1926. Ils déclarent notamment leur intention de prendre toutes mesures nécessaires pour assurer le maintien de l'ordre dans la zone frontière, pour mettre fin à l'activité des bandes armées et réprimer toute agitation illégale tendant à compromettre l'ordre et la sécurité de l'autre côté de la frontière.

Ils exerceront également le contrôle des populations nomades appelées à franchir la frontière dans des conditions qui assurent, de part et d'autre de cette frontière, le maintien de l'ordre et le respect de la souveraineté territoriale.

Les deux Gouvernements sont enfin d'accord pour préciser ou reviser, s'il est besoin, dans le plus bref délai, les conditions d'application de la Convention de Bon

Voisinage du 30 mai 1926 et l'accord du 20 octobre 1921, en vue de les mettre en harmonie avec la situation nouvelle résultant de l'affermissement de leurs relations d'amitié.

Le Gouvernement turc ne s'opposera pas au prolongement de la voie ferrée au delà de Nissibine sur territoire syrien en vue d'assurer la continuité du trafic pour les voyageurs et les marchandises; il prendra, en ce qui le concerne, les mesures administratives dont l'application serait opportune.

Le 22 juin 1929.

Enclosure 5 in No. 125.

Lettre adressée par M. de Chambrun, Ambassadeur de France, à son Excellence Tewfik Rouchdi Bey, Ministre des Affaires étrangères.

M. le Ministre,

Angora, le 22 juin 1929.

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que mon Gouvernement est disposé à reconnaître l'opération de rachat de l'embranchement Mersine-Tarsous-Adana effectuée par le Gouvernement turc, s'il est entendu que :

1. Le Gouvernement turc, tant en son nom propre que comme s'étant substitué au concessionnaire, renonce à toute réclamation sur les produits d'exploitation depuis la prise en charge de la ligne par la société française jusqu'à la date de sa remise et donne à cet égard quitus définitif des comptes afférents à cette exploitation.

2. Le Gouvernement turc versera à la société française au prix d'inventaire et au comptant la contrevaletur du charbon et des approvisionnements de toute nature en excédent à la date de la remise de la ligne. Les accessoires et pièces de rechange appartenant en propre à la ligne et en excédent d'inventaire seront laissés gratuitement au Gouvernement turc, étant entendu que tous approvisionnements quelconques en dehors desdits accessoires et rechanges qui seraient trouvés en excédent d'inventaire, seront reconnus la propriété de la société.

3. Aussi bien pour le Gouvernement turc que pour le Gouvernement français, tous les droits découlant des accords intervenus sont maintenus intégralement.

Il est, en particulier, précisé que la société n'a pas à intervenir pour le remboursement des frais de renforcement et d'amélioration exécutés sur la ligne Mersine-Adana, ainsi que des frais afférents au raccordement existant aux environs d'Adana entre la ligne Mersine-Adana et la voie spéciale au Chemin de Fer de Bagdad; le Gouvernement turc prendra, le cas échéant, toutes dispositions voulues à cet égard, étant bien entendu qu'il n'aura de ce chef aucun paiement à effectuer à la société française, sous quelque nom que ce soit.

4. Les indemnités de licenciement à verser au personnel qui serait éventuellement congédié du fait de la prise de l'exploitation par le Gouvernement turc ne pourront, en aucun cas, être mises à la charge de la société.

5. Le Gouvernement turc garantit la liberté du trafic civil et militaire de Derbissie à Nissibine et autorisera immédiatement l'ouverture d'un service de correspondance par voie de terre entre Nissibine et le territoire syrien à l'est de cette ville.

6. A partir du jour où le Gouvernement turc aura notifié son accord avec les termes de la présente lettre, les recettes nettes de la ligne lui appartiendront, déduction faite de 15 pour cent qui reviendront à la société, jusqu'au moment où la ligne Mersine-Adana lui aura été remise.

7. Les modalités de la remise de la ligne seront réglées d'un commun accord entre la société française et la Direction générale des Chemins de Fer de l'Etat turc. Toute diligence sera apportée à cet effet pour que la remise soit faite dans le délai de quinze jours à dater de la notification par le Gouvernement turc de son accord avec les présentes stipulations.

[E 4928/1971/44]

No. 126.

Viscount Cecil to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 24. L.N.A.)

Sir,

Geneva, September 23, 1929.

ON the proposal of Dr. Nansen the Sixth Committee took the question of the scheme for the establishment of the Armenian refugees in Erivan separately from that of the general question of refugees. Dr. Nansen recalled the past history of the project and expressed his regret at having been able to obtain only £150,000 for the execution of his plan. Of that sum, £100,000 was a gift from the Armenians of America and £50,000 a contribution from the German Government. It was true that other Governments had declared their readiness to contribute also, but it was clear that sufficient funds could not be obtained, and he, therefore, recommended that the scheme should be dropped. Replying to the Danish representative, who asked whether there was no possibility of proceeding with the scheme, Dr. Nansen said he was convinced that conditions held out little hope for the moment. Although he was proposing to abandon the scheme, this did not imply that nothing could be done for the Armenian refugees. The sum of £100,000 which had been offered by the Armenians in America would remain at his disposal and might now be used in order to meet other urgent expenses for the improvement of the position of Armenian refugees repatriated in Armenia. The question would, therefore, not disappear altogether from the agenda of the Assembly of the League.

2. The committee reluctantly but unanimously concurred in Dr. Nansen's conclusions and adopted his report and resolution, of which a copy is enclosed herein.*

I have, &c.

CECIL.

[E 4933/259/34]

No. 127.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 27.)

Sir,

India Office, September 26, 1929.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter from the Political Resident, Bushire, dated the 13th August, on the subject of slave traffic in the Persian Gulf.

I am, &c.

A. HIRTZEL.

Enclosure in No. 127.

Consul-General Barrett to Sir R. Clive.

Sir,

Bushire, August 13, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that on the 15th May his Excellency the Governor of Bushire brought to my notice, through my interpreter, that he had received a petition from Abbas Husain Ghulam Rodani, of Minab, near Bunder Abbas, that his brother and others had been kidnapped by Bashkirdis, who sold them as slaves. The names given were Ahmed, son of Husain Ghulam Abbas, son of Meshedi Husain, and Dadi, son of Ali Dad Shanbli.

The Governor brought this matter to my notice in this manner as he did not wish official recognition to the British position on the Arab coast.

With the help of Khan Bahadur Isa Abdul Latif, O.B.E., the Residency agent on the Oman coast, I managed to recover Dadi, son of Ali Dad, but failed to recover the other two men mentioned, for whom search is still being made.

I have, however, recovered Ali Ghulam Ali and Mahommed Abdullah, two Persians, both belonging to Ramishk, a village in Rodan, who had been kidnapped by Bashkirdis and sold to Baluchis, who subsequently sold them in Arabia.

I brought these three men to Bushire in H.M.S. "Triad" on my return from the Trucial Coast on the 2nd August and, at my request, the Governor of Bushire came on board and questioned the slaves.

* Not printed.

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It appears that in each case the method of capture was similar. Badi-bin-Ali Dad had been to Bunder Abbas to buy dates and was returning with two companions to his native village by night. They were suddenly fired on by armed men, who seized them.

In the morning Dadi's two companions were released as they were old, but he himself was detained, kept by the Bashkirdis for some days, and then sold to Baluchis, who, on a favourable opportunity offering, shipped him from a Mekran port to Suwaik on the Batinah coast of Muscat.

The experience of Ali Ghulam Ali and Mohammed Abdullah was even more unfortunate. They were travelling to Bunder Abbas in search of work, accompanied by thirteen companions. The Bashkirdis fired upon them by night, killing nine and capturing three, while three escaped. In other respects their experience corresponds with that of Dadi-bin-Ali Dad.

The senior naval officer has taken the three released slaves with him to Muscat, and as they say they are able to recognise and are willing to give evidence against the Batinah slave dealers, I hope it may be possible, with the help of the Muscat State authorities, to deal a blow at the slave trade. From Muscat the slaves will be repatriated via Bunder Abbas.

This case is of particular interest as it shows that it is not only Persian Baluchis who sell each other into slavery according to their tribal habits, as the Persian Foreign Minister naively informed Mr. Parr on the 25th October, 1923. Persian tribesmen have kidnapped and sold into slavery free-born Persian subjects journeying in their own country.

M. Pakravan should hereafter find it difficult to say that the British Government are "trying to point out the existence of this trade in certain places inhabited by Persian tribes while the Persian Government are sure that since many long years slave trade does not in any way exist in Persia."

I am sending copy to Government of India.

I have, &c.

C. C. J. BARRETT,

*Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and
Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

[E 5290/4198/65]

No. 128.

Mr. Parr to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 86.)

HIS Majesty's acting consul at Damascus presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of his despatch No. 115 of the 17th September to the Acting High Commissioner in Iraq respecting anti-Zionist agitation and the position of the Hashimite family.

Damascus, September 17, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 128.

Mr. Parr to the Acting High Commissioner in Iraq.

(No. 115.)

Sir,

Damascus, September 17, 1929.

WITH reference to our exchange of telegrams regarding the suggestion that certain political circles here attributed to the Hashimite family an anti-Arab and pro-Jewish policy based on an undue subservience to Great Britain, I have the honour to report that I have discovered little to support the theory that such sentiments are being propagated in Damascus.

2. A careful study of the local press has not brought to light any personal allusion to His Majesty King Faisal. In the course of over three weeks of heated discussion and comment there has been only one newspaper reference to the Govern-

ment of Iraq which might be interpreted in the sense suggested. This was in the "Ahrar" of the 12th September, and was to the effect that anti-Zionist demonstrations in Bagdad would inevitably be suppressed at the instance of His Majesty's Government. The Mond visit was cited as an instance of this.

3. As regards Transjordan, the "Al-Kabas" of the 6th September suggested that armed assistance from that country for the Moslems in Palestine was impossible so long as the Emir Abdullah was in the power of Great Britain. An assertion was also made that he had ordered the arrest of certain sheikhs who had announced their intention of raiding into Palestine. On the other hand, the "Fata-el-Arab" of the 27th August had already given prominence to an announcement that the Emir was doing his utmost to protect Moslem interests in the Holy Places, and that he would make representations to His Majesty's Government on the subject of the atrocities attributed to the Zionists.

4. As regards talk in political circles, I have been quite unable to hear of anything derogatory to His Majesty King Faisal or other members of the Hashimite family. Indeed, it is currently held that, had it not been for King Hussein's reluctance to endorse the policy of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, His Majesty's Government would infallibly have intervened to prevent his defeat by Ibn Saud.

5. The practical non-existence, therefore, of political propaganda against King Faisal on the score of pandering to our Zionist policy may be taken as established. On the other hand, there is no doubt but that nowadays in Syria attention is largely focussed on Ibn Saud, and that his prestige and fame have gained him the place in political sentiment here which formerly was held by the Hashimite dynasty. This is partially due to the activities of the Nejdian Agency at Damascus, partially to what appears to be a considered attitude on the part of the various Nationalist groups in the country, and partially to the actual march of events in Nejd and the Hejaz. On its way to make an anti-Zionist demonstration at this consulate on the 26th August the mob stopped at the Nejdian Agency to acclaim Ibn Saud, and the statement made in London by Sheikh Hafez Wahba that the King of the Hejaz was convinced that Great Britain would hold the scales evenly between the various religious interests in Palestine was received with incredulity and anger. Protests on this score were made to the Nejdian agent, who was even asked to telegraph to the King for authority to disclaim the declaration of Sheikh Hafez. The Syro-Palestinian Committee at Cairo was reported in the Damascus press to have made a categorical statement on this point, for which they claimed official inspiration from Mecca, declaring that Ibn Saud's representative in London had not correctly expressed the attitude of the King or of the Government or of the people towards events in Palestine.

6. The Party of Independence, one of the factions into which the Syro-Palestinian Committee split in September 1927, undoubtedly looks at present on Ibn Saud as the one Arab leader who may be able to achieve complete Syrian independence, and is inclined to toy with the idea that, when the opportunity comes, he may be able to compel French withdrawal by the threat or the force of arms. Alternatively, they envisage some political combination which might set one of his sons upon the Syrian Throne. It is not easy to assess precisely the weight which the Party of Independence carries with the mass of the people here, but it is probably safe to say that it enjoys the support of most of the better-educated classes.

7. The foregoing should not be taken to mean that King Faisal has been forgotten here. On the contrary, he is remembered with affection and respect as a great man who brought many benefits to the country. Only, he is no longer regarded as a political force to be used against the French mandate.

8. I am sending copy of this despatch direct to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.
ROBERT PARR.

[E 6231/318/65]

No. 129.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 2.)

Sir,

Downing Street, November 30, 1929.

WITH reference to your letter of the 15th October, regarding the exchange of ratifications of the Transjordan Agreement, I am directed by Lord Passfield to transmit to you, to be laid before Mr. Secretary Henderson, a copy of a despatch from the High Commissioner for Transjordan, forwarding the British copy in English and Arabic of the certificate of exchange* and the Amir's instrument of ratification,* for retention by His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

O. G. R. WILLIAMS.

Enclosure in No. 129.

High Commissioner for Transjordan to Lord Passfield.

My Lord,

November 4, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 17th October, and, in continuation of my telegram of the 1st November, to inform your Lordship that I went to Amman on the 31st October with the object of exchanging the ratifications of the Transjordan Agreement with the Amir Abdullah.

2. I was received by His Highness at his palace, and explained to him the object of my visit. I handed him the copy of the treaty ratified by His Majesty the King. He received the ratification with great pleasure, and, after kissing the King's signature, His Highness requested me to convey to His Majesty an expression of his pleasure at receiving the ratification of the treaty, and to assure His Majesty of his loyalty and friendship. He added that he would write a letter in due course formally to convey his thanks.

3. I then informed His Highness that, in virtue of His Majesty's recognition of the existence of an independent Government in Transjordan, the King has been pleased to approve of His Highness receiving a salute of twenty-one guns on customary occasions, this full salute being that normally accorded to Sovereign Princes or Heads of State. His Highness received this intimation with evident pleasure.

4. I lunched with His Highness at his palace, and had a conversation with him afterwards, in the course of which he again assured me of his friendship for Great Britain and of his loyalty to the King. He expressed a hope that tranquillity would soon be restored in Palestine, and said that he would do all that he could to help me to achieve that end. If at any time his actions should appear to me to be equivocal, he begged me to believe that it would only be because his local difficulties might at times prevent him from following a direct course, and that his intentions were sincere.

5. On my arrival at Amman a general strike was declared as a protest against the Balfour declaration and Zionism. Shops were shut and business suspended; but there were no demonstrations.

6. In accordance with the directions contained in paragraph 4 of your Lordship's despatch under acknowledgment, I enclose herewith the British copy in English and Arabic of the certificate of exchange and the Amir's instrument of ratification for retention by His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

J. R. CHANCELLOR.

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* Not printed.